



Enhancing the Supervisory Board of the Corruption Eradication Commission: Insights from Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and European Union

Mustafa Lutfi¹; Ramadhita²; Septiani³; Asrul Ibrahim Nur⁴

^{1,2,3} Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang, Indonesia

⁴ University of Debrecen, Hungary

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Abstract

Establishing the KPK Supervisory Board as a juridical consequence of Law Number 19 of 2019 is an effort to improve KPK's supervisory system. But its formation has caused many pros and cons in the community. The existence of this board is considered to weaken and hinder the performance of KPK. This study analyzes the position of the KPK Supervisory Board after Constitutional Court Decree Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019 concerning reducing the pro-Justitia authority of the Supervisory Board regarding the comparative study involving several countries. This study uses legal research with comparative and statutory approaches. The study results show that the KPK Supervisory Board, as the KPK's internal supervisory body, still requires adjustments by adopting the supervisory mechanisms implemented by comparator countries relevant to the Indonesian Legal System. Some of these are related to the mechanism of monitoring and evaluation of the performance of the KPK Supervisory Board and the KPK itself.

I. Introduction

Eradicating corruption is still a priority in Indonesia ([Umam et al., 2018](#)). Various efforts have been made, ranging from prevention to prosecution. Preventive actions are carried out through anti-corruption education ([Kurniawan et al., 2021](#)). This education is integrated into the education curriculum in elementary school to university level ([Ayuningtyas, 2020](#); [Kamil et al., 2018](#); [Kristiono, 2018](#); [Sakinah & Bakhtiar, 2019](#); [Suyadi et al., 2019](#); [Zulqarnain et al., 2022](#)). The corruption prevention is also carried out using information technology in every activity to create transparency ([Adam & Fazekas, 2021](#); [Bhattacharjee & Shrivastava, 2018](#); [Suhartati, 2016](#)). Meanwhile, regarding taking action,

the Corruption Eradication Commission (from now on, abbreviated to KPK) is on the front line to eradicate corruption in Indonesia ([Ariani & Prasetyoningsih, 2022](#); [Isra et al., 2017](#); [Oktavianto & Abheseka, 2019](#); [Ramadani & Mamonto, 2018](#); [Khrisna Lintang Satrio Nugroho, 2021](#)).

Various studies on KPK have been carried out by experts. These studies can be grouped into two categories. The first category is the studies on the performance of KPK, which are conducted by Rochman and Achwan (2016), Umam et al. (2018), Oktaviano and Abisheka (2019), Wijaya (2019), and Amanda (2019). The second category is the studies about KPK institutions, which are written by Ramadani and Mamonto (2018), Suyatmiko and Nicola (2019), Agustine et al. (2019), Wahyuningrum et al. (2020), and Novyanty (2022). The performance of KPK, particularly related to the authority in preventing corruption in Indonesia has not been optimally implemented. This is indicated by the large number of corruption cases handled by the Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission, the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Indonesian National Police. In addition, as an independent institution with special authority in eradicating corruption, KPK has a high potential for abuse of power. That was one of the reasons for establishing KPK Supervisory Board. Nevertheless, the existence of KPK Supervisory Board reduces KPK's authority. According to those studies, both KPK and KPK Supervisory Board must have a good cooperative synergy to improve their performance in eradicating corruption in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, the KPK Supervisory Board is a part of the preventive measure to prevent the abuse of KPK's authority and to improve KPK's internal communication relations, which require an improvement ([Salim, 2019](#); [Sudarti, 2021](#)). Without a proper supervision, KPK is prone to abuse, which involves irresponsible power holders. The indications of the abuse of authority committed by the Corruption Eradication Commission, violations of the law committed by KPK Commissioners, and violations of the code of ethics committed by the leader or forerunner of KPK have led to the formation of KPK Supervisory Board ([Manday, 2018](#)). The supervision of KPK, which was previously considered less effective as evidenced by the case of the extortion of witnesses committed by KPK investigators in 2006 and embezzlement cases of KPK funds committed by KPK employees, is expected to have a better performance with the establishment of the KPK Supervisory Board.

