

THE NEGATION OF PRRI IN HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

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ABSTRACT

Textbooks are a means of conveying subject matter to students. This study aims to analyze the causes and approach of the settlement carried out by the central government towards the events of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), which was proclaimed by Colonel Ahmad Husein based in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. The method used is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on textbook material High School History Curriculum 1984, Education Unit Level Curriculum (KTSP) in 2016, and Curriculum in 2013. The results showed that in all three textbooks, events that occurred were categorized as a rebellion against the Jakarta's central government so that its suppression was carried out through military operations. However, the causes were not stated in full as initiated by the regional and central government's disharmony. The injustice of central government in distributing development cake, economic difficulties, complicated licensing, dropping regional employees from the center, demands regional autonomy, regional discontent arose mainly due to the resignation of Hatta as Deputy President, the castration of the power of the West Sumatra armed group by KSAD General Abdul Haris Nasution, and the dominance of the PKI after the 1948 Madiun incident.

Keywords: *confirmation, PRRI, history textbooks, senior high school*

INTRODUCTION

On 15 February 1958, the establishment of the revolutionary government in Sumatra was announced with its headquarters in Bukittinggi. This government is known by the name of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI). Syafruddin became his Prime Minister (1958-61) and, as a member of his cabinet, including Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap, Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo, and Simbolon. Two days later, the rebels in Sulawesi joined PRRI (M.C. Ricklefs, 1999: 396). Three rebel officers (Colonel Simbolon, Colonel Warouw, Lieutenant Saleh Lahade) also received ministerial positions (Remy Madinier, 2013: 237).

In September and October 1957, Colonel Simbolon and other military dissidents in Sumatra, Colonel Samuel of the Permesta movement, and Colonel Lubis held several meetings in Sumatra to coordinate their activities. They summarized their goals into three targets: holding elections to elect a new President to end Sukarno's pro-PKI activities, replacing Nasution and his staff at the center, and banning the PKI. Meanwhile, Masyumi, who did not want to know about guided democracy, held a Congress of Indonesian ulemas in Palembang in September stating that communism was haram for Muslims and that the PKI should be banned. NU, which strives to maintain traditional Islam within this emerging system, is unwilling to send an official delegation to the Conference. In mid-

November, the Constituent Assembly began with its sessions in Jakarta and stalled in a dispute between those who supported Islam and those who supported Pancasila as a philosophical basis for a new basic law (M.C. Ricklefs, 2008: 540-541).

The Masjumi involvement in the PRRI movement is not clear. They only said they were dragged by a series of events so fast that they were almost beyond their control. The PRRI establishment document only included one signature, namely Lieutenant Colonel Husein, Chair of the Struggle Council. Syafruddin stated later that Husein had indeed asked him to take part in signing the document. However, the PRRI Prime Minister rejected it because the main responsibility of the initiative would be more easily known (Rosidi, 1966 in Remy Madinier, 2013: 237).

The Burhanuddin Harahap's memories also imply a similar impression - is it intentional? Their involvement was not based on belief but was dictated by circumstances to form a mere symbolic rival government.

Economic development launched by the Ali Sastroamijoyo I Cabinet (1953-1954) runs only as a slogan because it is not very accommodating to foreign capital, the cabinet considers foreign capital to be very detrimental to Indonesia. The situation was exacerbated "dropping employees" policy from the center to the regions, as a pretext to block unity. According to Kahin, there is a kind of spoil system that opens opportunities for certain people to achieve material benefits and positions in the center and in the regions. As a result, the PNI was strengthened, not the nation in general (Kahin, 1959 in Faishal Hilmy Maulida, 2018: 175). The employee dropping system has an impact on the role of native sons threatened by the policy.

The Ali Cabinet focused more on foreign policy and raising political mass by dropping employees from the center to the regions. The policy turned out to have an impact on regional conditions. From regional perspectives, centralization has marginalized the role of much regional power in managing their regions. This tendency was explained by Lieutenant General Abdul Haris Nasution in his memoir, that in Central Sumatra, the governor, resident, prosecutor, and chief of police were all from Java, only the army leader who was native to the area (Boogie Wibowo, 2010: 21).

Various layers and groups in a society strongly felt the failure of economic development. One group that experienced difficulties was the soldiers. The government's actions add to economic problems, such as foreign exchange misuse, granting special permits to supporting party members, and convoluted licensing bureaucracies, severely hampering traders. The troops' leadership in various regions was upset because the financial allocation for military operations and the welfare of the soldiers was not carried out properly. So, they find their way of raising funds. The method adopted by Angara Ain is to export local agricultural products without administrative procedures in Jakarta. The government in Jakarta called the commander's "barter" (Sundhaussen, 1986 in Faishal Hilmy Maulida, 2018: 175).

