

Battle of Islamic Women's Discourse through Popular Culture in Post-authoritarian Indonesia

Dian Rizky Azhari^{1,*}, M. Yoesoef², Turita Indah Setyani³

¹ Sekolah Tinggi Bahasa Asing YAPARI-ABA Bandung

² Universitas Indonesia

*Corresponding author. Email: dianazhari@stba.ac.id

ABSTRACT

After the collapse of the New Order, the debate on the discourse of Islamic women developed rapidly in various directions due to the influence of ideas from both the East and the West. Islamic thinkers from within the country are being challenged by the massive influence of global Islamism and the entry of modern western culture. This very complicated battle caused each faction of thought to have to find a way to speak up and propagate their discourse in the public sphere. The most appropriate tool to spread ideology in the midst of the development of society and technology is through popular culture. It can be seen that since the collapse of the New Order, each faction of thought propagated their version of discourse through literary works, magazines, films, entertainment programs on television, social media, to everyday commercial products through their advertisements and taglines. Most of the issues they dispute relate to the role of Islamic women, women's relationships with Muslim men, daily practices as Islamic women, and the image of Islamic women, such as the use of the hijab, clothing and accessories. The results of the research then show that although there are many outside thoughts that enter Indonesian society, the discourse of Islamic women in the traditional-moderate version of Islam as a thought that has long existed in Indonesia is still the majority discourse in society.

KEYWORDS

islamic women discourse, popular culture, post-authoritarian Indonesia, battle of discourse.

1. Introduction

Women and Islam were two discourses that were repressed during the New Order era. The role of women is limited to domestic roles only, as mothers and housekeepers [1]. Meanwhile, repression of Islam occurred in the political and social fields caused by the government's concern about the potential of political Muslims at that time [2].

After the fall of the New Order, the two discourses developed rapidly in various directions due to the influence of ideas that entered Indonesia, both from the East and from the West [3]. The influence that comes in revolves around the debates of conservatism, secularism, pluralism, and liberalism [4]. On the other hand, scholars from within Indonesia also gave rise to many variations of thoughts on the discourse of women and Islam.

The rise of these two discourses then gave birth to a new, much more complicated discourse, namely the discourse of Islamic women. It is a combination of battle of thought between women's discourse plus Islamic discourse with all its external influences. This very complicated battle caused each side to have to find a way to resonance louder and propagate its discourse in the public sphere. [4].

Based on rapid growth of society and technology, popular culture is considered as the most appropriate means to carry out propaganda [5]. Based on the explanation, this study aims to show how various popular cultures have been used as media of propaganda for Islamic women's discourse in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

2. Methodology

This research uses critical discourse analysis method to show the battle of Islamic women's discourse in Indonesia. It uses the concept of power of discourse from Michel Foucault as the main theory of discussion [6]. Meanwhile, data were collected through literature study and direct observation of several popular cultures, such as literary works, magazines, films, television shows, social media, and daily

commercial product advertisements. The literature study here refers to previous research from other scholars

3. Islamic Women's Discourse In Indonesia

The history of the Islamic women's movement has existed even before Indonesia's independence. Aisyiyah is one of the largest organizations for Muslim women in Indonesia which has been established since 1917 and plays a role in teaching Islamic knowledge, improving their economic conditions, and providing human rights assistance for these Muslim women [7]. Aisyiyah is an autonomous women's organization of Muhammadiyah which is one of the largest and oldest Islamic organizations in Indonesia. In addition, there is also Muslimat NU which was founded after Indonesia's independence, namely in 1946 which is a women's organization Nahdhatul Ulama [7, pp.1].

As a women's organization under the auspices of the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, each of them has its own characteristics and different roles. The Aisyiyah Muhammadiyah movement is seen as more reformist and modernist, while Muslimat NU is more traditionalist in style, but still provides space for existence for local culture as long as it does not conflict with Islamic teachings [7, pp.2]. What they have in common is that they both aspire to educate and produce women who have good academic abilities to be able to participate in the development of Islam in Indonesia.

