

DETERMINANT OF SOCIAL PROTEST IN SUBSIDIZED RICE PROGRAM



Jurnal Analisa Sosiologi

Mery Yanti^{1*}, Yusnaini¹, Indra Tamsyah¹,
Gunawan Lestari Elake²

¹Department of Sociology,
Faculty of Social and
Political Science,
Sriwijaya University,
Indonesia

²Department of Asia
Pacific-Regional Studies,
National Dong Hwa
University, Republik China

*Correspondence email:
mery.yanti@fisip.unsri.ac.id

Received: 22 January 2025
Revised: 13 March 2025
Accepted: 18 April 2025

Edition:
April 2025, 14 (2): 197-
223


Abstract

Food security is a central theme in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In Indonesia, the government's subsidized rice program (Program Beras Miskin or Program Raskin), initiated during the 1998 Monetary Crisis, has consistently sparked social protests among its beneficiaries. This study adopts a quantitative approach using logistic regression techniques to analyze determinants of social protest based on the 5th Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) dataset. Seven independent variables significantly explain social protest at a level of 0.0515 (5.15%), $X^2(7) = 428.32$, $p < 0.01$. The findings highlight that perceptions of governance quality at the village and district levels, as well as citizens' education levels, substantially influence the likelihood of social protest. Social capital and other contextual factors further enrich the analysis. This study contributes to the literature by bridging governance and social protest theories and provides actionable insights for policy improvement to enhance governance, strengthen community social capital, and expand equitable access to education, aiming to reduce public dissatisfaction and protests.

Keywords: Governance, poverty alleviation, social policy, trust

INTRODUCTION

One of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) objectives is to end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture (United Nations 2015). Among the policies of the government of the Republic of Indonesia that directly contributed to this goal was non-cash food assistance, regulated under Presidential Regulation Number 63 of 2017 concerning the distribution of non-cash social aid. The Subsidized Rice (*Raskin*) or the Prosperous Rice (*Rasta*) program is regulated by this regulation. Compared with other poverty programs, the Raskin program ranked number two as the program most protested by the beneficiaries of the program.



Source: Indonesian Family Life Survey V (2015)

Figure 1. Proportion of Poverty Alleviation Programs Protested by Village/Subdistrict Residents

The phenomenon of citizen protests in the context of the *Raskin* program has not received much attention from Indonesian scholars. From the literature on social policy, the scientific research on the *Raskin* program is more focused on the impact of *Raskin* on household income (Sadono 2018), poverty alleviation (Banerjee, Hanna, Olken et al. 2023, Purnomo, Supriyono and Muluk 2015), food security (Ari Fazlur 2020, Mutiah and Istiqomah 2017, Nasrudin, Resosudarmo, Yamazaki and Girsang 2020, Rammohan and Tohari 2023, Sundari and Nachrowi 2016), child development (Gupta and Huang 2018, Jayawardana, Baryshnikova and Pham 2021). Other topics are targeting beneficiary groups (Hanna and Olken 2018, Sutanto, Sakaguchi, Amrullah et al. 2020), privatization of the *Raskin* distribution (Banerjee, Hanna, Kyle et al. 2019), decision support systems (Ilyas 2017, Manik, Nurhadiyono and Rahayu 2015), the implementation of the Raskin

program (Fandaru 2016, Sitepu 2015). Existing studies primarily focus on the program's economic, health, and poverty impacts while leaving a significant gap in exploring how governance issues and social capital influence social protests in the program's implementation. Addressing this gap, this research contributes by analyzing these unexplored determinants, thereby enriching the understanding of factors triggering public dissatisfaction.

Meanwhile, from the perspective of the literature on protests and social movements, some research on social protests in Indonesia spans a wide range of topics, including labor protests (Caraway, Ford and Nguyen 2019, Nurlinah, Haryanto, Sukri and Sunardi 2021), protest culture (Bräuchler 2019), social protests through social media (Pratama, Nurmandi, Muallidin et al. 2022, Sutan, Nurmandi, Mutiarin and Salahudin 2021), and Islamic perspectives on protests and social movements (Abbas, Aidid, Pabbabari and Marilang 2021). Previous research focuses have been influenced by major theories in the literature on social movements, namely group identity (Bräuchler 2018, Sutan 2024, van Zomeren, Susilani and Berend 2016), political opportunity structure, framing, and resource mobilization (Caraway et al. 2019, Facal and Estrelita 2020, Michel, Purwaningsih, Rahmawati and Sutan 2023, Nasution 2021, Pang, Goh and Rohman 2016, Pratama and Qodir 2022, Putri 2024, Suharko 2020), as well as history and local context (Dhosa 2021).

Slightly different from previous studies, this research interprets the factors of group identity, political opportunity structure, framing, resource mobilization, and deprivation distinctly. The researchers chose social capital (X1), respondent type, and education level from the resource mobilization theory as independent variables. Social capital (networks, trust) is a crucial resource supporting social movement mobilization. In contrast, individual attributes such as education and social roles influence the ability to organize or support collective action. Framing theory is translated into four independent variables: perception of the quality of ID card services/KTP (X2), driver's license services (X3), perception of governance quality at the sub-district level (X4), and village level (X5). These four independent variables are considered derivatives of framing theory because every perception inherently involves a specific framing perspective. Knowledge of corruption practices in sub-district government (X6) and village government (X7) is related to the political opportunity structure theory. The narrative of corruption can act as a trigger for mobilizing social action by building emotional and cognitive resonance. Lastly, the type of residence is associated with identity theory, as

the type of residence (urban/rural) can influence collective identity and participation in social movements.

This research makes significant contributions to social policy and social protest literature. Theoretically, it enriches understanding of how social capital and governance interact as determinants of collective action, particularly in contexts involving state-led welfare initiatives. The study further aligns with and expands on sociological frameworks that analyze the role of social capital in fostering collective behavior. On the practical side, the findings provide actionable insights for policy development, particularly in designing governance structures and social programs that minimize citizen dissatisfaction and protests, ensuring more effective and equitable policy implementation.

In this article, social protest is the collective action of individuals or groups aimed at influencing the decisions of a specific target, altering systems of representation, public policies, or the relationship between citizens and the state (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995, Opp 2009). Social protests are phenomena that have become an integral part of societal dynamics throughout history. In a theoretical context, social protests can be understood as forms of collective expression that arise in response to injustice, dissatisfaction, or demands for social change. Social protests often involve various elements of society, ranging from individuals to large groups, who unite to voice their aspirations to authorities or the public.