Besides the various problems above, the closeness of the PKI to Sukarno raised threats for the military, especially the Army. Moreover, the revival of the PKI after the 1948 Madiun Rebellion was evident in the election results; PKI occupies the top four positions, under PNI, Masjumi, and NU. Soekarno's attitude, which was increasingly in line with the PKI's view of tackling political and economic

problems, made him differ with Hatta's views. As a result, Hatta put his position as vice president since 1 December 1956. The problem of the Trinity (Soekarno-Hatta) later today became one of the causes of political turmoil in Indonesia (Faishal Hilmy Maulida, 2018: 175).

The Army leadership in the area then took control of power in the area, which then held a bargain with the government. In Central Sumatra, former members of the Banteng Division submitted demands to the central government to immediately carry out improvements in the region, among other things to fill strategic positions so that the sons of the regions took precedence and demanded the abolition of centralization which caused widespread corruption. In other areas, army leaders control barter trade, such as copra, to finance troops. Meanwhile, relations between members of the Army in the regions continue to be consolidated and supported by the movement in dealing with the central government (Boogie Wibowo, 2010: 21-22).

The central government ignored the factor that caused the regional commanders to defy because they were very upset about the allocation of funds from the center for military operations. They looked at the central level, government officials misusing foreign exchange resources, giving privileges to the members of the party supporters, and the bewildering, confusing bureaucracy. In Sulawesi, the plan for Governor Andi Pangerang to develop his area did not receive a response from the center, although this was supported by the Commander of TT VII (Wirabuana). Many regional officials want (special) autonomy, which is hotly debated among the regional parties.

The main problems that have caused turmoil in turbulent regions are two main things, namely the Soekarno-Hatta dualism, which is considered capable of resolving the nation's problems and the National Council dominated by communists. Other problems were regional autonomy, finance, infrastructure improvements, and regional security stability that is not handled properly. The Ali Cabinet did not last long because of its unsuccessful handling of various crucial issues such as the land dispute in Tanjung Murawa (Sumatra). At that time, the central government allowed foreign entrepreneurs to manage land controlled by residents.

As stated by Mestika Zed (2009), in the precondition 1956-1957, the center ignored the regional protest movement because of Jakarta's power behavior that did not want to hear the people's aspirations. Regional discontent arose, especially as a result of Hatta's resignation as Vice President from 1 December 1956; central injustice in the distribution of "cake of development" which originates from regions outside Java; castration of the power of the West Sumatra military group by KSAD General Abdul Haris Nasution, and tour de force from the PKI group. As a result, there was a consolidation of regional power through the regional autonomy movement by forming councils in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The vanguard was Colonel Ahmad Husein's group, the Central Sumatra Military Command, by forming the Bull Council. Then it was arranged by the Garuda Council in South Sumatra led by Colonel Barlian, the Elephant Council in North Sumatra led by Colonel Simbolon, and Permesta in Sulawesi led by Colonel Ventje Samual.

The preconditions, backgrounds, or causes of PRRI in history textbooks are not fully and comprehensively elaborated. The narration that emerged immediately stated that PRRI was a rebel against the state and a separatist movement as often addressed to the regional upheavals during the period of the physical revolution

until the New Order era. But the grand narration did not mention the cause of the PRRI movement that was not a single event but was related to various aspects of the administration of Soekarno that ignored the aspirations of the region to realize the welfare of the community and operational costs of military operations.

Textbooks are important and functional books for students. Through this textbook, students can obtain knowledge information other than from a teacher. Textbooks provide detailed and clear descriptions of subjects according to the field of study, and even textbooks can provide neatly arranged learning materials and provide questions as evaluation material for students. Besides, textbooks can also make students motivated in learning (Muslich, 2010 in Beril Choliq Arraman, Nahdatul Hazmi, 2018: 124). According to Tarigan, 2009, in Beril Choliq Arraman, Nahdatul Hazmi, 2018: 124, the existence of a good textbook will greatly help expand the knowledge that has been obtained through interaction in class. According to Suryawan, 2007 in H. Purwanto et al., 2015: 349, other experts understand textbooks from the perspective of its function, namely as instructional media (instructional), whose role is dominant in the classroom, media delivery of curriculum material, and a central part in an education system. Even textbooks are also categorized as a tool to understand and learn from things that are read. Textbooks are also a tool to understand the world (outside of him).