The political turmoil of the New Order which attacked the discourse of women and Islam at the same time made the two organizations unable to speak much. It was only after the change in government policy that gave greater space to Islamic discourse, the activities of Islamic women's organizations began to rise again. It was noted that at the end of the New Order, Muslim women in Indonesia were very active in the public sphere, especially with regard to religious teaching, such as religious teachers, academics at universities, teachers of the Koran (reading the Koran), preachers, and interpreters [7, pp.4]. Traditionally, Islamic women have educational and educational spaces in the pesantren environment which also provide activities in the public sphere [8].

The more active Islamic women intellectuals make discussions about gender also emerge. With regard to gender understanding, Aisyiyah and Muslimat NU have almost uniform views, namely that men and women have their respective roles, and they complement each other [7, pp.4]. On the other hand, Fatayat NU considers the two to be equal. The discussion called for the initiation of a research institute on Islam and gender, and the Center for Women's Studies at IAIN Yogyakarta was established in 1995.

In the production of fatwas, in the 1990s women were given a place in the organization as members of the interpretation of the scriptures, at Muhammadiyah it was known as Majlis Tarjih, while in Nahdhatul Ulama it was known as Syuriah NU [7, pp.11]. This position is a step forward that women have begun to be taken into account in solving problems of religious life (Islam).

They began to be asked for their views on the various situations currently facing the nation, although the final decision was still in the hands of the authorities. However, this did not dampen the enthusiasm of Islamic women to participate in the political dynamics at that time, especially in 1999, when the debate about the possibility of becoming a female president, 'Aisyiyah issued a document which reads, "There is no objection to women being leaders" as long as they do not neglect their main duties " as a housewife [7, pp.14]. This action can be understood as an attempt to introduce oneself to the public in Indonesian politics. They wanted to show their existence and try to show their autonomy from the Muhammadiyah organization.

After the New Order, Indonesian society was basically seen as starting to develop in various directions. It was difficult to distinguish progress or vice versa because basically the conservative voice is getting stronger, but the voice of change is also getting stronger [7, pp.5]. Not to mention other voices that were modifications or improvements from existing understandings.

The rise of Islam after the New Order has increased awareness of religious identity. For some Muslims, this means an increase in the practice of personal piety. For others, it can be interpreted as an emphasis on the rule of Islamic law: they may want to follow the law more disciplined, or in some cases to enforce

it more strictly [7, pp.261]. This can be understood as a form of Islamization of Indonesian society after the restraint of Islamic discourse in the New Order era. On the other hand, the movement of women's discourses also led to the turmoil of war in the gender order which was marked by the awareness of women's subjectivity, which was influenced by the inclusion of understandings of both traditional and modernist Islam, and did not lag behind the influence of western secularists [3, pp.9].

The Islamization of Indonesian society has led to competition and fragmentation of religious authority. The debate that arose at that time occurred between Muslim groups in Indonesia who were dwelling on the ideas of secularism, pluralism, and liberalism [4]. The rapid development of Islamic discourse after the New Order led to an explosion of a generation of educated Muslims from the middle class. Of course, this also presents new ways of generating and disseminating knowledge ideas.

On the other hand, the explosion of the generation of Indonesian Muslim thought was challenged by the entry of young intellectuals from various countries in the Middle East who spread their version of Islam throughout the world, including Indonesia [4, pp.82]. Of course, the influence of the entry of Liberal Islamic thought which is more inclined to the values of humanism and western secularism [9, pp.16].

Kurzman [10] provides the label and basic character of the three ideas of the Islamic movement mentioned above. The first is the term traditional Islam, which is an Islamic group that combines regional customs with general Islamic values. Second, Revival Islam which is identical with Islamism, Fundamentalism, Wahhabism, which attacks the interpretation of adat because it is considered contrary to the core of Islamic doctrine. The three terms are Liberal Islam, namely a group of thought that criticizes both traditional and revivalist Islam because it causes backwardness of Muslims. Liberal Islam wants progress that aligns Islamic values with the values of western liberalism.