In its practice, the existence of KPK Supervisory Board hampers KPK's performance. The authority or pro-justitia authority in the law enforcement process that KPK Supervisory Board has, in terms of granting permits to conduct wiretapping, investigation, and prosecution, is deemed to have harmed the independence of KPK in enforcing the law. It should be noted that KPK Supervisory Board is not a law enforcement institution, so its judicial authority can be referred to as a form of violation of KPK's authority as a law enforcement institution. The declining performance of KPK in the practice of eradicating corruption, especially in prevention and prosecution, and the influence of KPK Supervisory Board are inextricable ([Suyatmiko & Nicola, 2019](#)).

Based on the results of a survey conducted by the Indonesian Political Indicator Survey Institute, after the establishment of KPK Supervisory Board, the level of public trust has decreased. Prior to the revision of the KPK Law, the public's trust in KPK reached 84.8 percent before it gradually decreased to 80.5 percent in February, 2019; 73.5 percent in September, 2020; 71.1 percent in November, 2021; and 71.7 percent in December, 2021.

However, the pro-justitia authority that KPK Supervisory Board possesses has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court based on the Constitutional Court Decree Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019. Thus, it is necessary to improve and readjust the duties and functions of KPK Supervisory Board. Given that the effectiveness of KPK supervision also plays a role in the process of handling corruption crimes, the authority of the KPK in the practice of eradicating corruption is not taken advantage of by other parties, both internal and external parts of KPK institution. The Constitutional Court Decree Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019 is the first step to improve the supervisory system implemented by KPK Supervisory Board in carrying out its function as a KPK supervisory agency.

To realize legal reforms to maximize the work effectiveness of KPK Supervisory Board in the future, comparisons can be made against agencies that have similar authority to KPK Supervisory Boards in other countries. The European Union has an institution called the Supervisory Committee of OLAF, an Advisory Committee of ICAC in Hong Kong, and the General Attorney of the United Kingdom as an anti-corruption supervisory board in the UK. The supervisory system for anti-corruption agencies in the three countries applies the same system that is a monitoring system. The implementation of the supervisory model with a monitoring system will work well if the anti-corruption agency and its supervisory agency coordinate well with each other, allowing for checks and balances between the two institutions. However, it should be noted that the implementation of a monitoring system in supervision has several disadvantages. The supervisory agency must be active and thorough in every stage of monitoring, starting from monitoring, examining, to controlling KPK. Furthermore, the supervisory agency must ensure whether the advice given in each evaluation is implemented or not. Even though they have different legal systems, the practice of corruption supervision in the three countries mentioned above do not conflict with the Indonesian legal system.

The success of dealing with corruption cases cannot be separated from the role of supervisory institutions. Thus, the extent of authority given to corruption eradication institutions in these countries can be carried out optimally. Based on the aforementioned issues, this study analyzes the position of KPK Supervisory Board after studying the Constitutional Court Decree Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019 compared to other similar institutions in several countries.

This study uses legal research with statutory and comparative approaches. It also involves a process carried out to find legal rules, legal principles, or legal doctrines to respond to the existing legal issues and provide solutions ([Efendi & Ibrahim, 2018](#)).

The normative method used includes several matters covering principles, norms, rules derived from laws and regulations, court decisions, doctrines, and agreements ([Fajar ND & Achmad, 2010](#)). Arguments, theories, or new concepts that function as prescriptions for solving legal problems are the objectives of legal studies ([Marzuki, 2007](#)).

II. The KPK Supervisory Board's Position and Authority

The formation of KPK Supervisory Board is one of the legal consequences of the revision of KPK Law. Article 21 paragraph (1) letter a of Law Number 19 of 2019 states that KPK Supervisory Board is a part of KPK. Prior to the revision of the law concerning KPK, KPK Institution is not associated with a Supervisory Board. Hence, there were provisions related to the Supervisory Board as contained in the Corruption Eradication Commission Law Number 19 of 2019 resulting in the need for the formation of a Supervisory Board to realize the mandate contained in the law. The establishment of this Supervisory Board aims to oversee the implementation of the duties and authorities of KPK. KPK Supervisory Board consists of 5 (five) members with a four-year office term, and they are appointed as well as declared by the President of the Republic of Indonesia. KPK Supervisory Board officially started its duties as the executor of KPK supervisory function after being sworn in on December 20, 2019 ([Farisa, 2021](#); [Ihsanuddin, 2019](#)).

