



## Fast-Track Legislation: The Transformation of Law-Making Under Joko Widodo's Administration

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
### Abstract

Since the end of 2019, the President and the House of Representatives have performed different legislative functions. Since the Law on the Commission Eradication Commission was amended, legislation had dramatically been transformed. Several laws have been passed and amended quickly. This study discusses three legal issues. First, the conceptual limitation of fast-track legislation in Indonesia. Second, the rationale behind fast-track legislation under Joko Widodo's administration. Third, the impact of fast-track legislation under Joko Widodo's administration. In this socio-legal study, a qualitative analysis was conducted. This study has identified that (1) fast-track legislation in Indonesia can only be adopted through Perpu with all its exemptions and exceptions; (2) the transformation of law-making under Joko Widodo's administration is associated with political pragmatism, political personalization, the elimination of the opposition, and cartel parties; and (3) the transformation of law-making under Joko Widodo's administration is detrimental to the future of Indonesia's democracy. The transformation has degraded the quality of deliberation in law-making. Besides, it does not adhere to law-making procedures, resulting in elitist and conservative laws.

### I. Introduction

Since the Law on the Commission Eradication Commission (KPK) was amended, some legislation has dramatically been transformed. Several laws have been passed and amended quickly, e.g. Law Number 19 of 2019 on the Second Amendment to Law Number 30 of 2002 on the Commission Eradication of Corruption (KPK Law), Law Number 13 of 2019 on the Third Amendment to Law Number 17 of 2014 on the People's Consultative

Assembly, House of Representatives, Regional Representative Council, and Regional People’s Representative Councils amendment to the Parliament Law (*MD3 Law*), Law Number 3 of 2020 on the Amendment to Law Number 4 of 2009 on the amendment to the Mineral and Coal Mining Law (*Minerba Law*), Law Number 7 of 2020 on the Third Amendment to Law Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court (*MK Law*), and Law Number 3 of 2022 on the State Capital State Capital Law (*IKN Law*). This graph shows how briefly those laws were discussed.



**Figure 1: Five Quickly-Passed Laws**  
Source: Reviewed by the authors

In 2019-2021, the data above shows the duration reflects the number of working days from the bill submission to the ratification. On average, the President and House (DPR) discussed and jointly approved several bills in less than ten working days. This table depicts how many working days it took to discuss and jointly approve those bills.


**Table 1: The Duration of the Discussion and Joint Approval**

No	Law	Discussion & Joint Approval	Year	Working Days
1.	Amendment to the <i>KPK</i> Law	September 13–September 17	2019	Five working days
2.	Amendment to the <i>MD3</i> Law	September 11–September 16	2019	Six working days
3.	Amendment to the <i>MK</i> Law	August 24–August 27	2020	Four working days
4.	Amendment to the <i>Minerba</i> Law	6 May-12 May	2020	Seven working days
5.	<i>IKN</i> Law	11 January-17 January	2022	Seven working days

**Source: Reviewed by the authors**

This phenomenon is worth discussing specifically. The fast-track legislation does not comply with law-making procedures. Since the end of 2019, more petitions against

the procedural flaws of quickly-passed laws have been lodged with the Constitutional Court (MK). This chart depicts the number of petitions against the procedural flaws.



**Figure 2: The Number of Petitions against Procedural Violations at Constitutional Court**

**Source: Public Relations, Indonesian Constitutional Court 2022**

It is obvious that fast-track legislation does not adhere to procedures and is detrimental to the substance of the law. There have been 47 petitions against procedural flaws, but the number has increased dramatically since 2019. In addition, procedural violations are associated with unconstitutional legislation. To rephrase it, the former leads to the latter. Based on the background, this study discusses fast-track legislation under Joko Widodo's administration. This study discusses three things. *First* is the conceptual limitation of fast-track legislation in Indonesia. *Second*, the rationale behind fast-track legislation under Joko Widodo's administration. *Third*, the impact of fast-track legislation under Joko Widodo's administration. This study only engages with the amendment to the MD3 Law, the KPK Law, the Minerba Law, the MK Law, and the State Capital Law (IKN Law).