METHOD

Research on PRRI over four years (1957-1961), was designed using the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) method. According to Haryatmoko (2015), there are four (4) stages in CDA to solve a problem, starting with (1) The existence of social irregularities; but (2) There are obstacles to solving it; because (3) Social structure requires irregularities, so it needs to be sought (4) How to overcome social problems or irregularities.

Jaffer Sheyholislami (in Haryatmoko, 2015: 3) explains the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) that does not merely interpret texts but explains. Which is the original CDA can be summarized as follows: (1) Language is the social practice through which the world is presented. (2) The use of discourse as a form of social practice itself not only represents and signifies other social practices but also other social practices such as the exercise of power, domination, prejudice, resistance, and so on. (3) Text obtains meaning by a dialectical relationship between text and social subjects: the writer and reader, who always operate with varying degrees of choice and access to texts and means of interpretation. (4) Linguistic features and structures are not arbitrary. (5) Power relations are produced, implemented, and reproduced through discourse. (6) All speakers and writers operate from specific discursive practices derived from special interests and goals involving inclusion and exclusion. (7) Discourse is historical in that the text obtains its meaning by being demonstrated in certain social, cultural, and ideological contexts, as well as time and space.

In this study, the above method is used to describe and interpret the PPRI affirmation in high school history textbooks. Affirmation has five meanings, namely, affirmation, confrontation, denial, deletion, and rejection. What is meant by affirmation is the confrontation and rejection of PRRI in textbooks as rebellion and separatism. The data sources are textbooks for high school history grade XII, 1984 curriculum written by Nugroho Notosusanto, textbook history for high school curriculum for the education unit level (KTSP) by I Wayan Badrika and 2013

curriculum by Indah Sawitri, Dwi Maryati and Ahmad Arif Musadad containing PRRI material and other books as a comparison. Data in the form of words into sentences from high school history textbooks and other related books.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

History textbooks are one source that can be used in schools that function to support the learning process. Usually, textbooks are written by experts or experts in the field (history). In Indonesia, history textbooks are usually written by lecturers, teachers, and people interested in history. Parallel textbooks have long been circulating in schools. This book is the main source used by teachers in the classroom's learning process (Supriatna, 2007 in Wawan Darmawan and Agus Mulyana, 2016: 281).

According to Wawan Darmawan, "the history lesson textbook as a historiography work for educational purposes does not ignore historiographical rules of history science" (Wawan Darmawan, 2010 in Heru Budiono & Alfian Fahmi Awaluddin, 2017: 36). Writing history should be a match between academic history and history for educational purposes in textbooks. But in reality, this is difficult to do, as the reasons stated earlier that the writing of history textbooks is always bound to a curriculum that already has an appropriate content benchmark and should not be present in history textbooks. While the curriculum that became the benchmark for textbook writing was a product of government education politics in its time (Agus Mulyana, 2011 in Heru Budiono & Alfian Fahmi Awaluddin, 2017: 36), this makes overlapping.

In his article, Helius Syamsuddin wrote about the criteria and problems of historical writing textbooks. In his opinion, six criteria must be met in writing a history textbook, namely:

1. Factual substances that must be accounted for;
2. Interpretation and / or explanation;
3. Presentation and rhetoric that must be following the theory of developmental psychology;
4. The introduction of historical concepts (Indonesian and General) needs to use criteria;
5. Technical-conceptual history textbooks follow the GBPP (curriculum);
6. Complete illustrations, pictures, photos, historical maps in informative and narrative settings and layouts (Helius Syamsuddin, 2000 in Heru Budiono & Alfian Fahmi Awaluddin, 2017: 37-38).

Shows that in writing history textbooks, besides must refer to the applicable curriculum and must meet the above criteria.