The contestation between Islamic discourses is not only in the socio-political field, but also enters the realm of the nature of Islam as a religion [4]. This triggered the emergence of the practice of 'writing back' as a post-traditional Islamic strategy to reclaim the discourse of Indonesian Muslim thought. The struggle for discourse enters the most intimate realm, namely, the ideology that is carried [4, pp.155]. Of course, a change in ideology will result in a change in the pattern of the state.

Bauman [4] conveys his criticism, that this phenomenon results in the commodification of religion as a form of disseminating ideas from each contested discourse. This is in line with the views of Bennett & Davies [11, pp.6] who argue that reform means a more conservative practice of personal body politics for many Indonesian Muslims.

Muslim thinkers in Indonesia from large organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, as well as reactionary Islamic organizations such as DDII, MMI, FPI, HTI, and even ICMI support the idea of MUI which decrees a fatwa on secularism, pluralism, and liberalism. There is also the role of INSIST in scientifically attacking Liberal Islamic thought, writing criticisms and focusing on responding to the challenges of western thought [9]. This decision caused divisions everywhere. One of them came from young intellectuals who rejected this decision. They thought it would perpetuate orthodoxy without allowing alternative understanding. [4, pp.45]

Responding to this phenomenon, Mohammed Arkoun [12] criticizes Islamic thought which has not developed since the 12th century due to pressure from conservatives who do not want a new version of understanding of Islam from alternative groups. This arises because there are political interests of knowledge that are echoed by conservatives. They ensure that orthodoxy's grip on knowledge must remain strong because there is a close relationship between interpretation and sacred texts, religious traditions and political power [4].

In gender discourse in Indonesia, the persistence of conservative orthodoxy can ensure that there is no significant change in the treatment of women. They feel the need to redefine Indonesian democracy, in order to create an increase in the role of Islam in the form of the Indonesian state. The orthodoxy is an affirmation of masculinity rooted in Islamic ideology which is claimed to be a competitor to the hegemony of alternative masculinities that hold control over women and the dominance of alternative

masculinities [3]. Therefore, gender relations are the main concern of the changing socio-political situation in Indonesia.

After the collapse of the New Order, feminists have analyzed that the social challenges of Indonesian women are not only against women's ideology typical of the New Order, but also a conservative Islamist agenda that offers a new formulation of hegemonic masculinity [3, pp.192]. The flood of religious understandings and interpretations that emerged in the reform era, especially from Saudi-Wahhabi which limited the discourse of Islamic women, made Muhammadiyah and NU women activists once again work extra hard to fight for their voices [7, pp.261]. The idea of Islamization brought by the revivalists is associated with claims to restore men's prerogatives in marriage in relation to roles, polygamy to divorce [3, pp.4].

The 'battle over the female body' demo in 2006 was a symbol of the women's movement in the reform era which rejected all forms of regulating women's bodies and marriage affairs by the Islamization movement [13]. Talks about polygyny in the post-Soeharto era have preceded the call for "restoration of rights according to Islamic teachings for men." [7, pp.17]. The revivalists began to promote the abolition of the marriage law. Proposals and attempts to revise the marriage law containing the issue of polygamy show that the state is used as an agent of sexual politics that supports patriarchal discourse in society [3, pp.65]. In response to this, several organizations that promote women's rights have sprung up to oppose the supporters of this polygyny with strong arguments.

The idea of alternative Islam challenges this conservative position by asserting Islam as a moral force that promises social equality, social values and religious pluralism. In this movement of change, many women's religious organizations played an important role in the women's movement. They move around issues of violence, workers' rights, and women's reproductive health [3, pp.191]. For women, education is the most important part in the struggle for gender equality in Indonesia. These fighters succeeded in realizing educational institutions for women, not only modern secular education, but also women in Islam with their Islamic education [3, pp.65]. The most significant change the organization has assisted is in the number of women gaining the right to study, they have the right to work, and they enjoy more protection in the event of a divorce [7, pp.263].