Based on Article 37B of Law Number 19 of 2019 before the Constitutional Court Decree Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019, KPK Supervisory Board has the following duties: 1) supervising the implementation of the duties and authorities of the Corruption Eradication Commission; 2) granting or not granting permission for wiretapping, investigation, and prosecution; 3) developing and stipulating a code of ethics for the leaders and employees of the Corruption Eradication Commission; 4) receiving and following up on public reports regarding alleged violations of the code of ethics involving the leaders and employees of the Corruption Eradication Commission or violations of the provisions of this Law; 5) holding a trial to examine the alleged violation of the code of ethics involving the leaders and employees of the Corruption Eradication Commission; and 6) periodically evaluating the performance of the Corruption Eradication Commission's leaders and employees once a year. In the practice, KPK Supervisory Board has hindered KPK's performance because of granting the permits for wiretapping, investigation, and prosecution.

This is proven by the decrease in the number of cases that KPK had successfully dealt with. Based on the data from the Law and Judiciary Monitoring Division of Indonesia Corruption Watch, there were 120 cases targeted by KPK in 2021. However, only 32 cases were handled by KPK. In addition, based on the data of the corruption crime statistics, there has been a significant decrease in the number of arrest where the alleged people were caught red-handed (henceforth referred to as OTT arrests), in which KPK only conducted 7 OTT arrests during 2021 and 2020. This number had decreased significantly

to 21 cases in 2019 from 30 cases in 2018. These data indicate that the existence of KPK Supervisory Board hindered KPK's performance, especially in investigation process, so the prosecution of corruption cases decreased and did not run efficiently.

After the Constitutional Court Decree Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019, Article 37B paragraph (1) letter b was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, the authority of KPK in terms of granting wiretapping, search, and/or confiscation permits had no binding legal force. Nonetheless, the Supervisory Board still has the authority to supervise the implementation of wiretapping, searches, and/or confiscations by KPK through a monitoring mechanism based on the reports made by KPK to the Supervisory Board. The existence of KPK Supervisory Board in the institution replaces the supervisory function that was previously held by the Internal Supervision and Public Complaints Division.

Moreover, the authority of the Supervisory Board in dealing with alleged violations of the code of ethics of KPK leaders and employees also replaces the position of the Employee Advisory Council (DPP). DPP was previously assigned to deal with the allegations of serious violations committed by KPK advisors and employees as well as the Ethics Committee. Ethics Committee was previously assigned to deal with the allegations of ethical and behavioral violations committed by KPK leaders. Prior to the existence of KPK Supervisory Board, KPK had a special institution that functioned to carry out internal supervision of KPK, namely the Audit charter. It is the only functional institution for KPK's internal supervisory that is allowed to directly summon and order KPK leaders to attend examinations due to ethical violation reports. The Director for the Development of Inter-Commission Networks and KPK Agencies stated that the Audit Charter has dismissed the KPK Director from his position because he did not stay at a hotel while he was on duty in Australia. However, he stayed at the Indonesian Embassy's Wisma in the capital, Canberra.

Thus, it can be concluded that KPK Supervisory Board has the position as an internal supervisory agency for the implementation of the duties and authorities of KPK. Inherently, KPK Supervisory Board is an internal part of KPK as the executor of the supervisory function. Its position in KPK institution is not hierarchical with the leaders of KPK. Hence, in the grand design of corruption eradication practices, the Supervisory Board and KPK leaders do not supervise each other but synergize with each other in carrying out their respective duties and functions.