Procedurally, social protest is a collective action initiated by a group of people to intervene in an undesirable or intolerable situation. The social process always contains specific messages that want to be conveyed to policymakers or the wider community (Price and Sabido 2015). When referring to the Alquran, the first protest occurs when the devil opposes the command of Allah SWT to bow to Adam, who was just created (QS. Al-Baqarah [2]:34; QS. Al-'Araf [7]:11-12; QS. Al-'Isra' [17]:61; QS. Al-Kahf [18]:50; QS. Taha [20]:116). The Koran also shows how the Prophet Moses protested Pharaoh who treated the Children of Israel as slaves (QS. Taha [20]:47; QS. ad-Dukhaan [44]:18), Prophet Ibrahim protested idolatry (QS. Al-'An'am [6]:74; QS. Al-Anbiya' [21]:66), or previous people who denied the prophetic status of the prophets and apostles (the Ad, the Thamud, the Madyan, and so on).

There are eight main approaches developed by scholars to understand the phenomenon of social protests. First, collective action theory explains that individual participation in collective actions is driven by the effort to achieve public good, such as social justice or policy reforms. In large groups, individuals tend to feel that their

contribution is insignificant because the benefits can be enjoyed by everyone, including “free riders.” Therefore, selective incentives, such as direct benefits or penalties, are necessary to encourage participation. This theory links individual motivation (micro-level) to collective outcomes (macro-level), where the size of the group influences individual incentives. Additionally, the theory emphasizes the importance of mobilization to attract more supporters and exert pressure on third parties (Opp 2009).

Second, the resource mobilization theory emphasizes the role of availability and management of resources, both material and human, in the success of social protests. While resources often serve as sufficient factors, protests can occur without adequate resources, or conversely, resources do not necessarily lead to protests if individual incentives remain unchanged. This theory explores resource mobilization, direct actions, and organizational investment to increase pressure on third parties such as the government. However, its weaknesses include difficulties in falsification due to the broad definition of resources and the lack of a micro-level foundation to explain changes in individual incentives and spontaneous forms of protests (Opp 2009).

Third, the political opportunity structure theory explains that features of the political environment, such as changes in political opportunities, influence the success of social protests through an inverted U-shaped curve: increasing low opportunities trigger protests up to a certain point, but continuously rising opportunities reduce protests. This theory connects macro-contexts with individual incentives but faces weaknesses such as the lack of a clear micro-macro model and the measurement of opportunities based on actors' perceptions. Integration with other theories, such as collective action theory, is necessary to address these issues. This theory combines culture, structure, and individual behavior to understand the dynamics of social protest (Andrain and Apter 1995, Opp 2009).

Fourth, identity theory emphasizes the role of collective identity, which includes shared beliefs, norms, social networks, and emotional bonds, in encouraging individual participation in social protests. Collective identity is a selective incentive, making collective actions beneficial and inactivity detrimental. Despite its importance, this theory has weaknesses, such as mixed empirical evidence between confirmation and falsification and a lack of systematic hypotheses. The theory requires the development of more rigorous micro-macro models and integration with collective action theory to create a more comprehensive framework for explaining the mechanisms of social protests (Opp 2009).

Fifth, framing theory explains that frame alignment between social movements and individuals who have not yet been mobilized increases the likelihood of collective action. This framework includes cognitive structures such as beliefs, norms, and incentives, creating emotional and cognitive resonance essential for protest mobilization. However, the theory faces challenges, such as difficulty measuring resonance and understanding its impact empirically. Changes in individual frames often occur through social interaction triggered by cognitive dissonance. Despite its limitations, this theory introduces cognitive structures into the study of social movements and serves as a foundation for developing more comprehensive theories (Opp 2009).

Sixth, balance theory explains the alignment of individual cognitive frameworks through interaction with social movement organizations, influenced by considerations of costs and benefits. Strong identification with an organization facilitates alignment, especially if individual beliefs are weak or inconsistent, but it may fail if antipathy toward the organization arises. This theory highlights the role of social relationships in overcoming cognitive dissonance and the concept of frame resonance, which involves detailed cognitive elements and cultural resources. Although it addresses ambiguities in the framing perspective and generates clearer hypotheses, the application of balance theory is still in its early stages (Opp 2009).

Seventh, the contentious dynamics approach focuses on mechanisms and sequences of events that transform relationships between actors in contentious politics. It rejects traditional theories such as collective action and rational choice despite often using them implicitly. Its advantages include a dynamic approach, attention to actors, and comparative analysis. However, its weaknesses are the absence of explicit theoretical alternatives, ad hoc causal mechanisms, and a lack of systematic explanations of micro-macro relationships and the free rider problem. This approach serves as a complement rather than a replacement for classical theories, requiring theoretical support to enhance its validity in the study of social protests (Opp 2009).

Eighth, the synthesis approach integrates framing theory, identity theory, rational choice theory, resource mobilization, and political opportunity into a comprehensive theoretical model to explain social protests. This approach challenges the traditional separation between rational analysis and cognition or identity, combining causal mechanisms of cognitive change, such as dissonance and frame adjustment, with structural dynamics. This synthesis enriches the literature on social movements by generating empirically testable hypotheses. It supports more rigorous research into the

relationship between cognitive and structural factors, especially within the broader “contentious politics” category (Opp 2009).

Social protests benefit individuals and society significantly, providing opportunities to explore moral intuition, define identity, and advocate for justice. Collectively, protests serve as spaces to express creativity, pursue utopian visions, and create joy. Additionally, protests offer practical value by presenting information about current issues and inspiring us to question our intuitions and actions, which are essential components of democracy. In liberal assumptions, protests are important as they support individual freedom to creatively design their lives, drawing inspiration from diverse models and alternatives. This diversity is necessary to shape individual goals and aspirations. Social protests become vital means to enrich individual lives, spark reflection, and drive meaningful social change (Jasper 1997).

A social protest is a form of proletarian class struggle that seeks to change the exploitative capitalist system and is governed by the bourgeois class (Barker 2013) or to gain recognition (Reinmuth 2016). As a sociological phenomenon, protest has the following essential attributes: (a) collective action that expresses a particular concern, problem, or criticism; (b) the social background of the participant will largely determine the process of articulation of the protest movement; (c) social movements always have ideologies; (d) the forms of protest varied greatly; (e) protests always occur specific social situations; (f) the protest movement is not isolated but part of a broader social and political culture movement (Rucht 2016).

In the tradition of liberal democracy, a social protest is a form of citizen political participation. Political elites who hold political power are responsible for producing policies that align with the public's wishes. However, because of limited resources and the complexity of public problems, policies born with formal political authority often cannot satisfy all parties and trigger dissatisfaction from a group of citizens (Andrain and Apter 1995). In this context, protest expresses dissatisfaction with the current policy, which gives rise to specific demands for policymakers. This demand, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, is the basis for the formation of social movements in various forms, including in the form of protests. The ultimate goal is to shape or influence public opinion and change the public policy process to align with their preferences (Porta and Diani 2006).