The activities of Islamic women's organizations began to appear in the realm of the state. One of them was took part in the debate about Megawati's candidacy as president of Indonesia which is a new political phenomenon that shows the involvement of Islamic interpretations based on gender relations [3, pp.97]. In the social sphere, the increasing level of education of Islamic women presents the phenomenon of the rise of female preachers. This is seen by Khodafi [14, pp.123] due to several factors: 1) political policies in the New Order era had a very large impact on the revival of Islam in the education and economic sectors, which increased the opportunities for Muslim women to gain access to formal education to higher education; 2) the proliferation of assemblies of taklim and formal Islamic schools, both within the pesantren and outside the pesantren, opens up opportunities for Muslim women scholars to become educators and religious lecturers at the same time; 3) the growth of public religious awareness followed by the rise of Islamic culture, encouraging electronic media such as radio and television to create Islamic programs that involve many Muslim women as supporters of the program.

4. Various Propaganda Through Popular Culture

After its imprisonment in the New Order era, the development of Islam reached all aspects of life in society. This phenomenon gave rise to the impression of a new style of Islamization, namely the process of changing society to (re) Islam again after the phase of seclusion. Indeed, the form of isolation experienced by the Muslim community at that time did not reach the prohibition of embracing Islam. However, strict control is still carried out on Islamic symbols in public spaces, such as the hijab, recitation activities, mosque sound regulation, and discussions and Islamic movements [15].

The Islamization of Indonesian society has led to unavoidable competition and fragmentation of religious authority. Indonesian Muslim thinkers are challenged by the influx of young intellectuals from various countries in the Middle East who spread their more conservative version of Islam throughout

the world, including Indonesia [4, pp.82]. This is seen as the long tail of the development of global Islamism. In addition, there is also the influence of Liberal Islamic thought which is more inclined to the values of humanism and western secularism [9, pp.16].

The battle for Islamic discourse is not only in the socio-political realm, but also in the realm of Islamic ideology [4, pp.155]. In general, the battle on Islamic discourse in Indonesia revolves around three main ideas: 1) traditionalist Islam, namely groups that combine regional customs with general Islamic values; 2) Revival Islam which is identical to Islamism, Fundamentalism, Wahhabism, which is more conservative; and 3) Liberal Islam, namely thinking that equates Islamic values with western liberalism values [10].

Another view is raised by Khaled Abou El Fadl [16] who divides two types of Islamic thought, namely Puritan and Moderate. Puritan understanding tends to be intolerant, uncompromising in seeing other points of view in a pluralist reality [16, pp.27]. Groups that have this understanding can even carry out acts of violence against fellow Muslims but have different understandings and non-Muslims. On the other hand, moderate thinking emphasizes tolerance and being able to accept differences in Islamic society, especially with regard to modernization and the development of the times [16, pp.28].

The two views above do not contradict each other, but instead complement each other. Kurzman explained the ideological aspects of the Islamic school of thought while Fadl described its characteristics. For the Islamic Revival thought group, their characteristics are more Puritan, because seen from the attitude and even the teachings that are propagated show more absolutism in ideology. On the other hand, moderate traits tend to be closer to traditionalist Islamic thought, which still opens up space for discussion and adaptation to traditional and modern values. Meanwhile, Liberal Islam's understanding can be said to have moderate characteristics, namely accepting differences and being tolerant, but on some sides it focuses more on freedom, in accordance with the ideology it adheres to, namely embracing the notion of absolute freedom (liberalism). In contrast to Moderate Islam, which although still opens itself to values outside of itself (to new things), it still adheres to certain non-negotiable boundaries and follows the traditional style that still maintains the scientific *sanad* system.

In this study, the discussion of Islamic popular culture which is alleged to contain propaganda will be contrasted with the general characteristics of the three forms of Islamic understanding above. This research limits itself not to discuss or relate the results of the analysis to certain organizations, groups, and/or thinkers. This is because a group can have two or three factions of thought mentioned above. Furthermore, the dynamics of thought in Indonesia currently allows one group to present new ideas (faction) resulting from the combination of the two or three factions mentioned above. Therefore, this study only attempts to present a discussion of the patterns of thought that arise in a form of popular culture. The pattern in question is also only contradicted by general characteristics.