III. Legal Politics of Reducing the Authority of the KPK Supervisory Board in Constitutional Court Decision No. 70/PUU-XVII/2019

After the Constitutional Court declared that Law Number 19 of 2019 Article 37B Paragraph (1) letter b and Article 47 Paragraph (2) Article 37B Paragraph (1) letter b and Article 47 Paragraph (2) unconstitutional, the authority of the Supervisory Board in terms of permits to do wiretapping, search, and/or confiscation no longer has any

binding legal force. KPK Supervisory Board is no longer authorized to demand that KPK obtains permission before conducting wiretapping, search, and/or confiscation. The Constitutional Court argues that the act of wiretapping, searching, and/or confiscating is part of the authority of *pro justitia*, where this authority is only held by law enforcement agencies such as the police, prosecutors, courts, and KPK which have law enforcement functions. The authority of the Supervisory Board in granting wiretapping, search, and/or confiscation permits is considered inappropriate, considering that KPK Supervisory Board is not a part of law enforcement agencies or institutions that have law enforcement functions. The granting of judicial authority to a non-law enforcement agencies is a form of action that can threaten the independence of law enforcement agencies.

The authority of the Supervisory Board in terms of granting wiretapping, search, and/or confiscation permits, apart from being a part of the *pro-justitia* authority, which is outside the scope of the authority of non-law enforcement agencies, cannot be implemented. It is due to the reason of prioritizing the integrity factor to protect the dignity of KPK to avoid misusing its authority. The existence of extra-legal/extra-judicial institutions is a form of intervention against legal institutions. This intervention is likely to threaten the independence of law enforcement agencies and weaken the existence of the rule of law principle. In addition, the Supervisory Board, which incidentally is not a law enforcement agency, can use its *pro-justitia* authority to control KPK due to certain political interests. The following is a comparison of the authority of KPK Supervisory Board before and after the Constitutional Court Decree Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019.

Table 1. The Comparison of the Authorities of the KPK Supervisory Board

No.	Law Number 19 of 2019	Constitutional Court Decision Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019
1.	Article 12 C Paragraph (2) states that the wiretapping as referred to in Article 12 Paragraph (1), which has been completed, must be accounted for to the Head of the Corruption Eradication Commission and the Supervisory Board no later than 14 (fourteen) working days as of the wiretapping is completed.	The wiretapping in Article 12 Paragraph (1) must be accounted for to the Head of the Corruption Eradication Commission and notified to the Supervisory Board no later than 14 (fourteen) working days after the wiretapping is completed.
2.	Article 40 Paragraph (2) states that the termination of the investigation and prosecution as referred to in paragraph (1) must be reported to the Supervisory Board no later than 1 (one) week as of the issuance of the order for the termination of the investigation and prosecution.	The termination of the investigation and prosecution as referred to in paragraph (1) shall be notified to the Supervisory Board no later than 14 (fourteen) working days as of the issuance of the order for the termination of the investigation and prosecution.
3.	Article 47 paragraph (1) states that during the investigation process, investigators may conduct searches and confiscations with written approval from the Supervisory Board.	During the investigation process, investigators may conduct searches and confiscations by notifying the Supervisory Board.

Based on the table, the change of the Supervisory Board authority is only judicial authorities or authorities in the law enforcement process, while other authorities related to the supervisory function remain the same as stated in Law Number 19 of 2019. There is also a reduction in the board authority to maintain the integrity of the Supervisory Board. The Constitutional Court decision improves laws violating the existing legal regulations. From the perspective of constitutional democracy, the reduction in the authority of the Supervisory Board is a form of limitation of power. It is performed by the Constitutional Court considering the Supervisory Board authority that is not in accordance with the existing legal regulation (Asshiddiqie, 2009). It includes all institutions formed by laws. If the decision of the Constitutional Court states that the authority of these institutions is contrary to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court can reduce this authority. Thus, the reduction of the authority of KPK Supervisory Board, after the Constitutional Court Decision Number 70/PUU-XVII/2019 was issued, is implemented to prevent the Supervisory Board to use its authority for certain political interests. In addition, the Constitutional Court in its legal considerations emphasizes that in a true constitutional state, it is impossible to intervene these legal institutions, including that extralegal/extra-judicial institutions will not be given judiciary authority for becoming a threat to the independence of law enforcement agencies, which in turn can weaken the existence of the rule of law principle.