In the Indonesian National History Book Volume 3 for Balai Pustaka Publisher High School published in 1986 editor Nugroho Susanto, concerning PRRI, was written in Chapter V of the Liberal Democracy Period, letter B Denying the 1945 Values number 1 Experiment on the Liberal Democracy Political System, page 174, with sentences:

"Kembali Ali Sastroamidjoyo disertai mandat untuk membentuk kabinet, pada tanggal 20 Maret 1955. Kabinet baru merupakan kabinet koalisi, dimana tiga partai besar PNI, Masyumi, dan NU ikut serta dalam kabinet. Program kabinet adalah pembangunan lima tahun, perjuangan membebaskan Irian, melaksanakan politik luar negeri bebas aktif. **Namun kabinet hasil Pemilihan Umum ini belum berhasil**

memperbaiki ekonomi sebagaimana yang diprogramkan. Di daerah-daerah telah timbul dewan-dewan yang memperlihatkan gejala separatisme. Di Sumatera Barat Dewan Banteng yang dipimpin oleh Letnan Kolonel A. Husein pada tanggal 20 Desember 1956, Dewan Gajah yang dipimpin oleh Kolonel Simbolon pada 22 Desember 1956 di Medan, dan Piagam Perjuangan Semesta (Permesta) yang dipimpin oleh Letnan Kolonel Ventje Samual di Ujung Pandang pada tanggal 2 Maret 1957, telah menyatakan memisahkan diri dari pemerintahan pusat dan mengambil alih pemerintah daerah. Sedang Dewan Garuda dibentuk di Palembang pada tanggal 17 Januari 1957 yang dipimpin oleh Kolonel Barlian, pada tanggal 9 Maret 1957 juga mengambil alih pemerintahan daerah. Dewan-dewan ini menganggap bahwa pemerintah pusat mengabaikan pembangunan daerah”.

Furthermore, PRRI is described in the explanation below:

“Dengan terbentuknya dewan-dewan di daerah-daerah yang menentang pemerintah pusat, situasi negara menjadi gawat. Sehari sebelum menerima penyerahan mandat, pada tanggal 13 Maret 1957 **Presiden menyatakan negara dalam keadaan bahaya.** Pembentukan kabinet baru pengganti Kabinet Ali terkatung-katung. Partai-partai tetap masih menginginkan cara tawar-tawaran kedudukan dalam membentuk kabinet baru. Akhirnya Presiden menunjuk Ir. Djuanda yang non partai untuk menyusun kabinet”.

“Daerah-daerah yang bergejolak semakin membuka kedoknya bahwa mereka bermaksud memisahkan diri dari pemerintah pusat. Pada tanggal 10 Februari 1958 Ketua Dewan Banteng, Ahmad Husein mengeluarkan ultimatum kepada pemerintah pusat, bahwa 5 x 24 jam kabinet Djuanda harus mengundurkan diri, jika tidak, Dewan Banteng akan memisahkan daerah Sumatera Tengah dari pemerintah pusat. Pemerintah memutuskan untuk segera menindak oknum-oknum yang terlibat dalam gerakan-gerakan daerah itu. **Beberapa perwira TNI yang terlibat dipecat dengan tidak hormat.** Mereka adalah Letnan Kolonel Ahmad Husein, Kolonel Simbolon, Kolonel Dahlan Djambek, dan Kolonel Zulkifli Lubis. Pada tanggal 15 Februari 1958 Achmad Husein mempermaklumkan berdirinya Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) disusul dengan bergeraknya Permesta di Sulawesi Utara. Krisis Demokrasi Liberal telah mencapai puncaknya. Republik Indonesia hasil perjuangan dan pergerakan rakyat terancam desintegrasi (Nugroho Susanto, 1986 : 177).

Meanwhile in the History Book for grade twelve High School Level Curriculum Education Unit according to the 2006 Content Standards written by I Wayan Badrika, in Chapter 3 Struggle to Defend Independence and the Threat of Disintegration, letter C Struggle to Face Internal Conflict number 5 Movement of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia / Struggle of the People of the Universe (PRRI / Permesta). Both events are written as one, related, and related, although the place and time of the movement occur differently. But PRRI/Permesta is a movement that has no connection or two different movements. About this in the Rosihan Anwar Book stated as follows:

“Menurut Kol. Achmad Husein dalam keterangannya kepada pers di Solok seluruh pasukan atau pengikutnya yang akan turun dari hutan berjumlah kurang lebih 13.500 orang. Persenjataan pasukan A. Husein adalah satu banding dua. Ia tidak pernah mendapat bantuan senjata dari luar negeri dan kalau ada pembicaraan-pembicaraan mengenai tambahan senjata untuk pasukannya dari luar negeri, itu adalah pembicaraan yang dilakukan oleh menteri-menteri PRRI. Mereka yang berada di gunung-gunung mempunyai senjata yang pernah dimiliki dulu oleh Komando Daerah Militer Sumatera Tengah (KDM-ST) Banteng. **A. Husein tidak ada**

hubungan dengan Permesta. Yang ada hubungan dengan Permesta ialah Simbolon yakni via radio set. **Ia juga tidak punya hubungan dengan Kartosuwiryo di Jawa Barat tetapi dengan Daud Beureueh di Aceh, dia ada hubungan via radio set dalam rangka kerjasamanya**" (Rosihan Anwar, 2007: 46).