One of the discourses that is widely discussed in line with the development of Islamic discourse is the discourse of Islamic women. The discussion of Islamic women's discourse is centered around the three schools of thought above. There is a discourse of conservative Islamic women, there is a moderate one, and there is a discourse of liberal Islamic women. Basically, the practice of Islamic women's discourse in Indonesia has liberated and empowered women even before Indonesia's independence. It is evident from the emergence of Aisyiyah Muhammadiyah and Muslimat NU [7]. Women are given a place to play a role in the public sphere, such as religious and general education, leadership training, to soft skills provision in order to be able to improve their quality of life economically. These two organizations eventually produced educated Muslim women, who later participated in shaping Islamic discourse in Indonesia [17].

Based on this, the practice of Islamic women's discourse in Indonesia looks more free than practice in Arab countries, where there are restrictions on education and freedom to play a role in the public sphere [18]. In Indonesia, women have access to traditional education through pesantren [8], a more modern one through madrasas [19], as well as general education through public schools run by the government. They are also freer in organizing, carrying out special religious activities for women in public spaces,

such as recitation and qosidah-an [20], and even showing the beauty of their voices through Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran (MTQ) activities [21].

The magnitude of the development of Islamic culture has encouraged the emergence of various Islamic popular cultures in Indonesia that carry the theme of Islamic women and involve Muslim women in the process. Popular culture referred to in this case is all the habits and material culture that are well accepted by a society [22]. This includes written culture (literature), mass media (film, television), social media, art, clothing, to daily necessities [23]. In terms of Islamic women's discourse, propaganda generally appears through magazines, literary works, films, entertainment shows on television, social media, and daily commercial products through their advertisements and taglines.

The Islamic press media was the first to develop rapidly after the collapse of the New Order. Islamic press media emerged in various forms and immediately took a strong position in the Indonesian market. They even publish various segmentations for readers based on age, gender, social group, and belief (mazhab) [24, pp.12].

Magazines that appeared after 1999 mostly targeted young Muslim women with relaxed and light language, such as *Nikah*, *Noor*, *Karima*, *El Fata*, *Puteri*, *Muslimah*, *Permata* and others [24, pp.13]. For example, *Muslimah* magazine comes with a bright pink title, plus the title 'Islamic Youth Trends' and on the cover there is a photo of Muslim female celebrities wearing trendy Muslim clothes and matching headscarves [25, pp.38]. Nef-Saluz then explained that similar magazines do display a more relaxed face of Islam: it can be seen from the discussion in them that only talks about the lives of celebrities, contains short stories full of meaning about the life of the Islamic community, contains coverage of Islamic activities, Islamic music, and advertisements for cosmetic products for Muslim women [25, pp.40].

Similar to the style of content above, the newer women's magazines still contained contents related to Islamic women and their daily lives. *Ummi* and *Aulia* magazines seem to brought up the representation of women in relation to their families, namely as wives (*Ummi*) and mothers (*Aulia*). In other words, the discourses raised by the two magazines are women in the domestic sphere. Nevertheless, *Ummi* and *Aulia* are seen as bringing up the narrative of women's dual roles, both in the domestic and public spheres, while *Noor* magazine presents a narrative of women who are more empowered and focused on their role in the public sphere only [26].

In contrast to that, there are also *Scarf* and *Laiqa* magazines which even put forward discussions on Islamic women's fashion matters, such as cosmetic products, hijab models, the latest clothing trends, the latest clothing styles, and other things related to the fashion world. In each edition, there is always fashion ideas for Islamic women on various occasions, events, places, times, and weathers. In addition, there are also articles that discuss women's independence, issues of women's empowerment, and motivation for independent women.

Based on the visualization of the models wearing the hijab in these magazines, it can be said that their visual depiction is closer to a more moderate stream. This is based on the assumption that if Islam is Conservative, then the image of Muslim women in it will be more conservative, in the sense of wearing a hijab that is not trendy and avoiding topics such as Islamic music and entertainment. Meanwhile, it is not Liberal Islam, because it is possible that the magazine will feature women who do not wear headscarves.