Social protests can be triggered by various factors, such as social and economic inequality (Power 2018, Yagci 2016), political dissatisfaction (Barakat and Fakih 2021,

Sangnier and Zylberberg 2017), issues of racism (Valiavska and Meisenbach 2023), gender equality (Santillana 2024), human rights (Jeong, Lee and Suh 2025), environmental issues (Suharko 2020), gender, trust in government, corruption concern, and social media usage (Barakat and Fakhri 2021), and so on. Recent studies have identified several factors that drive individual involvement in social protests, such as level of education (Sawyer and Korotayev 2021), belief systems (Ozkan 2024), social identity, political efficacy, structural embeddedness (Shafi and Ran 2021), empathy (Zhang and Pinto 2021), trust response efficacy, protest enjoyment and the perceived success of the strikes (Cologna, Hoogendoorn and Brick 2021).

Social protests can take various forms, including demonstrations, boycotts, and symbolic actions, both in the offline and online world (González-Bailón and Wang 2016, Lane, Do and Molina-Rogers 2021). The impact of social protests is diverse, both positive and negative. On one hand, social protests can encourage policy changes and raise public awareness of specific issues. On the other hand, social protests can also provoke more significant conflict or tension within society. Therefore, the effectiveness of social protests often depends on the strategies employed and the responses from authorities. The success of social protests is influenced by various factors, such as communication (i.e., assembling networked movement), and organization (i.e., leadership) (González-Cacheda and Outeda 2021, Nardini, Rank - Christman, Bublitz et al. 2021, Useem and Goldstone 2021).

Some researchers point out that social protest is closely related to social capital. Although there is debate among scientists about the meaning of social capital, it can be defined as aspects of social structure that facilitate the production of or provide access to resources used by individuals or collectivities to pursue goals (Tindall, Shakespear and Edwards 2024). This social network is formed because someone and others involved in this social network have a set of values and norms about goodness (for example, honesty, responsibility, trust, and reciprocity) that guide their lives and allow them to work together or take collective action (Fukuyama 1997).

Because social protests always involve a group of people, the values, norms, and norms of social networks formed before the protests were included in the category of social capital. The existence of social capital among protestors facilitated the protest (Williams 2020). Also, the decision to get involved and not get involved in collective actions is rare in isolated social situations but tends to occur in specific social networks

(Bernroider, Harindranath and Kamel 2022, González 2020, Lau 2020). Conversely, protest actions can also increase the stock of social capital of fellow protest actions, for example increasing social cohesion (Zúñiga, Asún and Louis 2023).

Social protests also relate to governance and public services. Governance refers to the phenomenon of organizing state power, which promotes the networking and collaboration of various actors (government, private corporations, civil society) based on voluntary mechanisms, mutual benefits, flexibility, openness, transparency, and accountability (Klijn and Koppenjan 2016). Because public services or governance are related to public interests, social protests can be triggered because of public perceptions that the government has not succeeded in establishing governance and public services following their policy preferences or public distrust of governance (Barakat and Fakhri 2021).

Student protests in 1998, for example, were triggered because existing governance was laden with corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices. The same logic also explains the phenomenon of labor protests (Caraway et al. 2019, Nurlinah et al. 2021), social protests using social media (Pratama et al. 2022, Sutan et al. 2021), forest resource conflicts (Riggs, Sayer, Margules et al. 2016), and various structural conflicts in Indonesia. The birth of the privatization policy of public services in the 1980s, pioneered by the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, was a reaction to the poor governance of government institutions (Steger and Roy 2010). This narrative emphasizes that public service is a product of governance.

Meanwhile, historically, the Raskin program came from the Special Market Operations (*Operasi Pasar Khusus* or OPK) program released by the central government to anticipate the impact of the Monetary Crisis in 1998. The OPK program integrated into the Social Safety Net (*Jaringan Pengaman Sosial* or JPS) policy aimed at strengthening the resilience of family food and reducing poverty based on the suggestion of the World Bank. In addition to the OPK program, JPS policies include several programs that intervene in three main sectors: job creation, education, and health. In the Jokowi-JK era, the *Raskin* program evolved into the prosperous rice program (*Rastra*) and, based on Presidential Regulation No. 63 of 2017 concerning the Distribution of Non-Cash Social Assistance, became part of the Non-Cash Food Assistance (*Bantuan Pangan Non-Tunai* or BPNT) program (Sumarto 2023).

The *Raskin*, *Rastra*, or *BPNT* program is a derivative of the concept of the welfare state. By definition, a welfare state is a country which formally institutionalizes various

forms of social protection for its citizens. Its foundation is an ancient notion: *salus populi suprema lex esto* (the welfare of citizens is the highest law). According to this principle, the legitimacy of the government depends very much on how far it can improve the quality of the welfare of its citizens (Spicker 2000). In Indonesia, normatively, the identity as a welfare state is seen in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution: “...*in order to form a Government of the State of Indonesia that shall protect the whole people of Indonesia and the entire homeland of Indonesia, and in order to advance general prosperity, to develop the nation's intellectual life, and to contribute to the implementation of a world order based on freedom, lasting peace and social justice...*”. This fundamental norm legitimizes state intervention in promoting the welfare of the Indonesian people.

METHODS

This study adopted a quantitative approach, specifically logistic regression techniques. Researchers used the fifth wave of IFLS data collected by RAND Corporation and Survey Meters in 2014-2015, especially the results of interviews with the Informant Books. IFLS 5 is a continuation of the activities of IFLS 1 (1993), IFLS 2 (1997), IFLS 3 (2000) and IFLS 4 (2007) which were carried out in 13 provinces: four provinces in Sumatra (North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra and Lampung), five provinces on Java Island (DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, DI Yogyakarta, East Java), four provinces that present other islands (Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi) (Strauss, Witoelar and Sikoki 2016).

The population of IFLS 5th is the entire population of Indonesia. The IFLS 5th sample was selected using a stratified random sampling technique, which refers to the SUSENAS sampling framework in 1993. As many as 16,204 households, 50,418 individuals as household members, and 640 community leaders at the village level participated in a sample of the IFLS 5th (Strauss et al. 2016). Research respondents are residents or villagers who have a social role as senior teachers/headmasters, health practitioners, youth activists, religious leaders, party activists at the village level, or local entrepreneurs. The number of community leaders who were successfully interviewed by IFLS 5th with the Informant Book reached 640 people and spread over 13 provinces.

The IFLS 5th dataset used in this study is a longitudinal survey that adheres to rigorous international standards for survey design, implementation, and quality assurance. Sampling was conducted using a stratified random sampling technique to ensure representativeness across urban and rural areas in 13 provinces. Survey instruments

underwent extensive pilot testing to guarantee clarity and contextual appropriateness. Data collection was performed by trained enumerators under strict supervision, with multiple layers of quality control applied both during and after data collection. Reliability tests, such as Cronbach's alpha, confirmed the consistency of key variables, including social capital. Furthermore, the use of IFLS data in numerous peer-reviewed publications highlights its validity and acceptance among the academic community.