I Wayan Bardika's textbook explains about PRRI/Permesta is quoted below:

"Gerakan PRRI/Permesta muncul di tengah keadaan politik yang sedang tidak stabil dalam pemerintahan. Hubungan yang tidak mesra antara pemerintah pusat dengan beberapa daerah menjadi salah satu pemicu timbulnya gerakan ini. Keadaan itu disebabkan oleh ketidkakuasaan beberapa daerah di Sumatera dan Sulawesi terhadap alokasi biaya pembangunan dari pemerintah pusat. Sikap rasa dan tidak puas itu mendapat dukungan dari beberapa panglima militer."

Like in other history textbooks, I Wayan Badrika writes about the establishment of the Bull Council, the Elephant Council, the Garuda Board, and the Manguni Council. In the paragraph I Wayan Badrika shows PRRI / Permesta is a united movement, as quoted below:

"Gerakan ini akhirnya berkembang menjadi suatu gerakan terbuka yang terkenal sebagai gerakan PRRI/Permesta. Tanggal 10 Februari 1958, Ketua Dewan Banteng, mengeluarkan ultimatum kepada pemerintah pusat yang menyatakan bahwa Kabinet Djuanda harus mengundurkan diri dalam waktu 5 x 24 jam. Menerima ultimatum itu, pemerintah bertindak tegas dan memberhentikan secara tidak hormat Achmad Husein, Mauludin Simbolon, Zulkifli Lubis dan Dahlan Djambek dari kedudukannya sebagai perwira TNI" (I Wayan Badrika, 2006 : 76).

In the History Book of grade XII High School Specialization Social Sciences Curriculum 2013, written by Indah Sawitri, Dwi Maryati and Ahmad Arif Musadad, in Chapter IV, the material "The Struggle to Defend the Integrity of the Republic of Indonesia," is divided into three (3) sections. First, the government's policy on the Beginning of Indonesian Independence. Second, the Revolution at the Beginning of Indonesian Independence. Third, the Life of the Indonesian Nation in 1948-1965. In the material section of the Life of the Indonesian Nation in 1948-1965 contains material on the political situation in 1948-1965 and the uprising in Indonesia in 1948-1965. In the material rebellion contains; the Madiun incident in 1948, the DII/TII rebellion, the APRA rebellion (Angkatan Perang Ratu Adil/ The Army of Ratu Adil), the Andi Aziz rebellion, the RMS rebellion (Republic of South Maluku), the PPRI Rebellion (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) and the 30-S / PKI movement.

The revolt of the PPRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia/ Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) was written in two (2) paragraphs, as below:

Munculnya pemberontakan PRRI diawali dari ketidakharmonisan hubungan pemerintah daerah dan pusat. Pemerintah daerah merasa kecewa terhadap pemerintah pusat yang dianggap tidak adil dalam alokasi dana pembangunan. Kekecewaan tersebut diwujudkan dengan pembentukan dewan-dewan daerah seperti berikut :

- 1) Dewan Banteng di Sumatera Barat yang dipimpin oleh Letkol Ahmad Husein.
- 2) Dewan Gajah di Sumatera Utara yang dipimpin oleh Kolonel Maludin Simbolon.
- 3) Dewan Garuda di Sumatera Selatan yang dipimpin oleh Letkol Barlian.
- 4) Dewan Manguni di Sulawesi Utara yang dipimpin oleh Kolonel Ventje Samuel.

Pada tanggal 15 Februari 1956, meletuslah PRRI/Permesta. Ahmad Husen memproklamasikan berdirinya Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) dengan Syafruddin Prawiranegara sebagai perdana menteri PRRI. Pada tanggal 17 Februari 1958, Letkol D.J. Somba di Sulawesi ini dikenal dengan gerakan Piagam Perjuangan Semesta atau Perjuangan Semesta atau PERMESTA. Dengan diproklamasikannya PRRI di Sumatera dan PERMESTA di Sulawesi, pemerintah memutuskan untuk menumpas gerakan separatis tersebut. Pemerintah segera mempersiapkan operasi gabungan yang terdiri atas unsur darat, laut, dan udara untuk menumpas gerakan PRRI. Serangkain operasi yang dilakukan adalah Operasi 17Agustus yang dipimpin oleh Kolonel Ahmad Yani untuk wilayah Sumatera Tengah, Operasi Tegas dipimpin oleh Letkol Kaharudin Nasution, Operasi Saptamarga dipimpin oleh Brigjen Djatikusumo, dan Operasi Sadar dipimpin oleh Letkol Dr. Ibnu Sutowo. Sedangkan untuk menumpas pemberontakan PERMESTA, dilancarkan operasi gabungan dengan nama Operasi Merdeka di bawah pimpinan Letkol Rukminto Hendraningrat.