Meanwhile, with regard to the contents of these magazines, they offer discussions about issues of Islamic women only, not serious issues such as the issue of differences in teachings and ideas. They present a lifestyle propaganda for Muslim women that is not too strict and still goes hand in hand with the principles of modernity. Referring to the description above, the discourse they profess is closer to the pattern of Islamic thought that can go hand in hand with modernization. This image is considered not leaning towards liberals, because there are still limits to Islamic teachings that are guarded, such as clothing restrictions and issues that are propagated not contrary to prohibitions in Islamic discourse.

The rapid development of Islamic press media at the end of the 20th century cannot be separated from the hard efforts of the Forum Lingkar Pena (FLP). FLP has been active since the end of the New Order era, through its publication media which played a very important role in the world of da'wah for young Muslims in Indonesia at that time, namely Annida [27, pp.35]. Annida can be easily accepted by young Muslims because the language and method of delivering its contents are adapted to the style of young Muslims, as well as raising the latest themes in the lives of Muslim youth at that time [28, pp.13]. Annida deliberately adopts popular themes and then packs Islamic values and symbols into literary works and also youth magazines that are closer to the Muslim community [27, pp.37].

Seeing the development of the literary world, the progress of popular literary works that promote Islamic values cannot be separated from the success of Habiburrahman El Shirazy's AAC, which is part of the FLP. FLP has long been conducting cadre of Muslim writers for da'wah purposes in Indonesia [29, pp.185]. They provide a platform for budding writers to publish their writings in their various magazines. Furthermore, the very good response from the public towards the works of FLP writers made them also collaborate with major publishers in Indonesia, such as Syaamil (Bandung), Mizan (Bandung), Pustaka Ummat (Bandung), Era Intermedia (Solo), D&D Publishing (Solo), FBA Press (Depok), Gunung Agung (Jakarta), Zikrul Bayan (Jakarta), Ghalia (Jakarta), Republika, (Jakarta), Gramedia (Jakarta), and Senayan Abadi (Jakarta) [30, pp.50]. After the collaboration, the flow of popular Islamic literature publishing was no longer unstoppable. Writers from various circles began to emerge, with works that were also for various groups. The goal is only one, that is to propagate through popular culture.

Kailani [27, pp.48] in his writings even states that one of the ways writers who are members of the FLP propagate Islamic values is through the packaging of popular culture (including pop literature) which is then published to the public. In line with this, the phenomenon of "Hijrah" emerged in Indonesia. This phenomenon makes people thirsty for information from the media and even the entertainment side that matches their new lifestyle, the Islamic lifestyle [27, pp.36]. People are becoming more selective in choosing all aspects of their daily life. This certainly has a very positive impact on the production of popular Islamic literature in Indonesia. Both FLP and its partner publishers will certainly benefit from this. Until now, the market for popular literary works containing Islamic values has never subsided, in fact tends to increase, along with the increasing number of people who choose to perform Hijrah.

The strategy can be seen, namely the themes of stories that are currently busy in the community are lifted into literary works and inserted propaganda narratives. Rokib [29, pp.191] writes that the AAC novel contains the da'wah of Islamic values, namely how to behave well in love, friendship, and marriage relationships that are intended for young Muslims. Likewise, other novels do the same thing in their works, using issues that are currently hot in the community, sometimes a bit sensitive, then turned into works and built with da'wah narratives [28]. Issues such as polygamy, self-identity formation, courtship, and others become the main themes of story building in these popular Islamic novels.

In the midst of the massive work that focuses only on the da'wah of Islamic values, Arimbi [31] reveals that there are still Muslim women writers who play an important role in the discussion of women's freedom within the framework of Islamic values. In his research, Arimbi [31] criticized the works of Titis Basino, Ratna Indraswati Ibrahim, Abidah El Khalieqy, and Helvy Tiana Rosa which contained discussions of Islamic women and modernity. The four writers are very responsive and even offer various ways to deal with social, cultural, and political situations, which aim to voice women's freedom, question the position of women in the public sphere, so that women are no longer considered objects in the construction project of their identity [31, pp.181]. They want to reveal that women must fight for full control over identity and representation in the process of self-definition. In addition, they also emphasize their rejection of the depiction of women through a male perspective [31, pp.182].