The researcher applies logistic regression techniques to analyze data using STATA 15. The data analysis process consisted of several stages: data transformation, bivariate analysis, multivariate analysis, and goodness of fit test. During bivariate analysis, each independent variable was tested individually against the dependent variable, using Chi-square tests to assess the significance of their relationships. Variables that showed a significant bivariate relationship were included in multivariate logistic regression models. A stepwise approach was adopted, following the recommendations of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000), to develop the most parsimonious model. The final logistic regression model was evaluated using pseudo- R^2 , Chi-square (X^2), and p-values to ensure model adequacy and reliability.

The dependent variable in this study is social protest (Y). It is defined as the presence or absence of citizen social protest caused by the implementation of the Raskin program and measures through the question as follows: "*is there protest from the community in this village against the Raskin program?*". This question has two answer options: Yes (1) and No (0).

Furthermore, this study has eleven independent variables — first, the social capital variable (X1). Data X1 was obtained from seven statements (tr14 - tr20) in the form of a Likert scale and had four answer options: "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Disagree," and "Strongly disagree." Of these seven statements, four statement (tr14, tr15, tr19, and tr20) are a positive, while three statement (tr16, tr17, tr18) are negative. If the respondent strongly agrees and agrees with the positive statements, this indicates high social capital at the community level and vice versa. Meanwhile, when respondents strongly agree and agree with the negative statements (tr16, tr17, and tr18), it shows low social capital in the community. The reliability and validity test for these seven statements is calculated using the Alpha (α). Data processing with STATA shows that all statement items have high reliability ($\alpha > 0.50$) and total α reaches 0.60. All statement items are also positive (+) indicating the positive relationship of each statement with the measuring

instrument. This variable transformed into a dummy variable (1 = higher social capital and 0 = low social capital).

Second, the variable of respondents' perceptions about the quality of citizen ID card (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk* or KTP) services (X2) which is measured through the question: "*how is the quality of KTP services in this village?*". This question has four answers: very adequate, adequate, inadequate, and very inadequate. For the data analysis, this variable is changed into a dummy variable (1 = adequate and 0 = inadequate).

Third, respondents' perceptions about the quality of driver license (*Surat Izin Mengemudi* or SIM) services (X3). which is measured through the question: "*how is the quality of SIM services in this village?*". This question has four answers: very adequate, adequate, inadequate, and very inadequate. Like X2, this variable is changed into a dummy variable (1 = adequate and 0 = inadequate).

Fourth, respondents' perceptions about the quality of district governance (X4), which is measured through the question: "*According to your assessment, how is the quality of governance at district level?*". This question consists of four answers: "The Best", "Good", "Bad", and "Worse". The respondent's response was recorded into a dummy variable (1 = Good and 0 = Bad).

Fifth, respondents' perceptions about the quality of village governance (X5) are measured through the question: "*According to your assessment, how is the quality of governance at the district level?*". This question consists of four answers: "The Best", "Good", "Bad", and "Worse". The respondent's response was recorded into a dummy variable (1 = Good and 0 = Bad).

Sixth, respondents' knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices in district government (X6): This variable is measured through the question: "*do you think that currently there are cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism in district government?*" with two possible answers: Yes (1) or No (0).

Seventh, respondents' knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices in village government (X7): This variable is measured through the question: "*Do you think that currently there are cases of corruption, collusion and nepotism in village government?*" with two possible answers: Yes (1) or No (0).

Eighth, type of residence (X8). It refers to the characteristics of the respondent's geographical location (1 = urban area and 0 = rural area).

Ninth, the type of respondent (X9). It refers to the social roles of the respondent in the community, such as senior teachers/headmasters, health practitioners, youth

activists, religious leaders, village-level party activists, and local entrepreneurs. This variable is changed into two categories: government actors (1) and non-government actors (0).

Tenth, sex (X10). It refers to the biological division between respondents (1 = male and 0 = female).

Eleventh, level of education (X11). For the analysis, the X11 is simplified into two categories: <SMA (0) and > SMA (1).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Results

Characteristics of Respondent

This research has 622 respondents who live in 13 provinces. The number of male respondents is 477 (77.94%) people, while female respondents are 135 (22.06%) people. 67.04% of respondents live in urban areas, and others (32.96 per cent) live in rural areas. Based on their social role, the composition of respondents consisted of schoolteachers/headmaster (18.01%), health practitioners (12.86%), youth activists (18.17%), party officials at the village level (15.27%), religious leaders (19.13%), and local entrepreneur (16.56%). The highest proportion (38.73%) of respondents had a bachelor's degree. Another respondent has a high school education (15.20%), academy/D1/D2/D3 (13.24%), vocational high school (9%), master's degree (6%), elementary school (5.88%), and junior high school (5.23%). Most respondents (23.71%) have settled in their village within 31-40 years. The second and third positions are occupied by respondents who have lived for 41-50 years (20.73%) and 21-30 years (20.07%) whereas respondents who had just settled in their village today for 0-10 years were only around 5.47%. Thus, the respondents of this study are Indigenous people who understand the characteristics of the area and the villagers very well.

Bivariate Analysis

Bivariate analysis was performed using a cross-tabulation technique. All independent variables are transformed into nominal types with only two categories. The bivariate analysis aims to find whether there is a relationship, the significance, and the strength of the relationship of each independent variable with social protest (Y) as the dependent variable. As shown in Table 1, the bivariate analysis results confirm that eleven independent variables identified by researchers as determinants of social protest have a

weak and significant relationship with social protest (Y). Thus, multivariate analysis using logistic regression will include all these independent variables.

| No. | Independent variable | X ² | df | p | Φ |
|-----|--|----------------|----|------|------|
| 1. | Perceptions about quality of district governance (X ₄) | 204.6 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.1 |
| 2. | Perceptions about the quality of village governance (X ₅) | 198.0 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.1 |
| 3. | Knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices in village government (X ₇) | 19.5 | 1 | 0.01 | -0.0 |
| 4. | Social capital (X ₁) | 18.0 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| 5. | Type of respondent (X ₉) | 12.9 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.04 |
| 6. | Level of education (X ₁₁) | 12.3 | | 0.01 | -0.0 |
| 7. | Perceptions about the quality of driver license service (X ₃) | 12.0 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.0 |
| 8. | Perceptions about the quality of citizen ID card service (X ₂) | 10.3 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.0 |
| 9. | Knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices in district government (X ₆) | 8.9 | 1 | 0.01 | -0.0 |
| 10. | Type of residence (X ₈) | 8.9 | 1 | 0.01 | -0.0 |
| 11. | Sex (X ₁₀) | 7.8 | 1 | 0.01 | -0.0 |

Table 1. Summary of bivariate analysis

Multivariate Analysis

The multivariate analysis begins by entering the independent variable, which sequentially has the most considerable chi-square value (X2) in the logistics regression formula. According to Table 2, X4 (respondents' perceptions about the quality of district governance) became the first independent variable to be included in the binary logistics regression because it has the giant X2, followed by X5 (respondents' perceptions about the quality of village governance), X7, (respondents' knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices in village governance), X1 (social capital), X9 (type of respondent) X11, (level of education), X3 (respondents' perceptions about the quality of SIM services), X2 (respondents' perceptions about the quality of KTP services), X6 (respondents' knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices in the district government), X8 (location of residence), and X10 (sex). In this process, if one's independent variable does not have a significant relationship with Y, it should be omitted from logistic regression in the next step.