This research is a socio-legal study under the Joko Widodo administration. Due to this research focusing on the type of socio-legal research, the types of data used are primary and secondary. Primary data was collected from 121 Association of Constitutional and Administrative Law Lecturers members in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. This survey employed the purposive random sampling method involving lecturers and researchers of Law and Legal Drafting to explore the public perception of how quickly those five laws were made. Secondary data was obtained from rules, books, and journals. The analysis in this study was carried out qualitatively. This study is limited to five products of law under Jokowi's, among these, the KPK Law, the amendment to the MD3 Law, the amendment to the Minerba Law, the amendment to the MK Law, and the State Capital Law (IKN Law).

## II. Analysis and Discussion

### 1. Fast-Track Legislation in Indonesia

There is no time limit to law-making. Under our regulations, a bill can even be carried over. If the discussion is heated, the bill may be discussed in another session. In other words, under the provisions of the 1945 Constitution and the Law of Establishment of Regulation, the quality of deliberation is preferred over fast-track legislation. However, constitutions often allow laws to be made quickly. The phenomenon can frequently be found under the presidential system.

In several countries, *emergency decrees* are known as *constitutional decree authority*. Some scholars call them *executive decree authority* or *presidential decree authority*. In Brazil, for example, the decrees are known as *medidas provisórias* (*provisional measures*) or “*tindakan sementara*” in Indonesian. In Argentina, they are *decreto de necesidad y urgencia* (*decrees of necessity and urgency*). Under the presidential system, the authority is the *president's legislative power*. Thus, the president can issue *presidential decrees* or *emergency decrees*, veto bills, introduce specific bills, draw up the national legislation program priority list, call for referendums or plebiscites, and submit state budget bills (Negretto, 2011).

With the *constitutional decree authority* under the presidential system, the president may make a regulation in lieu of law in certain circumstances that come into force immediately without legislative deliberation. Nonetheless, the regulation must be approved by the parliament. Otherwise, it must be revoked. As noted by Gabriel L. Negretto, CDA is often explicitly allowed by the constitution or court ruling. Besides, the authority is only wielded under difficult circumstances without the ordinary legislative procedure. Thus, the regulation immediately comes into force with no legislative deliberation. (Arsil & Ayuni, 2020)

Article 62 of Brazil's Constitution of 1988 says that the president may make regulations in lieu of law (*presidential legislative decrees*). Those regulations immediately come into force without being approved by the parliament. Nonetheless, they may only be issued in *relevant and urgent* cases. Within 30 days, the parliament must approve or reject the provisional measures. If rejected, they must be revoked.

The authority is also granted by Argentina's Constitution of 1994. However, Presidents Raul Alfonsín and Carlos Menem exercised it in 1983 and 1990 by issuing emergency decrees supported by the Supreme Court. In 1994, it started

to be guaranteed by the constitution. Argentina's Constitution of 1994 says that the president can issue decrees under exceptional circumstances that immediately come into force. The decrees can be issued to implement different policies.

Nonetheless, they may not be focused on criminal issues, taxation, electoral matters, or the system of political parties. The decrees must be submitted to and discussed within ten days by the parliament. In Ecuador, the president may propose bills qualified as urgent on economic matters to the National Assembly. Then, the *National Assembly* must adopt, amend, or reject the bills within 30 days. The president can enact the decrees when the National Assembly does not decide within the time limits. (Arsil & Ayuni, 2020).

In Indonesia, the 1945 Constitution also allows laws to be made quickly. It says the president can make regulations in lieu of law (*Perpu*). However, the authority is limited. *Perpu* is a necessary evil. It may be unpopular, but it cannot be avoided. *Perpu* can only be issued under exceptional circumstances when there is a legal vacuum or insufficient law. (Manan & Harijanti, 2017) The exceptional circumstances are associated with the urgent need to make interim laws quickly. The circumstances arise from (i) *proportional legal necessity, limited time*, and the need for an unusual procedure (Huda, 2016).


Nevertheless, the authority lacks public participation and deliberation. Thus, *Perpu* may only be issued under exceptional circumstances or without using a normal procedure. Without the “*exceptional circumstances*”, the normal procedure must be followed. Therefore, the five laws in this study should not be made quickly. In other words, they should have been made by going through the normal procedure. As there were no exceptional circumstances, there should have been public participation.