Most of the literary works that contain Islamic values tend to attack conservative groups. The thought attack that was launched came from two other factions of Islamic thought, the Moderate and the Liberal. Most of the attacks are carried out on conservative values that are incompatible with the culture of

today's society (the time the work was written), too bigoted, and above all incompatible with the spirit of tolerance. The works of Habiburrahman, Ahmad Fuadi [32], Asma Nadia [33], Helvi Tiana Rosa [34], and Tere Liye [35] seem to contain the values of Islamic discourse that are more fluid and aimed at criticizing conservative Islamic values. This shows the tendency of ideas in their work on moderate Islamic thought. Meanwhile, in the novels of Abidah El Khalieqy [36] and in the novel *Bilangan Fu* by Ayu Utami [37] there are freer ideas related to women's discourse and criticism of the value of conservatism in religion. This can be seen as the tendency of their work to contain Liberal Islam.

In contrast to that, Conservative Islamic thought groups propagate their understanding more through digital media in cyberspace, such as blogs, websites, and social media such as Youtube, Facebook, and others. This can be understood as part of their point of view that is not agree with forms of Islamic popular culture, which tend to be more entertainment in nature. In terms of propagating their ideology, they are more likely to choose conservative methods such as spreading knowledge and teachings directly (preaching), not through entertainment media which is even considered as an unlawful act by their religious leaders from a more strict side [38].

Digital media in the last decade has played a very important role as a tool or means of spreading Islamic values (da'wah) [39]. In terms of propaganda in the digital world, of course, Moderate Islam and Liberal Islam faction also do the same thing [40]. Their goal is the same, that is not only to spread their respective versions of Islamic discourse, but also to argue against versions of Islamic discourse from other faction. However, based on the data collected by Khisbiyah et al. [40, pp.252] da'wah voices from Conservative Islamic faction are more popular than moderate faction. This is because their movement is seen as more structured and focused on the use of digital (social) media. In addition, the political climate of populism in Indonesia which has led to the strengthening of Islamism and Islamic extremism has also helped the growth of intolerant understanding [40, pp.253]. Therefore, the media that provides the intolerant content becomes a reference for netizens.

In contrast to that, the Moderates and Liberals do not only focus on one media. This is due to their views that do not forbid the creative process in the form of Islamic "entertainment". Electronic media such as radio and television make Islamic programs which then involve many Muslim women as supporters of the program [14]. One of the reasons for this is that there is no longer any prohibition of forms of broadcasting as was done in the New Order era.

On television, there are many programs that specifically show women, such as *Dua Hijab Trans 7* in the form of a talk show about style for women and *Muslim Traveler Net Tv* in the form of a travel story for Islamic women. At both events there were female hosts who wore hijabs and dressed trendy Muslim women. In *Dua Hijab*, the discussion of fashion for Islam Women focuses on variations/fashion of clothing but still in accordance with the limits of Islamic teachings. Meanwhile for *Muslim Traveler*, Muslim female hosts cover stories of Muslim life and Islamic communities in various countries in the world. Based on the appearance and discussion in the event, it can be seen that these programs present a more moderate Islamic discourse, not a discourse that restricts women or liberates Muslim women too much.

The world of music has also become a stage for Muslim women. Islamic female singers in Indonesia are not new. During the Reformation era, Sulis emerged as a young Islamic female singer whose songs were very popular in the Indonesian Muslim community. More recently, there is a big name Nissa Sabyan who not only brings her own compositions in the form of songs, but also sings poetry/shalawat that have been previously known by the Indonesian Islamic community, especially in the Traditionalist-Moderate Islam group.

On the other hand, Muslim female singers, wearing headscarves, appear on television and radio shows, either as solo singers, in groups, or in singing talent shows. The Indonesian Islamic community knows Fatin Shidqia who is the winner of the *X-Factor Indonesia* season 1 talent show and then continues his career as a solo singer. Fatin's songs are more pop than Islamic. However, her appearance on stage is never separated from Islamic symbols, such as the hijab and clothes that cover the whole body (not showing the skin other than the hands and face).