The results of multivariate analysis showed that three independent variables (perceptions about the quality of KTP service/X2, perceptions about the quality of SIM service/X3, and type of respondent/X9) were eliminated from the logistic regression model because they did not significantly affect Y ($p > 0.05$). The final model of the logistic regression model can be formulated as follows: $Y = 3.3198 + -1.1368 * X4 + -1.8105 * X5 + 0.3069 * X11 + -0.1993 * X6 + 0.3867 * X8 + 0.2196 * X10 + -0.0349 * X1$. This final model can explain social protest (Y) by 0.0515 (15%) significantly, $X2 (7) = 428.32, p < 0.01$. The areas above 5 percent are caused by another independent variable not identified by this study.

| Independent variable (X) | Dependent variable (Y): social protest |
|--|---|
| Perceptions about quality of district governance (X ₄) | -1.137*** (-0.108) |
| Perceptions about the quality of village governance (X ₅) | -1.811*** (-0.164) |

| | |
|--|------------------------|
| Level of education (X ₁₁) | 0.307*** (-0.0937) |
| Knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices in district government (X ₆) | -0.199*** (-0.0574) |
| Type of residence (X ₈) | 0.387*** (-0.0626) |
| Sex (X ₁₀) | 0.220*** (-0.0753) |
| Social capital (X ₁) | -0.0349*** -0.0135 |
| Constant | 3.320*** (-0.279) |
| Observations | 6,287 |
| Standard errors in parentheses | |
| *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 | |

Table 2 The final model of logistic regression

Discussion

This study examines the relationships between various determinants—social capital, perceptions about the quality of KTP and SIM services, governance at the village and district levels, knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices, type of residence, type of respondent, and education level—in shaping social protest within the implementation of the *Raskin* program. Through a series of analyses, the study highlights expected and unexpected patterns that provide meaningful theoretical and practical insights.

The bivariate analysis demonstrates statistically significant but weak relationships for all independent variables. However, the multivariate analysis refines the model, excluding four variables—perceptions about the quality of KTP and SIM services, knowledge about corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices at the village level, and type of respondent—as they were not statistically significant. The final logistic regression model, consisting of seven key variables, explains 5.15% of the variability in social protest (Pseudo R² = 0.0515, X² (7) = 428.32, $p < 0.01$). This leaves 94.85% of the

phenomenon unexplained, indicating social protest's complexity, as Opp (2009) emphasized.

The study reveals significant negative relationships between perceptions of governance quality and social protest. Specifically, perceptions of village governance quality (X5) contribute the most, reducing social protest likelihood by 83% for every one-percent improvement in perceived governance quality. Similarly, perceptions of district governance quality (X4) show a 67.9% reduction in protest likelihood. These results align with governance theories posited by Riggs et al. (2016), which emphasize the role of institutional performance in building trust and mitigating dissatisfaction. In the context of the Raskin program, these governance variables highlight the critical role of local and regional governments as key actors in welfare program implementation.

Education (X11) demonstrates a positive relationship with social protest, with individuals attaining higher education levels (>SMA) being 18.1% more likely to participate in protests. This finding supports theories of civic engagement and social movements, arguing that education fosters critical awareness, enabling citizens to advocate for change (Sawyer and Korotayev 2021). It underscores education's empowering role in driving democratic participation and social justice.

Conversely, social capital (X1) exhibits a negative relationship with social protest, contradicting earlier findings which implicitly show positive associations (Bernroider et al. 2022, Lau 2020, Tindall et al. 2024, Williams 2020). In the context of the Raskin program, high social capital appears to foster trust rather than collective dissent, underscoring the importance of contextual factors in analyzing the interplay between social capital and protest behavior.

The type of residence (X8) adds another layer of nuance. The finding that rural residents are slightly more likely to engage in social protests than urban residents contrasts with conventional assumptions that urban areas dominate collective actions due to superior access to resources and networks (Sawyer, Romanov, Slav and Korotayev 2021). This result invites further exploration into the geographical and sociopolitical dynamics of rural communities in Indonesia.

The findings of this study contribute substantial insights into interpreting the dynamics of social protest, both from the lens of social policy and sociological theory. Each determinant—governance quality, education level, social capital, type of residence, gender, and corruption awareness—offers distinct implications for understanding and addressing citizen dissent within the framework of the Raskin program.

From a social policy perspective, the negative relationships between perceptions of governance quality at village (X5) and district (X4) levels and social protest underscore the importance of institutional performance in fostering trust and minimizing dissatisfaction. These findings highlight the critical need for governance reforms prioritizing transparency, accountability, and responsiveness across all levels. Aligning with the work of Riggs et al. (2016), this study reinforces the argument that improvements in governance quality serve not only as preventive measures against citizen unrest but as vital strategies for strengthening state-citizen relations. Additionally, given the positive link between education (X11) and social protest, policymakers should recognize education as a dual-purpose tool. Beyond empowering citizens to engage critically with governance structures, education equips individuals to mobilize constructively, advocating for policy changes that align with democratic principles. Sawyer and Korotayev (2021) aptly characterize education as a cornerstone for fostering civic engagement and social justice, a perspective that this study corroborates

Social capital (X1) emerges with complex implications, presenting a negative association with social protest in the context of the Raskin program. This contradicts earlier findings that argue that high social capital facilitates collective action (Bernroider et al. 2022, González 2020, Lau 2020, Williams 2020). Policymakers can leverage this nuanced understanding by fostering community dialogue and strengthening trust networks, preventing grievances from escalating into protests. This approach emphasizes community cohesion as a mechanism for conflict resolution.