## 2. The rationale behind the Transformation of Law-making

From 2019 to 2022, five laws have been made through fast-track deliberation. There are four root causes of this phenomenon, i.e. political pragmatism, political personalization, the elimination of the opposition, and cartel parties.

### a. Political Pragmatism

Legislation has tended to be fast-tracked as the target of *prolegnas* has not been met from 2019 to 2022. The fast-track legislation prevents too many bills from being deliberated during the lame-duck session. This chart compares the targets and realizations of *prolegnas* in each term.



**Figure 3: Targets and Realizations of *Prolegnas***  
**Source: Reviewed by the authors**

Legislation has tended to be fast-tracked as the target of *prolegnas* has yet to be met from 2019 to 2022. We analyze that the data above shows that each regime has low legislation achievement. At this point, the fast-track legislation between the president and the House becomes a pragmatic choice to generate more product of legislation. The fast-track legislation prevents too many bills from being deliberated during the lame-duck session. From 2019 to 2022, fifteen laws have been made, i.e. the amendment to the *Minerba* Law, the amendment to the *MK* Law, the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, the State Capital Law, the Sexual Violence Law, the Amendment to the Papuan Special Autonomy Law, the Law on Fiscal Relations between the Central Government and Regions, the Tax Law, the Amendment to the Law on the Attorney General’s Office, the National Sports System Law, the Amendment to the Roads Law, the Psychological Practice Law, and three laws on high courts.

#### **b. Political Personalization**

The “social contract” in law-making has become “unilateral” as if it adheres to democratic principles. Elite and public interests are poles apart. After the reform, rent-seeking, instead of political ideologies and policy preferences, has been common among political parties.

As a consequence, law-making has lacked public participation. This conditions is what Dixon and Landau call a new authoritarianism under liberal democracy. In their book *Abusive Constitutional Borrowing: Legal Globalization and the Subversion of liberal democracy*, they show that constitutionalism has not been able to end the abuse of power. Meanwhile, authoritarians have taken advantage of liberal democracy. In recent decades ([Landau, 2021](#)), there has been democratic regression owing to *lawfare*, i.e.




the abuse of law and law enforcement agencies by political actors to their advantage. This politicization of law undermines the protection of human rights, the supremacy of law, and civil society organizations, particularly those playing the role of the opposition ([Warburton, 2021](#)).

After the Reform, political parties in Indonesia have not undergone institutional transformations. This phenomenon stems from three things. First, party patronage. As noted by Mair and Spirova, patronage leads to power monopolies ([Petr Kopecky, Peter Mair, 2012](#)). The absence of intra-party democracy undermines ideologies as the elite dominate ([R. S. K. & P. Mair, 1995](#)). Thus, they also influence decisions. ([William P. Cross, 2013](#)).

Second, client politics between parties and those providing financial resources. For this reason, parties tend to represent business people instead of the general public ([Gunther, 2001](#)). Third, party personalization. Since the reform, parties have not been collective entities, but they have represented their founders or symbols. Cross argues that party personalization can be seen during campaigns when parties rely on figures instead of ideas to boost their electability ([William P. Cross, Richard S. Katz, 2018](#)). As Klima observes, this phenomenon is known as the privatization of politics in Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union collapsed. Consequently, candidates and cadres are chosen through clientelism instead of the merit system ([Klima, 2018](#)).

### c. The Elimination of the Opposition

The absence of the opposition has led to the absence of deliberation in law-making.



**Figure 5: The Ruling Coalition and Opposition (Jokowi-Ma'ruf)**

*Source: Reviewed by the authors*

In Jokowi's second term, Gerindra joined the ruling coalition, leaving PKS as the only opposition, but the Democrats have remained neutral. From this data, it is clear that the ruling coalition dominates the parliament. In other words, after democratic consolidation, the President and DPR have been *blended*. The relationship is common under the parliamentary

system, in which political parties in the parliament promote policies made by the president and government (Katz, 2007). As Linz points out, the presidential system needs no coalition. Thus, under the presidential system, the relationship should be anti-party. To rephrase it, the executive and legislative branches should be separated without a coalition (Richard Gunther, José Ramón Montero, 2002). However, after the reform, there has been complexity in Indonesia. There has been no dominant force under Indonesia's multiparty system. This circumstance is what Siaroff calls the extreme multiparty system (Siaroff, 2000). Consequently, it is hard to make political decisions, and a coalition is formed in the parliament (Crotty, 2005). According to Romli (Romli, 2018), there are two coalition models:

**Table 2: Coalition Models**

Policy Blind Coalitions Theory	Policy-Based Coalitions Theory
Vying for seats	Reflecting similar policy preferences
Minimal winning coalitions (William Riker)	Minimal connected coalitions (Rober Axelrod)
"Office seeking" (gaining power)	"Policy seeking" (promoting policies to their advantage)
Less loyalty among coalition members	Loyalty to policy goals
Unpredictable as the number of parties varies	Loyalty to policy goals

The table above shows that political parties in Indonesia have forged a *blind coalition*. They can leave the coalition to galvanize opposition to the government. Ideologies and the masses have been abandoned. An *ideologically-connected coalition* remains a dream. Hence, the coalition has not been *policy-seeking* but *rent-seeking*. The coalition and opposition do not have their ideologies. They have only been *the ins* or *the outs*. In regions, the coalitions are different from the national coalition. For instance, PDIP-Gerindra formed coalitions in the East Java and South Sulawesi governor elections. Besides, PDIP and the Democrats assembled coalitions in the Central Java and West Kalimantan governor elections. In addition, PKS and PDIP built coalitions in the East Java and South Sulawesi gubernatorial elections. It shows that *office-seeking* can lead to coalitions. (Burhanudin Muhtadi, 2019) (Yuda, 2018).

#### d. Cartel Parties

The study conducted by Ambardi in 2008 reveals that political parties in Indonesia and Europe underwent different patterns of development. Throughout history, in Europe, the parties were more neatly developed. It has a huge impact on how they can gain financial support. Moreover, they



have limited capability, experience, and insight into generating revenue. From a theoretical perspective, they would systematically be reliant on the state ([Ambardi, 2008](#)).


Money allocated to political parties can undermine democracy. Politicians can leave their voters if they represent their donors. With the role of financial resources, the election has no equality. To promote transparency, political actors should reveal how much it costs to participate in politics. Elections should be well organized without money politics. In Asian countries, politics has been commercialized by its actors and businesspeople. Thus, it leads to clientelism ([Elin Falguera, Samuel Jones, 2016](#)).

Funding from the national and/or regional budgets has not been sufficient, so parties have relied on individual contributions. In almost all parties, the financial contributions have been made by their executive members or sympathizers. Consequently, the elite can influence their policies. In addition, the elite have used their parties to their advantage. In Indonesia, there are three types of rent-seeking in political parties. First, rent-seeking through the legislative branch by controlling and hijacking budget policies and legislation. Second, rent-seeking through the executive branch by deploying cadres in ministries, state-owned enterprises, or agencies with vast financial resources. Third, rent-seeking through businesspeople. In their operations and campaigns, parties have used financial resources from the businesspeople. In return, the businesspeople have been afforded access to government projects ([Faisal et al., 2018](#)).

Under Law Number 2 of 2011 on Political Parties, there are three resources for financing political parties: i.e. membership fees, legitimate contributions according to the law, and financial resources from the national and/or regional budgets. Political parties have obtained financial resources from individuals (non-members) and companies (enterprises). The law says that individuals and companies (enterprises) may only allocate no more than Rp 1 billion and Rp 7 billion, respectively. The provision limits the amount of financial resources individuals and companies can obtain. However, unequal access exists for individuals and companies (enterprises). Consequently, old or established parties have obtained resources, and all parties have engaged in cartels ([Susanto, 2017](#)).


Then, they have become cartel parties. The political cartel of the overweight coalition in the parliament has detrimental impacts on the law. As Wiratraman notes, political parties in Indonesia are still dominated by the elite incubated during the New Order era. They have influenced parties in the parliament. The cartels have consisted of influential businesspeople, military cliques, retired generals, or public officials as party founders ([Wiratraman, 2021](#)).

After the reform in Indonesia, the cartels have led parties to collude as state agents and use state resources (state parties) to survive. In this respect, parties do not act as intermediaries between the civil society and the state, but the state co-opts them. As Mair observes, the transformation into cartel parties has three stages. The stages are illustrated below (P. Mair, 1997).