IV. Comparison of Anti-Corruption Institutions Supervision Models in Several Countries

The Supervisory Committee is an institution authorized to oversee the implementation of the tasks and functions of the European anti-fraud office (office European de Lutte anti-roude OLAF). OLAF is an institution to eradicate corruption in the European Union by applying the rules found in the Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Replacing Article 280 of the EC Treaty) as the legal basis for eradicating corruption (Pujas, 2003). OLAF was established on April 28, 1999, based on the Decision 1999/352/EC, ESC, Euratom ([European Anti-Fraud Office, 2022a](#)) with three main tasks of conducting independent investigations on fraud and corruption involving EU funds, conducting investigations on serious violations committed by EU staff and members of EU Institutions, and developing anti-corruption policies in the European Union ([European Anti-Fraud Office, 2022b](#)).

The 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index report released by Transparency International shows that the top 10 cleanest countries in the world out of a total of 180 countries included in the assessment is still dominated by European countries ([Javier, 2022](#)). It shows that the corruption level in the European Union is very low compared to other countries in the world. The success of the practice of eradicating corruption cannot be separated from the implementation of good supervision to allow for effective and efficient corruption eradication practices and optimal control over the authority held by the related corruption eradication institution.

The Supervisory Committee, based on the Regulation 883/2013, has a role in monitoring the implementation of OLAF duties and functions on a regular basis, especially related to the investigation function ([The European Parliament and The Council, 2022](#)). It is an independent institution carrying out the supervisory function of OLAF. It consists of five expert members for five years of employment. All members are appointed based on a mutual agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Commission ([Supervisory Committee of OLAF, 2022](#)). The supervisory mechanism implemented by the Supervisory Committee is associated with the use of a monitoring mechanism. In carrying out its supervisory function, the Supervisory Committee has several tasks. Those are providing opinions to the Director General of OLAF regarding the activities that have been carried out and examining as well as distributing annual reports on OLAF performance to European Union institutions for further evaluation. The tasks also include reporting the results of OLAF investigations and determining follow-up actions against the results of the investigation.

Similar with the European Union, Hong Kong is one of the countries that has a low level of corruption. According to the 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index, Hong Kong is ranked 12th out of 180 countries. Hong Kong has successfully earned the title as one of the most corruption-free regions in Asia ([Manion, 2004](#)). By applying three approach methods, namely law enforcement, prevention, and anti-corruption education for the community, The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was established on February 15, 1974. It acts as an institution authorized to eradicate corruption in Hong Kong. This measure is considered to have succeeded in eradicating corruption in Hong Kong. ICAC consists of four main departments, namely the Operations Department (Law Enforcement), the Corruption Prevention Department (Prevention), the Public Relations Department (Law Enforcement), and the International Cooperation and Corporate Services Department (International cooperation and administrative support).

ICAC is one of the most successful anti-corruption agencies in the world, having an important role in changing the culture of corruption in Hong Kong and transforming it into one of the most corruption-free regions in Asia ([LaMagna, 1999](#)). Its effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with corruption cases in Hong Kong make it a role model for anti-corruption agencies that are widely adopted and imitated by various countries in the world ([de Sousa, 2010](#)). In addition, it is also known as an independent anti-corruption institution that has a good checks and balances mechanism by implementing double supervision in carrying out its duties. ICAC has an external monitoring system carried out by the executive council, legislative council, and Advisory Committee as well as an internal monitoring system implemented by the Internal Investment and Monitoring Group. It functions to maintain the integrity of ICAC and all ICAC employees and the ICAC Complaints Committee in charge of reviewing non-criminal complaints related to ICAC and ICAC staff ([Surahmad, 2021](#)).

The Advisory Committee is an institution functions to supervise the implementation of ICAC's duties and authorities. Its members are appointed by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Government who come from cross-sectoral components of society. The Advisory Committees aims to oversee ICAC's performance ([Shafiqul Huque, 1995](#)) and provides recommendations to ICAC and ensure the realization of these recommendations ([Djaja, 2008](#)). The Advisory Committee consists of 4 committees. First, it is the advisory committee on corruption, which is responsible for supervising ICAC's organizational policies and operations. Second, it is the advisory review committee, which is responsible for examining the reports of alleged corruption and reviewing investigations and other activities run by the Operations Department. Third, it is the corruption prevention advisory committee, which is responsible for the supervision of the Corruption Prevention Council through providing advice regarding priority studies of prevention. The fourth one is the citizens advisory committee on community relations, which is responsible for the supervision of the Department of Public Relations. It is particularly regarding the evaluations related to public education concerning the efforts to combat corruption ([Surahmad, 2021](#)).