The role of type of residence (X8) further challenges prevailing assumptions in protest literature. Rural residents are slightly more likely to engage in protests than their urban counterparts, contradicting the arguments of Sawyer et al. (2021) that urban areas dominate protest activities due to resource accessibility. This finding necessitates tailored interventions to address the socio-political realities of rural communities, bridging the resource and governance disparities that fuel their dissent. Similarly, gender dynamics (X10) reflect the heightened sensitivity of women to household needs, particularly regarding welfare programs like Raskin. This insight highlights the importance of gender-sensitive policies, ensuring that welfare initiatives adequately address women's concerns and priorities.

In sociological theory, this study's findings make important contributions to the literature on social protest, social capital, and governance. The complexity of social protest phenomena, as evidenced by the model's limited explanatory power (5.15%),

underscores the multifaceted nature of citizen dissent—a point previously emphasized by Opp (2009). This highlights the necessity for integrating interdisciplinary approaches, such as framing theory and political opportunity structure theory, to develop a comprehensive understanding of protest dynamics.

Moreover, the study's challenge to conventional perspectives on social capital—presenting a negative relationship within the Raskin program—supports the argument for contextualizing theoretical frameworks. It affirms the previous findings which note that social capital's role varies significantly across different socio-political environments (Bernroider et al. 2022, González 2020, Lau 2020). Governance theory is further validated by the strong explanatory power of village (X5) and district governance (X4) variables, reinforcing Steger and Roy (2010) assertion that governance quality directly shapes citizen behavior and collective action. Lastly, the consistent positive relationship between education and protest emphasizes education's pivotal role in sociological frameworks of civic engagement and mobilization, enriching the theoretical discourse around empowerment and social movements.

CONCLUSION

This study investigates how social capital, service quality perceptions (KTP and SIM), governance, corruption awareness, residence type of respondent, and education level shape social protest within the Raskin program. Bivariate analysis reveals weak but significant relationships across variables. In contrast, the multivariate analysis excludes perceptions of KTP and SIM service quality, corruption awareness at the village level, and respondent type as insignificant predictors. The final logistic regression model, comprising seven independent variables, explains 5.15% of protest variability, emphasizing the phenomenon's complexity. Governance quality is the most influential factor, with improved village and district governance reducing protest likelihood by 83% and 67.9%, respectively, reflecting the critical role of institutional performance in fostering citizen trust. Education positively correlates with protests, highlighting its role in empowering citizens to advocate for change, while social capital shows a negative relationship, indicating that high trust mitigates protest likelihood. Rural residents are slightly more inclined to protest than urban residents, and women demonstrate higher sensitivity to household welfare needs, increasing their likelihood to protest.

These findings suggest actionable recommendations, including enhancing

governance transparency, ensuring equitable access to education, strengthening social capital through community-based initiatives, and addressing rural disparities. Future research should expand variables, such as household income and family size, employ SUSENAS data, and use advanced techniques like multi-level analysis to deepen insights into social protest dynamics. While this study advances sociological theories on governance, education, and social capital, its explanatory model reflects the need for interdisciplinary approaches to enrich understanding and inform effective policy strategies for addressing institutional trust and collective action.

REFERENCES

- Abbas, Abdul Harris, Hasyim Aidid, Musafir Pabbabari and Marilang Marilang. 2021. "Social Protest Movement Islamic Law Perspective (Critical Study of the Protest Phenomenon in Indonesia)." *Jurnal Diskursus Islam* 9(2). doi: <https://doi.org/10.24252/jdi.v9i2.22596>.
- Andrain, C. F. and D. E. Apter. 1995. *Political Protest and Social Change: Analyzing Politics*. London, UK: Macmillan Publisher.
- Ari Fazlur, M. . 2020. "The Effectiveness of the Raskin Policy and Household Food Security in Medan Sinembah Village, Tanjung Morawa District, Deli Serdang Regency." *ProBisnis : Jurnal Manajemen* 11(1):32-39. doi: <https://doi.org/10.62398/probis.v11i1.9>.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin A. Olken and Sudarno Sumarto. 2019. "Private Outsourcing and Competition: Subsidized Food Distribution in Indonesia." *Journal of Political Economy* 127(1):101-37. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1086/700734>.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, Elan Satriawan and Sudarno Sumarto. 2023. "Electronic Food Vouchers: Evidence from an at-Scale Experiment in Indonesia." *American Economic Review* 113(2):514-47. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210461>.
- Barakat, Zahraa and Ali Fakih. 2021. "Determinants of the Arab Spring Protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya: What Have We Learned?". *Social Sciences* 10(8). doi: <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10080282>.
- Barker, C. 2013. "Class Struggle and Social Movements." in *Marxism and Social Movements*, edited by C. Barker, L. Cox, J. Krinsky and A. G. Nilsen. Leiden,

Netherland: Brill.

- Bernroider, Edward W. N., G. Harindranath and Sherif Kamel. 2022. "From Connective Actions in Social Movements to Offline Collective Actions: An Individual Level Perspective." *Information Technology & People* 35(8):205-30. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1108/itp-08-2020-0556>.
- Bräuchler, Birgit. 2018. "Bali Tolak Reklamasi: The Local Adoption of Global Protest." *Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies* 26(3):620-38. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354856518806695>.
- Bräuchler, Birgit. 2019. "Brokerage, Creativity and Space: Protest Culture in Indonesia." *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 40(4):451-68. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2019.1628721>.
- Caraway, Teri L., Michele Ford and Oanh K. Nguyen. 2019. "Politicizing the Minimum Wage: Wage Councils, Worker Mobilization, and Local Elections in Indonesia." *Politics & Society* 47(2):251-76. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329219838917>.
- Cologna, V, G. Hoogendoorn and C. Brick. 2021. "To Strike or Not to Strike? An Investigation of the Determinants of Strike Participation at the Fridays for Future Climate Strikes in Switzerland." *PLoS ONE* 16(10):e0257296. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257296>.
- Dhosa, Didimus Dedi. 2021. "State-Led Forest Development and Social Protest in East Nusa Tenggara Province." *Forest and Society*:288-303. doi: <https://doi.org/10.24259/fs.v5i2.11320>.
- Facal, Gabriel and Gloria Truly Estrelita. 2020. "Social Movements Facing Authoritarian-Style Neoliberal Governments: Comparative Positioning Towards Violence in Indonesia and France." *Jurnal Humaniora* 32(3). doi: <https://doi.org/10.22146/jh.59555>.
- Fandaru, Raden Rahman Asjhatri. 2016. "New Design of Raskin Program (Analysis Implementation Rasda in Kulonprogo Regency)." *JKAP (Jurnal Kebijakan dan Administrasi Publik)* 20(1). doi: <https://doi.org/10.22146/jkap.12643>.
- Fukuyama, F. 1997. *Social Capital*. Oxford, UK: Brasenose College.
- González-Bailón, Sandra and Ning Wang. 2016. "Networked Discontent: The Anatomy of Protest Campaigns in Social Media." *Social Networks* 44:95-104. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2015.07.003>.
- González-Cacheda, Bruno and Celso Cancela Outeda. 2021. "Political Crowdfunding and Resource Mobilization for Collective Action: The Keys to Success." *Technology in*