PRRI narrative is the same as the content in the 30 Years of Indonesian Freedom Book. In the first volume of the book, not only writing political events but is considered as part of the struggle of the Indonesian people in building a newly independent Republic of Indonesia. The struggle of the Indonesian nation at the beginning of independence was armed struggle and diplomacy and pioneered other fields such as education and economics. Examples of educational struggles are the Establishment of the Gadjah Mada National University Institute and the struggle in the economic field, namely the establishment of Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI 1946). The second volume (1950-1964) illustrates the struggle of the Indonesian people in facing political turmoil that occurred at home, both in the form of rebellions in the country and the ups and downs of parliament. These shocks caused political instability, making it difficult for the Indonesian people to develop (Agus Mulyana & Darmiasti, 2009: 96-97).

Some of the rebellions that occurred, for example, Andi Aziz Incident in Makassar, RMS (Republic of South Maluku), Ibn Hajar Rebellion in Kalimantan, DI / TII Rebellion Kahar Muzakar, DI / TII Rebellion Daud Beureuh, PRRI, and Permesta. These rebellions are described as forces that undermine the government. In quelling the rebellion, the government is described as always taking a sympathetic attitude; for example, conducting diplomacy first, if diplomacy is not achieved, then the government takes repressive actions with military force. This repressive action was carried out because the rebels showed bad faith (Agus Mulyana & Darmiasti, 2009: 97). From the material in the grade XII History textbook, an example of how the government resolved the rebellion in a repressive manner such as PRRI: "with the proclamation of PRRI in Sumatra and PERMESTA in Sulawesi, the government decided to quell the separatist movement and prepare for joint land, sea and air operations." A sympathetic attitude with diplomacy is not carried out by the Central government.

In writing M.C. Ricklefs: "On 16 February Sukarno returned and urged harsh treatment of the rebels. Djuanda, Nasution, and most PNI and PKI leaders also wanted the rebellion to be crushed. Together with Masyumi and PSI leaders in Jakarta, Hatta urged a settlement by negotiations, thus putting themselves in a compromised position. The military acted in a convincing manner. The air force bombed PRRI installations in Padang, Bukittinggi, and Manado in late February

1958. In early March, the Army began to land units from the Siliwangi Division and Diponegoro Division based in Java on Sumatra under the leadership of Colonel Achmad Yani (MC) Ricklefs, 1999: 397). The language used against PRRI in this book was immediately declared "rebel," "separatism," and "overthrow."

The repressive attitude of the Central Government in facing PRRI, conveyed by Mestika Zed, in a narration below:

Dari sudut pandang Jakarta persiapan menghadapi PRRI juga tidak tanggung-tanggung. Bahkan termasuk yang paling serius dan terbesar, dan terlama di antara sejumlah pergolakan daerah menentang rejim Jakarta selama dekade 1950-an (seperti gerakan DII/TII di Aceh dan Jawa Barat serta Sulawesi Selatan, gerakan separatis di Kalimantan Barat dan RMS Maluku). Sedemikian seriusnya, sehingga tidak pernah terjadi sebelumnya dan juga tidak sesudahnya, kecuali dalam kasus PRRI, dimana Jakarta mengerahkan semua kekuatan angkatan bersenjata (laut, darat, dan udara serta polisi dan satuan intilejen). Kekuatan PRRI di kota-kota dengan mudah dapat didobrak dan mundur ke pedalaman dengan melancarkan perang gerilya. Pusat perlawanan terutama terjadi di Sumatera Barat, Riau, Sumatera Selatan serta mitra PRRI, yaitu Permesta di Sulawesi (Mestika Zed, 2009: 11).