Apart from the European Union and Hong Kong, the United Kingdom is also one of the regions with the lowest levels of corruption in the world. The United Kingdom, based on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2021, is ranked 11th out of 180 countries. It indicates that the United Kingdom is quite clean from corruption cases. The United Kingdom has a Serious Fraud Office (SFO) as a special agency established to eradicate corruption in the United Kingdom. The SFO is a prosecution authority with the power to deal with various matters relating to fraud, bribery, and high-level corruption. It is a part of the United Kingdom justice system covering England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The SFO is established following public dissatisfaction with the UK's anti-corruption system in 1988, where its establishment complies with the basis of the Criminal Justice Act 1987.

In contrast to the European Union and Hong Kong, which have special supervisory agencies that oversee the performance of anti-corruption agencies in their respective countries, the supervision of the SFO is a part of the authority of the Attorney General of the United Kingdom. When it carries out its duties and functions, SFO is under the supervision of the Attorney General of the United Kingdom. The Attorney General has the authority to hold the SFO accountable for the implementation of his duties and authorities. The director of the SFO is also required to make regular reports to the Attorney General regarding the progress and developments experienced by the SFO in performing his duties and authorities based on the strategic plan that has been set. Based on the explanation above, the following compares the supervisory model between KPK Supervisory Board, Supervisory Committee of OLAF, Advisory Committee of ICAC, and the Attorney General of the United Kingdom.

Table 2. Agencies of the KPK Supervisory Board in various countries

Information	Indonesia	European Union	United Kingdom	Hong Kong
Position	KPK's internal supervisory agency	OLAF external supervisory agency	Chief legal adviser to the Crown	ICAC external supervisory agency
Institution Name	KPK Supervisory Board	Supervisory Committee of OLAF	Attorney General of the United Kingdom	Advisory Committee of ICAC
Appointment	Appointed by the President	Appointed through the agreement of the European Parliament, Council of the European Union, and the European Commission	Appointed by the Queen of the United Kingdom, European Union, and the European Commission	Appointed by the Chief Executive of the Government of Hong Kong
Character	Dependent, which is a part of the KPK agency	Independent	Independent	Independent
Number of Members	5	5	1	4 commissions
Supervision Form	Internal	External	External	External
Monitoring Mechanism	Monitoring and evaluation	Monitoring	Monitoring and accountability	Monitoring

Based on the comparison above, the institutional model of the KPK Supervisory Board in Indonesia is similar to the KPK Supervisory Board in the US, UK, and Hong Kong, except for the nature and form of supervision. The agency of KPK Supervisory Board in Indonesia is dependent; it is an organization with KPK agency. It is different from the other three countries where the Supervisory Board is independent. It affects the form of supervision. The form of supervision carried out by KPK Supervisory Board is internal supervision. It is different from the other three countries whose supervision is external supervision. Based on it, the agency of KPK Supervisory Board should be emphasized and differentiated from KPK agency itself so that the supervisory process can run more optimally. It can also prevent overlapping powers between KPK agency and the Supervisory Board. In addition, the following compares the powers of the above agencies.

Table 3. The Comparison of the Authorities of the KPK Supervisory Board in various countries