- Society* 67. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2021.101743>.
- González, Felipe. 2020. "Collective Action in Networks: Evidence from the Chilean Student Movement." *Journal of Public Economics* 188. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104220>.
- Gupta, P. and B. Huang. 2018. "In-Kind Transfer and Child Development: Evidence from Subsidized Rice Program in Indonesia." Tokyo, Japan: Asian Development Bank.
- Hanna, R and B. A. Olken. 2018. "Universal Basic Incomes Versus Targeted Transfers: Anti-Poverty Programs in Developing Countries." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 32(4):201-26. doi: <https://doi.org/10.3386/w24939>.
- Hosmer, D. W. and S. Lemeshow. 2000. *Applied Logistic Regression*. Massachusetts, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Ilyas, I. 2017. "Implementasi Sistem Pendukung Keputusan Penerima Beras Untuk Keluarga Miskin (Raskin) Menggunakan Metode Ahp (Analytical Hierarchy Process)." *Jurnal Sistemasi* 6(2):18-25. doi: <https://doi.org/10.32520/stmsi.v6i2.23>.
- Jasper, J. M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements*. Illinois, USA: The University of Chicago Press.
- Jayawardana, Danusha, Nadezhda V. Baryshnikova and Ngoc Thien Anh Pham. 2021. "Can Unconditional in-Kind Transfers Keep Children out of Work and in School? Evidence from Indonesia." *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy* 21(3):1035-65. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2020-0442>.
- Jenkins, J. C. and B. Klandermans. 1995. *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*. Minnesota, USA: University of Minnesota Press.
- Jeong, S. J., H. Lee and C. S. Suh. 2025. "Moving Apart, Coming Together: The Formation of an Lgbtq Movement Community in South Korea." *J Homosex* 72(7):1375-400. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2024.2378743>.
- Klijn, E. H. and J. Koppenjan. 2016. *Governance Network in the Public Sector*. New York, USA: Routledge.
- Lane, Daniel S., Kevin Do and Nancy Molina-Rogers. 2021. "What Is Political Expression on Social Media Anyway?: A Systematic Review." *Journal of Information Technology & Politics* 19(3):331-45. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2021.1985031>.
- Lau, Pui Yan Flora. 2020. "Fighting Covid-19: Social Capital and Community Mobilisation in Hong Kong." *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*

- 40(9/10):1059-67. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1108/ijssp-08-2020-0377>.
- Manik, A. R. S., B. Nurhadiyono and Y Rahayu. 2015. "Implementasi Metode Weighted Product (Wp) Dalam Sistem Pendukung Keputusan Untuk Menyeleksi Penerima Beras Masyarakat Miskin (Raskin)." *Techno.com* 14(2):109-14.
- Michel, Diana, Titin Purwaningsih, Dian Eka Rahmawati and Arissy Jorgi Sutan. 2023. "Digital Social Movement: Using Social Media to Reject Indonesia's Draft Criminal Code (Ruu Kuhp)." *Digital Theory, Culture & Society* 1(1):9-21. doi: <https://doi.org/10.61126/dtcs.v1i1.5>.
- Mutiah, Sarah Ayu and Istiqomah Istiqomah. 2017. "Determinants of Household Food Security in Urban Areas." *Jejak* 10(1):103-20. doi: <https://doi.org/10.15294/jejak.v10i1.9130>.
- Nardini, Gia, Tracy Rank-Christman, Melissa G. Bublitz, Samantha N. N. Cross and Laura A. Peracchio. 2021. "Together We Rise: How Social Movements Succeed." *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 31(1):112-45. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1201>.
- Nasrudin, Rus'an, Budy P. Resosudarmo, Satoshi Yamazaki and Wardis Girsang. 2020. "Contribution of Cash Transfers in Moderating Household Food Insecurity in Small-Island Communities: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia." *Marine Policy* 118. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104025>.
- Nasution, Rizki Ramadhani. 2021. "From the Tweets to Street: The Production of #Gejayanmemanggil Movement Discourses and Frames." *ETTISAL : Journal of Communication* 6(2). doi: <https://doi.org/10.21111/ejoc.v6i2.7013>.
- Nurlinah, Haryanto, Sukri and Sunardi. 2021. "Informal Politics and Local Labor Activism in Indonesia." *Critical Asian Studies* 53(4):561-81. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2021.1965896>.
- Opp, K-D. 2009. *Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique, and Synthesis*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Ozkan, Zafer. 2024. "Understanding Protest Intentions: The Influence of Belief Systems Post-Earthquake Tragedies." *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction* 115. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdr.2024.105031>.
- Pang, N., D. Goh and A. Rohman. 2016. "The Impacts of Mobile Social Media on Collective Action: Two Case Studies from Singapore and Indonesia. ." in *Mobile Media, Political Participation, and Civic Activism in Asia*, edited by R. Wei. Springer: Springer, Dordrecht.

- Porta, D. D. and M. Diani. 2006. *Social Movement: An Introduction*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.
- Power, Séamus A. 2018. "The Deprivation-Protest Paradox: How the Perception of Unfair Economic Inequality Leads to Civic Unrest." *Current Anthropology* 59(6):765-89. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1086/700679>.
- Pratama, I., A. Nurmandi, I. Muallidin, D. Kurniawan and Salahudin. 2022. "Social Media as a Tool for Social Protest Movement Related to Alcohol Investments in Indonesia." Paper presented at the the 5th International Virtual Conference on Human Interaction and Emerging Technologies, IHiet 2021, 28-30 October 2021, France.
- Pratama, Irfandi and Zuly Qodir. 2022. "What Lies Behind No-Confidence Motion on Indonesian Social Media?". *Society* 10(1):84-96. doi: <https://doi.org/10.33019/society.v10i1.334>.
- Price, S. and R. S. Sabido. 2015. *Contemporary Protest and the Legacy of Dissent*. London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Purnomo, Aris Eko, Bambang Supriyono and M. R. Khairul Muluk. 2015. "Does the Subsidized Rice Program Successfully Alleviate Poverty? (a Case Study Central Java Province)." *Wacana, Jurnal Sosial dan Humaniora* 18(02):116-26. doi: <https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.wacana.2015.018.02.5>.
- Putri, Fanda Amalia. 2024. "Political Opportunity, Media Framing and Resource Mobilization." *Journal of Kuasa* 1(2):64-71. doi: <https://doi.org/10.22437/kuasa.v1i2.11>.
- Rammohan, Anu and Achmad Tohari. 2023. "Food Vouchers and Dietary Diversity: Evidence from Social Protection Reform in Indonesia." *Food Security* 16(1):161-84. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-023-01413-0>.
- Reinmuth, D. 2016. "Judith Butler and the Politics of Protest." in *Social Theory and Social Movement: Mutual Inspirations*, edited by J. Roose and H. Dietz. Wiesbaden, Germany: Springer VS.
- Riggs, Rebecca Anne, Jeffrey Sayer, Chris Margules, Agni Klintuni Boedhihartono, James Douglas Langston and Hari Sutanto. 2016. "Forest Tenure and Conflict in Indonesia: Contested Rights in Rempek Village, Lombok." *Land Use Policy* 57:241-49. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.06.002>.
- Rucht, D. 2016. "Protest Cultures in Social Movements: Dimensions and Functions." in *Protest Cultures: A Companion*, edited by K. Fahlenbrach, M. Klimke and J.