The emergence of the phenomenon of Islamic female singers above cannot be seen as a form of propaganda from one particular understanding. It is seen more as a form of cultural development due to the increasing demand and need for Islamic events (entertainment). It is also seen as a form of self-actualization of the Islamic community itself in the midst of the current development of the era. On the other hand, the popularity of Muslim female singers must be viewed from the point of view of public acceptance. In other words, the majority of people are more accepting of moderate and liberal discourse values as part of their daily lives, from a popular culture perspective.

In the film industry, the popularity of Habiburrahman's novels gave birth to many Islamic films and soap operas. Almost all of his popular novels are made in the form of visual impressions. Of course, the values carried in the films and soap operas are still the same as those in the novels. This was because Habiburrahman had direct control over the transfer of his early works, and later became the direct director of the production. After that, many other films and soap operas appeared with Islamic themes. However, in discussing the issue of Islamic women, the discourse that arises revolves around discussions on the use of headscarves, domestic violence, or another conservative issue such as men's masculinity, male domination, and men as guardian [41].

In line with the emergence of Islamic (non-religious) entertainment programs through popular culture media, there are also lectures on television featuring ustazah (female lecturers). The Indonesian Islamic society knows Mamah Dedeh as a female religious preacher who has appeared on television since 2007. Apart from her, there are also names that have been popular in recent years, namely Ustazah Oki Setiana Dewi and dr. Aisha Dahlan.

The presence of female lecturers in Islamic society is a growing need. The rapid development of Islamic discussions makes Muslim women increasingly need more female lecturers who speak from their point of view. On the one hand, the understanding of Islam is increasingly widespread, Islamic activities from women are increasingly widespread, and there are more and more educated people who then participate in enlivening Islamic discourse in Indonesia. On the other hand, the more people who participate in the discussion, there will also be more variations of Islamic discourse, both from the amalgamation of the three factions of thought above, as well as the production of new discourses based on criticism and/or influences from other outside thoughts.

Discourse battles also appear in the daily necessities of Islamic women. There are shampoo products, bath soaps, face washes, cosmetics, and most importantly women's clothing products. Discourse propaganda is carried out through the creation of values and images in their product advertisements. The conflict that arises is between the propaganda of syar'i products (according to the law of Islamic discourse) which is identical to conservative Islamic thought and the idea of stylish products which are identical to moderate Islamic thought. Several products, such as Citra, Sunsilk, and Wardah, appear to have given rise to discourses of Islamic women who are empowered and active in public spaces, but still maintain Islamic values [42]. Meanwhile, propaganda for syar'i products is present not only in clothing products such as Si.Se.Sa and Al Batique, but also in housing advertisements [43].

From there, the debate that followed was about the extent to which religion is allowed to dress and make-up. Conservative Muslims use the argument that their values are based on the text of the holy book (according to their version). Meanwhile, moderate Islam claims that their views are also based on the text of the holy book, but have been adapted to the era, such as the context of modern society. On the other hand, Liberal Muslims do not really take part in the discussion of these limits, because for them the limitation of something is contrary to the spirit of freedom that they promote.

5. CONCLUSION

Based on the explanation above, the battle of the Islamic women's discourse can be seen in the contested issues such as those that related to the role of Islamic women, the relationship between women and Muslim men, daily practices as Islamic women, and images as Islamic women, such as the use of headscarves, clothing and clothing. the accessories. Moderate Islamic thought and Liberal Islam use popular culture in propagating their discourse. The difference is, Moderate Islam still holds certain

limitations in women's issues, while Liberal Islam places great emphasis on the aspect of freedom in addressing women's issues. On the other hand, the Conservative Islamic faction prefers to use print and digital media in spreading its ideology. They prefer a direct da'wah style and avoid using mainstream forms of popular culture, due to their disagreement with the discourse of Islamic entertainment. The results of the discussion above show that the discourse of Islamic women, known as traditional-moderate, is still the majority discourse in society. This is evident from the very large acceptance of the community towards popular culture which contains the discourse of traditional-moderate Islamic women. Although many outside thoughts have entered Indonesian society, it can be said that so far the winner of the battle for the discourse of Islamic women in Indonesian Islamic society is thought which is a continuation or development of an old discourse that existed even before independence.

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