The case of the PRRI resistance against the Jakarta regime for four years (1958-1961) was not solely a center-regional conflict, nor did it merely involve the CIA, but also Australia and several countries in Southeast Asia. The PRRI resistance was also not a separatist movement as was often generalized to the type of regional upheaval during the 1950s and after that, but rather a "total and harsh correction" of the central regime, which was seen as violating the constitution. For example, their demands to replace the New Cabinet with Hatta and Javanese figure Hamengkubuwono IX. PRRI has never exchanged the Republic of Indonesia symbols (flags, national anthems, and other national symbols). Even behind Simbolon's working desk, Sukarno's photo remained proudly displayed. On the contrary, it is because of the encouragement of nationalism and patriotism that they are forced to take up arms, after all, means of constitutional procedures have been adopted (Mestika Zed, 2009: 11).

Furthermore, in his article titled PRRI in Regional Military and Political Perspectives: A Reinterpretation (1999), Mestika Zed believes that PRRI is more than just a regionalist movement, it can even be said as a national movement that crosses regional boundaries and backgrounds their ethnicity and religion. The movement continued to recognize the constitution and uphold the unitary state and none of the statements and intent of the PRRI movement to make a separation from the Republic of Indonesia which was born through the Proclamation of 17 August 1945, except from the Sukarno regime (Mestika Zed in Faisal Helmi Maulida, 2018: 182).

Meanwhile, Lerissa, in her book, PRRI Permesta, Strategies to Build an Indonesia without Communism (1997), revealed that the upheaval that occurred in Indonesia, especially those involving PRRI-Permesta, was inseparable from several preceding causes. Among other things, the failure of the political system, the failure of economic development, the threat of communism in Indonesia, and the Army's disparity. These various reasons underlie the activities of the Bull Council to the Permesta, which want reform in various sectors, especially the real economy (Lerissa in Faisal Helmi Maulida, 2018: 182-183).

Yamin stated that the emergence of the Republic of Indonesia Revolutionary Government (PRRI) was as an accumulation of people's disappointment in the region towards the central government in Jakarta. The disappointment was caused by the centralization of power and led to development gaps in all fields between the center and the regions, especially in the regions, especially in Central Sumatra (Yamin, 2009 in Wiyatmi, 2013: 220). Even though the Indonesian government then considered the PRRI struggle to be a rebellion that was successfully crushed by the government. However, if understood, the background to the emergence of PRRI was disappointment at the centralization of power and uneven development.

PRRI's rebellion was denied by Sofjan Kahar, one of PRRI's historical actors, saying: "Judging from the idealism of the PRRI struggle itself, there was no mission of the rebellion. The word rebellion is a PKI statement that clearly states the war on PRRI ". The accusation that PRRI was a rebellion that wanted to establish a state within a state was also denied by Masdar Rasyid, S.H., one of the sons of PRRI fighters. According to him, PRRI never wanted to establish a state within the state as has often been accused so far of the PRRI perpetrators, but only established a kind of counter-government. Forming a rival government itself is nothing but a form of protest against the central government, which is considered to be outside the constitutional line (Syamdani, 2009: 94).

From Barbara's book, it is also known that the PRRI incident there was no regional intention to separate themselves from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The action to form PRRI by the regions was intended to warn the actions of the central government, which was considered to have deviated from the constitution. However, Sukarno's strong desire to carry out his conception triggered more regions to increase protests (Syamdani, 2009: 11). What is imagined by Barbara seems to be following the "ultimatum" conveyed by the region, that if some demands are not met, then the region does not recognize Sukarno's leadership as head of state? In the ultimatum, there are no words that say that they will form their own country or the like that are separated from the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. As for their actions to form government officials from the President to the ministers, according to John D. Legge, it is nothing but a rival to the ruling government, and they still claim to be loyal to the republic (John D. Legge, 1996 in Syamdani, 2009: 12).

To this day, the actors who support the PRRI event reject the government's rebel stamp for their actions. In an interview, Ahmad Husein said that when dealing with Sukarno at the Bogor Palace, in a post-PRRI meeting, he had once offered to Sukarno to try him if all his actions in Central Sumatra had been considered a rebellion. But Sukarno said that the court action was not necessary because what Ahmad Husein had done in the PRRI incident was only a historical process which could not be impeded by any power. Instead, Sukarno offered Ahmad Husein to be able to return to being active in the army service, but Husein did not accept it (Syamdani, 2009: 92-93).