No.	Institution	Authority
1.	KPK Supervisory Board	Supervising the implementation of the duties and authorities of the KPK; Developing and establishing a code of ethics for KPK Leaders and Employees; Receiving and following up on reports from the public regarding alleged violations of the code of ethics by KPK Leaders and Employees or violations of statutory provisions; Holding a trial to examine allegations of violations of the code of ethics by KPK Leaders and Employees; Evaluating the performance of KPK Leaders and Employees periodically 1 (one) time in 1 (one) year.
2.	Supervisory Committee of OLAF	Expressing opinions to the Director General of OLAF regarding the implementation of OLAF activities without disturbing the ongoing investigation process; Receiving annual reports on the implementation of OLAF tasks and distributing them to EU institutions; Receiving reports on the results of OLAF investigations and submitting them to European Union institutions and providing advice on what actions to take based on the results of these investigations.
3.	General Attorney of the United Kingdom	Receiving regular reports from the Director of the SFO regarding the progress and development of the strategic plan that has been prepared by the SFO; Receiving information related to budget and other financial matters; Receiving information related to various actual problems that have the potential to affect the administration of government and legal developments.
4.	Advisory Committees	Supervising the duties and authorities of the ICAC, especially in terms of law enforcement, prevention, and anticorruption education; Providing advice and input related to the results of the implementation of ICAC's duties in the fields of law enforcement, prevention, and education; Providing recommendations to ICAC on other matters and ensuring that these recommendations are properly implemented.

The authority of several supervisory agencies, as presented in the table above, is the same: to supervise the implementation of the duties and functions of anti-corruption agencies in each country. It can be achieved by implementing a monitoring mechanism to carry out most of their supervisory functions. The differences in the rules used, the environment, and the challenges of eradicating corruption that varies from one country

to another produce different result in dealing with corruption. Based on the comparison above, the supervisory model carried out by the Advisory Committee of ICAC is an ideal example to be applied in Indonesia. Even though Hong Kong has a different legal system from Indonesia, the monitoring mechanism for anti-corruption agencies in Hong Kong, implemented by the Advisory Committee of ICAC, does not conflict with legal values in Indonesia. Therefore, it can be adopted to improve KPK supervisory mechanism in Indonesia.

The existence of supervisory agencies is a form of control to maintain the dignity of anti-corruption agencies to avoid actions that have the potential to produce the abuse of power. The number of authorities possessed by each anti-corruption agency has great potential to be exploited by certain parties holding power. Thus, the Supervisory Board plays a role in preventing it. By monitoring and evaluating the performance of each anti-corruption agency, possible violations, or practices of eradicating corruption that contravene applicable legal provisions can be avoided as early as possible. As the supervisory model carried out by the Supervisory Committee of OLAF, authorized to request regular reports related to OLAF performance, the Advisory Committee of ICAC implements double supervision in its external and internal supervision. The Attorney General of the United Kingdom is authorized to hold accountable for the implementation of the duties and authorities of the SFO. The active participation of supervisory agency in its supervisory function is the key to achieving optimal supervisory effectiveness. However, it should be noted that in carrying out supervision, supervisory agency is not allowed to interfere with the performance of the agencies being supervised. It means that the supervisory function should not be used to hinder the process of eradicating corruption. In addition, good cooperation between supervisory and supervised anti-corruption agency is also a determining factor in the success of corruption eradication practices.

V. Conclusion

The Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) is an agency with a law enforcement function. Apart from having the authority to carry out investigations, inquiries, and prosecutions for criminal acts of corruption, KPK also has *pro justitia* power. This *pro justitia* authority supports the actions to eradicate corruption, such as wiretapping, searches, and confiscations. To prevent the abuse of power due to the extent of authority, KPK Supervisory Board was formed to carry out more effective supervision on the implementation of the duties and functions of KPK. After the Constitutional Court (CC) Decree Number 70/PUU/XVII/2019 was issued, the supervisory mechanism for judicial authority owned by KPK has changed from the mechanism of licensing to monitoring. The reduction in the authority of the Supervisory Board is carried out with the consideration that the judicial authority possessed by the Supervisory Board, which incidentally is not a law enforcement agency, is a form of intervention against legal institution. It is likely to threaten the independence of law

enforcement agencies in carrying out their duties and functions. It should be put in mind that in eradicating corruption, the relationship between KPK Supervisory Board and KPK leaders is not about supervising each other but synergizing while carrying out their respective duties and functions. The Supervisory Committee of OLAF, the Advisory Committee of ICAC, and the Attorney General of the United Kingdom are some of the supervisory models owned by several countries with a fairly high level of success in the practice of eradicating corruption in the European Union, Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom. In optimizing the implementation of KPK supervision, the three agencies mentioned above can be acknowledged as the role models for supervising anti-corruption agency in Indonesia.

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