- Scharloth. New York, USA: Berghahn.
- Sadono, Endiarjati Dewandaru. 2018. "Impact Evaluation of Raskin Program Using Matching Method: Case of Ifls 5." *Jejak* 11(1):207-23. doi: <https://doi.org/10.15294/jejak.v11i1.9192>.
- Sangnier, Marc and Yanos Zylberberg. 2017. "Protests and Trust in the State: Evidence from African Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 152:55-67. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.05.005>.
- Santillana, Melissa. 2024. "Framing Feminist Protest: A Content Analysis of the Glitter Revolution." *Feminist Media Studies*:1-17. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14680777.2024.2418378>.
- Sawyer, Patrick S. and Andrey V. Korotayev. 2021. "Formal Education and Contentious Politics: The Case of Violent and Non-Violent Protest." *Political Studies Review* 20(3):366-89. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929921998210>.
- Sawyer, Patrick S., Daniil M. Romanov, Maxim Slav and Andrey V. Korotayev. 2021. "Urbanization, the Youth, and Protest: A Cross-National Analysis." *Cross-Cultural Research* 56(2-3):125-49. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/10693971211059762>.
- Shafi, Saahir and Bing Ran. 2021. "Social Movements as Complex Adaptive Systems: The Antecedents and Consequences of Movement Participation in the Age of Social Media." *The Social Science Journal*:1-20. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2021.1949551>.
- Sitepu, Anwar. 2015. "Implementasi Kebijakan Program Subsidi Beras Untuk Masyarakat Berpenghasilan Rendah Di Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat." *Sosio Konsepsia* 4(2). doi: <https://doi.org/10.33007/ska.v4i2.114>.
- Spicker, P. 2000. *The Welfare State: A General Theory*. London, UK: SAGE Publication.
- Steger, M. B. and R. K. Roy. 2010. *Neoliberalisme: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Strauss, J., F. Witoelar and B. Sikoki. 2016. *The Fifth Wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey: Overview and Field Report Volume I*. California, USA RAND Corporations.
- Suharko, Suharko. 2020. "Urban Environmental Justice Movements in Yogyakarta, Indonesia." *Environmental Sociology* 6(3):231-41. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2020.1778263>.
- Sumarto, M. 2023. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Global Politics and the Development of Indonesia's Social Protection Policy " Pp. 349-68 in *The Paradox of Agrarian*

- Change Food Security and the Politics of Social Protection in Indonesia*, edited by J. F. McCarthy, A. McWilliam and G. Nooteboom. Singapore, Singapore: NUS Press.
- Sundari, Irma and Nachrowi Djalal Nachrowi. 2016. "Analisis Raskin Dan Ketahanan Pangan Rumah Tangga Di Indonesia (Analisis Data Susenas 2011)." *Jurnal Ekonomi dan Pembangunan Indonesia* 15(2). doi: <https://doi.org/10.21002/jepi.v15i2.452>.
- Sutan, A.J., A. Nurmandi, D. Mutiarin and S. Salahudin. 2021. "Using Social Media as Tools of Social Movement and Social Protest in Omnibus Law of Job Creation Bill Policy-Making Process in Indonesia. ." Paper presented at the the 2021 International Conference on Advances in Digital Science (ICADS2021), 19–21 February 2021, Salvador, Brazil.
- Sutan, Arissy Jorgi. 2024. "Social Media and Collective Identity on Protest, Analysis Comparative of Omnibus Law Protest and Hongkong 19-20 Protest." *Masyarakat, Kebudayaan dan Politik* 37(4):403-17. doi: <https://doi.org/10.20473/mkp.V37I42024.403-417>.
- Sutanto, Wiliyanti, Mayumi Sakaguchi, Eka Rastiyanto Amrullah, Aris Rusyiana and Akira Ishida. 2020. "Accurate Targeting in the Indonesian Raskin Program." *International Journal of Social Economics* 47(11):1363-79. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1108/ijse-03-2020-0124>.
- Tindall, D., M. Shakespear and B. Edwards. 2024. "Social Capital and Social Movements: Creating and Accessing Resources through Social Structures." in *Handbook on Inequality and Social Capital*, edited by S. McDonald, R. Côté and J. Jing Sh. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
- United Nations. 2015. *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York, USA: United Nations.
- Useem, Bert and Jack A. Goldstone. 2021. "The Paradox of Victory: Social Movement Fields, Adverse Outcomes, and Social Movement Success." *Theory and Society* 51(1):31-60. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-021-09460-2>.
- Valiavska, Anna and Rebecca Meisenbach. 2023. "Racialized Scripts of Silence: How Whiteness Organizes Silence as a Response to Social Protest About Racism in the United States." *Journal of Applied Communication Research* 51(6):582-601. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00909882.2023.2169888>.
- van Zomeren, Martijn, Nella Susilani and Simin Berend. 2016. "Explaining a Rare Null

- Relationship between Group Identification and Social Protest through a Relational Form of Coping with Low Group Status." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 4(1):381-402. doi: <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v4i1.419>.
- Williams, Dana M. 2020. "Relationships of Horizontalism and Hierarchy: Exploring Divergent Forms of Sociopolitical Trust." *Social Science Quarterly* 101(3):1150-64. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12784>.
- Yagci, Alper H. 2016. "The Great Recession, Inequality and Occupy Protests around the World." *Government and Opposition* 52(4):640-70. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2016.3>.
- Zhang, Bingbing and Juliet Pinto. 2021. "Changing the World One Meme at a Time: The Effects of Climate Change Memes on Civic Engagement Intentions." *Environmental Communication* 15(6):749-64. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2021.1894197>.
- Zúñiga, Claudia, Rodrigo Asún and Winnifred Louis. 2023. "Normative and Non-Normative Collective Action Facing Repression in a Democratic Context: A Mixed Study in a Chilean Social Movement." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 11(1):362-82. doi: <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.7973>.