According to Rosihan Anwar (senior journalist), there was an Army Information brochure. In the brochure, there is also the text of the Palembang agreement signed by Achmad Husein, H.N.V. Sumual, and Barlian, each regional leader who flared up in September 1957. It stated there their basic demands such as "the reinstatement of the leadership of the Soekarno-Hatta Dwi-Tunggal state,

replaced by the leadership of the Army (Nasution); the implementation of decentralization in the state government system; the formation of the senate; rejuvenation and simplification at all fields and levels; the prohibition of communism which at its center is international "(Rosihan Anwar, 2007: 42). The outbreak of Dwi-Tunggal Sukarno-Hatta, many parties, was disappointed and wanted to be whole again to overcome the political turmoil.

In his speech on 28 October 1956, Sukarno requested that the parties be dissolved. Two days later, he stated that he had a thought, a conception of a new system, namely "guided democracy." Natsir and other Masyumi leaders opposed the idea. Murba, who had only a small chance of achieving power in the parliamentary system, praised the idea and made closer ties with Sukarno. The PNI and NU, who were interested in Sukarno but would suffer many losses if the parliamentary system was abolished, were ambiguous. The PKI, which mainly sought protection, supported the President but with the hope that the small parties would not be abolished. People outside Java were worried about a Sukarno-Murba-PKI-PNI-NU government system, a Javanese system of government, and radicals who conflicted with them and the Masjumi. In the military, the commanders outside of Java saw that a similar system was formed by Jakarta against them (M.C. Ricklefs, 2008: 527-528).

There seems to be a political deadlock in Jakarta because many people feel that the constitutional system cannot be maintained anymore, but don't know what steps to take. Some people called for the new Hatta cabinet, but now the old cooperation between Hatta and Sukarno had broken up. On 20 July 1956, Hatta submitted his resignation as vice president, which took effect on 1 December. This means the throwing of the most admired outside Java characters from the central government. He did not take brilliant steps, clearly feeling unsatisfied with the path taken by the Indonesian state. In his last speech, he criticized the behavior of parties based on narrow personal interests. Regarding this matter, he and Sukarno agreed, but in other matters, they rarely agreed. Hatta preferred to improve the parties, while Sukarno wanted to free himself from the parties altogether (M.C. Ricklefs, 2008: 527).

Regarding Hatta, in Ricklefs' writings, the following was stated: "The Sumatra crisis caused another call for the Ali Cabinet to resign from being replaced by a non-parliamentary committee led by Hatta, who was considered the only person who could satisfy Sumatra" (Ricklefs, 2008: 529). Furthermore, "when the country broke up, Nasution took the initiative of ending parliamentary democracy. There are still many appeals to form the Hatta cabinet, a solution that was also supported by NU on 11 March 1957. Nasution tried to arrange a meeting between Hatta and the President, but Sukarno refused "(M.C. Ricklefs, 2008: 531). This event was not revealed in the high school history textbook. The desire of some groups to reunite the Sukarno-Hatta dualists in resolving the political turmoil as the dual-struggle in the early independence and revolutionary period was not appreciated by Sukarno even though Hatta was willing to do so.

CONCLUSION

The material on the events of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in the History textbook in the 1984 Curriculum, 2006 Curriculum, and 2013 Curriculum, in principle, has the same principle that the PRRI carried out an uprising against the central government in Jakarta. PRRI is a

rebel against legitimate government and separatism. To eliminate the separatist movement, the central government made military operations and dismissing officers involved. The compromise path proposed by Hatta, Masyumi figures, and PSI was not accepted by Sukarno, Nasution, and Djuanda.

The cause of the PRRI was not a single event but was related to various aspects of governance that were ignored by Sukarno. The main problems were the neglect of local aspirations in realizing the citizens' welfare; the financial support to the operational costs of military operations was minimal. From political and administrative, there are several problems, such as the end of dual Sukarno-Hatta, because Hatta resigned from the position of Vice President, demands regional autonomy, finance, improve infrastructure and regional security stability that was not handled properly. The local government also viewed the central injustice in the distribution of development cake, the castration of the power of the West Sumatra military group by KSAD General Abdul Haris Nasution, and communist domination. The cause of the event was not disclosed in full and comprehensive, but partially.

The emergence of PRRI is an accumulation of people's disappointment in the region towards the central government in Jakarta. Disappointment caused by the centralization of power and led to the development gap in all fields between the center and the regions, especially in Central Sumatra. The central government regards the PRRI as a successfully crushed rebellion, but if understood, the background to the emergence of the PRRI is disappointment at the centralization of power and uneven development. PRRI is also not a separatist movement but a total and harsh correction of the central regime, which is seen as violating the constitution.

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