**Figure 4: Political Parties as Civil Society Movements**

Initially, political parties promoted idealism as an integral part of civil society. They represent the people in political decision-making by state actors, e.g. political parties in Indonesia from 1999 to 2002. Then, they become buffers or links between the civil society and the state. In this regard, they depended on civil society and the state, e.g., political parties in Indonesia from 2003 to 2004. This model is illustrated below:



**Figure 5: Parties as Buffers/Links**

Finally, political parties become more dependent on the state. Consequently, they do not represent the general public, but they collide with government actors to exploit state resources, e.g., political parties in Indonesia from 2009 to 2024. The phenomenon is illustrated below:



**Figure 6: Parties as the Parasites of the State**

At this stage, winning elections is not the primary goal. Consequently, there is no ideological competition for seats. Parties do not compete against each other, but they exploit state resources for their survival. (Katz & Mair, 1995) This cartel has dominated Joko Widodo's administration. Electoral stability is a matter of life and death for cartel parties. Therefore, they rig elections through law-making (Hopkin, 2003). In Indonesia, for instance, cartel parties have taken advantage of the presidential and parliamentary thresholds, as noted by Katz and Mair. (R. S. K. & P. Mair, 2018).

By observing Joko Widodo's administration, Hargens confirms this thesis with a different term, i.e. oligarchic cartelization. This oligarchic cartel has dominated representative democracy in making policies at all levels and limited electoral competition to defend the status quo. After the election, there has been no newcomer in the parliament due to the domination of old parties. Gerindra joined the grand coalition during Jokowi's second term (2019-2024). In addition, most of the ministers come from political parties (Hargens, 2019).

### 3. Impact of Fast-Track Legislation

Fast-track legislation, i.e. the making of five laws, shows three things. First, the impact on the quality of deliberation. Second, the characteristics of law. Third, procedural injustice.

#### a. Poor Quality of Deliberation

This study was conducted among 121 Association of Constitutional and Administrative Law Lecturers members in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. This survey employed the purposive random sampling method involving lecturers and researchers of Law and Legal Drafting to explore the public perception of how quickly those five laws were made. It shows that 66% of the respondents rejected fast-track legislation, 29% supported it, and 3% strongly agreed.






Figure 7: Response to "Fast-Track Legislation"

This survey also shows that 91% of the respondents said making the five laws lacked public participation, 3% said it was participative, and only 1% said it was participative.



**Figure 8: Public Participation in the Formation of Laws in 2019-2022**

Regarding legislative performance in making the five laws, 89% of the respondents were disappointed, 3% were satisfied, and 1% were fully satisfied.



**Figure 9: Satisfaction of Legislative Performance**

The poor quality of deliberation has affected the legislative performance of Joko Widodo's administration, as in the making of the five laws.

#### **b. Due Process of Law-making**

Under Joko Widodo's administration, the procedure for law-making has been violated. According to Harijanti, under the rule of law, legislation should follow the procedure stipulated by law on the principles of *legislative due process*. Thus, law-making should be deliberative to make a good law (Harijanti, 2021). As Murphy observes, Harijanti says, "In the social psychological literature, procedural justice is conceptualized as involving the quality of treatment and the *quality of decision-making received by an*

authority. Criteria typically used to define procedurally just treatment include: 1) respect; 2) neutrality; 3) trustworthiness; and 4) voice". (Murphy, 2017) There are six fundamental principles of law-making in Indonesia.

**Table 3: Universal Principles of Law-making**

Indicators of Law-making	
<b>Legality (L)</b>	Legal basis, method, and technique under national law
<b>Validity (V)</b>	Accountability/compliance with procedures for law-making
<b>Participation (P)</b>	Involvement of stakeholders in political decision-making
<b>Transparency (T)</b>	Access to information at each stage of law-making
<b>Prudence (PD)</b>	Norm formulation with precise languages and structures
<b>Acceptability (A)</b>	Public acceptability of legislative performance

Sources: (Flores, 2009) (Mader, 2001) (Irianto, 2020)

First, legality requires a legal basis, method, and technique under national law. Second, validity requires compliance with the procedure for law-making. Third, stakeholders should be involved in making political decisions. Fourth, there should be access to information at every stage of law-making. Fifth, norms should be formulated prudently with clear language and structures. Sixth, public acceptability requires control over each stage of law-making.

**Table 4: Procedure Compliance Indicators**

Law	Procedure Compliance Indicators					
	(L)	(V)	(P)	(T)	(PD)	(A)
Amendment to the KPK Law	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X
Amendment to the MD3 Law	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X
Amendment to the MK Law	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X
Amendment to the Minerba Law	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X
State Capital Law (IKN Law)	✓	✓	X	X	✓	X

Law-making under Joko Widodo's administration has lacked participation, transparency, and acceptability. Sunstein and Vermeule call this the failure of legal systems where there is no participation, transparency, and public acceptability in law-making (Vermeule, 2020).

**c. Characteristics of Law**

According to Rosenfeld and Arato, political configuration affects law enforcement. Thus, authoritarian regimes lead to bias-based law enforcement (Arato, 1998). As Mahfud (1993) noted, political configuration affects the law’s characteristics. In addition, only democratic politics can lead to responsive law and uphold the rule of law. On the contrary, authoritarian politics lead to orthodox law in its making and enforcement. This phenomenon cannot be separated from how law is used to cling to power. Mahfud’s findings are illustrated below:

**Table 5: Research into Legal Policy Conducted by Mahfud**

Das Sein as a Choice	
Political Configuration (Independent Variable)	Law (Dependent Variable)
Democratic	→ Responsive-Populist
Authoritarian	→ Conservative-Elitist

Thus, there is a significant correlation between the thesis above and the five laws made under Joko Widodo’s administration. These are the impacts and characteristics of those laws.

**Table 6: Characteristics of 5 Laws Made under Joko Widodo’s Administration**

Law	Impact	Characteristics
<b>Amendment to the KPK Law</b>	KPK went from an independent authority to a body of the executive branch	<b>Conservative</b>
<b>Amendment to the MD3 Law</b>	Increasing the number of leadership positions in MPR from five to ten.	<b>Elitist Elitist</b>
<b>Amendment to the MK Law</b>	Increasing the maximum term from 10 years to 15 years	
	The transitional provisions apply to serving judges.	<b>Elitist</b>
<b>Amendment to the Minerba Law</b>	Exploration for a longer period. Previously, only two years for exploration. Under this law, mining businesspeople may control vast land for eight years and another year	
	Potential criminalization of those who oppose mining with fines and jail sentences.	
	Extending contracts of work and coal contracts of work without tenders but with a secured 20-year extension.	
<b>IKN Law</b>	Head of the Nusantara Capital City equivalent to a minister selected, appointed, and dismissed by the president upon consulting with DPR	<b>Elitist</b>
	Killing local democracy	



The data above shows a strong correlation between the fast track legislation carried out by the President and House regarding the character of the resulting legal products. As a result of the fast track intended by the president and the DPR, they were not carried out based on the general principles of law formation. The resulting legal products became elitist. The President and House tend to build a compromising, accommodative relationship with fellow interest groups and certain elites. The fast track by the President and House is a product of the government's elite interests, commonly known as autocratic legalism.

### III. Conclusion

Based on the data and analysis regarding five legislation products, law-making in Indonesia lacks public participation, transparency, and public acceptability. In the making of five laws, the fast-track legislation is abnormal. In other words, law-making procedures were not followed. Under Joko Widodo's administration, the transformation of law-making cannot be separated from political pragmatism, political personalization, the elimination of the opposition, and cartel parties. The fast-track legislation reflects autocratic legalism by representing state interest.

Consequently, the transformation is detrimental to the future of Indonesia's democracy. First, it has degraded the quality of deliberation in law-making. Besides, it does not adhere to law-making procedures, resulting in elitist and conservative laws.

Even in a fast-track environment, the President and the House must follow the procedures. Six basic principles, i.e. legality, validity, participation, transparency, prudence, and acceptability, should be applied to draft and evaluate legislation. Thus, the "rule of law" can become the "rule of a good law" in law-making. In the future, further arrangements are needed to adopt fast-track legislation between the president and the House. There is an opportunity to develop this study through research to generate the conceptual boundaries for the fast-track legislation between the President and House (DPR). In the current positive law, fast-track legislation can only be adopted through law in lieu (*perpu*) with all its exemptions and exceptions. The constitution provides no other mechanism for forming laws quickly without using the president's authority to establish law in lieu (*perpu*)

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