

DIGITAL NARRATIVES ON PAPUA AND ACEH: A DESCRIPTIVE SECURITIZATION AND FRAMING ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MEDIA

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ABSTRACT

Securitization theory explains how an issue is made to appear as a major threat requiring extraordinary handling, but not how competing publics frame and contest such issues on social media. This descriptive study examines recent issues concerning Papua and Aceh on social media using securitization theory, complemented by framing analysis. The data used comes from Reportica media monitoring, consisting of 641 pieces of content on Papua (July 14 to August 12, 2026) and 2.6 thousand conversations on Aceh (August 9 to 16, 2026), analyzed separately because they differ in collection method and level of detail. Papua-related discourse is dominated by negative sentiment (55.4%), with “papua merdeka” (free Papua) appearing most frequently. However, the narrative with the highest engagement condemns violence by separatist groups rather than criticizing the government. In Aceh, the raising of the Bulan Bintang flag during the 21st commemoration of Aceh Peace Day triggered 1.4 thousand conversations in a single day and five competing framing directions, while the media intelligence system gave near-identical security recommendations to almost every issue cluster, including small, symbolic ones. In both cases, criticism of development-policy negligence shows the most negative sentiment, although its volume is relatively small. Through securitization theory, these patterns can be read, in Papua, alongside prior arguments that state securitization has not stopped the violence, and in Aceh, as a monitoring system securitizing even symbolic issues. This study remains descriptive and interpretive. It does not establish causal effects, measure audience reactions, or statistically compare the two regions.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Papua and Aceh both have a long history of independence movements, but their current conditions differ greatly. In Papua, demands for self-determination have continued to be voiced since the territory’s transfer from Dutch to Indonesian administration in the 1960s (MacLeod, 2011).

Armed conflict between the Indonesian military/police (TNI-Polri) and the TPNPB-OPM continues to this day, amid a Special Autonomy policy that has not been considered successful (Pan & Xiao, 2023). Aceh, by contrast, ended thirty years of armed conflict through the 2005 Helsinki MoU (Jemadu, 2007). As a result, independence discourse on Aceh social media today mostly takes the form of historical memory and symbols of peace, rather than an active movement.

This study seeks to capture recent issues concerning both regions on social media, then examine how those issues are constructed and responded to, by both the state and media intelligence systems, using securitization theory. Put simply, this theory (Buzan et al., 1998) holds that a “security threat” is not something that automatically exists on its own. Rather, it is the result of how a given actor (the state, the media, or an analytical system) frames an issue as a major danger requiring extraordinary handling. However, this framing only succeeds if the public comes to believe the issue is genuinely dangerous. If the public does not believe it, the issue remains regarded as an ordinary political matter, not a security threat.

Wangge (2023) shows that the state has long used this perspective for the Papua conflict, but the approach has failed to convince its intended audience, the Papuan indigenous community, so that armed violence continues. This study examines the extent to which this pattern appears in social media data, noting that the data used is aggregate and cannot disaggregate audience identity in detail (see Section 2). For Aceh, this study examines whether today’s media intelligence systems still tend to frame symbolic issues as security threats even though the conflict itself ended long ago. As a complement, this study also draws on framing theory (Entman, 1993) for both datasets, and readiness theory (Schiff, 2013) for the context of Aceh’s peace history. However, the main theory used remains securitization theory. The two datasets are analyzed separately (see Section 2), without directly comparing them.

Securitization studies have long recognized that how a threat is communicated, and to whom, shapes whether securitization takes hold. Williams (2003) argues that securitization theory needs to take into account changes in the media through which security claims are communicated, while Balzacq (2005) emphasizes that securitization depends on the audience and the context in which a threat claim is received. Social media adds a further layer to this, because ordinary users can act both as audiences and as actors who spread security claims, as Umansky (2024) shows in the case of the Amazon fires on Twitter. To the authors’ knowledge, however, studies on securitization in Papua and Aceh, such as Wangge (2023), have mostly focused on state policy and its intended audience, rather than on how these issues are framed and contested in everyday digital discourse, or on the role of media intelligence systems in that process. Social media data is therefore used in this study not to test whether securitization succeeds among a particular audience, but to observe how security claims and competing narratives about Papua and Aceh are framed online. This distinction is important because the data used cannot identify whether accounts represent Papuan indigenous communities, Indonesian nationalist users, officials, media organizations, or international audiences (see Section 2).

This study seeks to answer three questions, namely (1) how the Papua and Aceh issues are framed into competing narratives on social media, (2) how the patterns of sentiment and issue-cluster prioritization in each dataset relate to the logic of securitization, and (3) what is gained by combining securitization theory with framing analysis rather than relying on either alone. Framing analysis is used because securitization theory can show that an issue has been cast as an existential threat, but not how competing publics build and contest that framing through problem definition, blame, moral judgment, and proposed remedy (Entman, 1993). Watson (2012) likewise argues that the framing literature can be integrated with the Copenhagen School to better explain how threats are constructed. Readiness theory and Habermas’s deliberative democracy framework (discussed further in Section 3) are used as complementary lenses rather than competing explanations. The former helps explain why old conflict memories in Aceh can resurface from a single symbolic moment, while the latter is used interpretively to assess how far this digital discourse is from open public deliberation.

2. RESEARCH METHODS

This study is descriptive and uses data from two Reportica social media monitoring datasets. Papua Data comprises 641 public posts from seven platforms (Twitter/X, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, YouTube, Threads, and news media), collected by Reportica under the monitoring theme of independence, human rights, and special autonomy using Papua-related keywords, over July 14 to August 12, 2026 (30 days). This dataset records the platform, account type, automated sentiment label, and posting time for each post. Aceh Data comes from the media intelligence report of the “Regional Security 2026” project, comprising 2.6 thousand conversations from seven channels over August 9 to 16, 2026 (8 days). Unlike the Papua data, the Aceh data is only available in summarized form, consisting of sentiment labels, emotion labels, and 20 issue clusters generated by an automated system, together with the recommended actions the system assigns to each cluster.

The two datasets are not statistically compared because they differ in four respects, namely the level of data granularity (Papua is per content, while Aceh has already been summarized), period length (30 days vs. 8 days), completeness of sentiment labeling (nearly complete for Papua, only 42.1% for Aceh), and the nature of the dominant events (the Papua issue is relatively constant over time, while the Aceh issue erupted from a single moment). For this reason, the Papua and Aceh findings are presented as two separate sections, each interpreted in its own way.

Sentiment, emotion, and issue-cluster labels in both datasets come from Reportica’s own automated classifier, which works from lexical and contextual pattern-matching rather than human review. Reportica does not publish accuracy or inter-rater figures for this system. In the Aceh data, sentiment and emotion labels are available for only 42.1% to 59.1% of all conversations. Because the Aceh data is only available in summarized form, its labels cannot be checked post by post, and no manual validation of the Papua labels was carried out in this study. The percentages and categories reported in Section 3 should therefore be read as output from an unvalidated automated tool, not as independently confirmed measurements.

In addition to securitization analysis, this study also conducts a framing analysis on both datasets. The unit of analysis is each post for the Papua data and each issue cluster for the Aceh data. Each unit is read through its keywords and text content, then categorized according to its framing direction using Entman’s (1993) four questions, namely what is considered the problem, who or what causes it, who is judged right or wrong, and what solution is proposed. For Papua, five frames are used. Delegitimization-OPM covers content portraying OPM/TPNPB as the perpetrator of violence against civilians. Legitimation-Reintegration covers narratives of former OPM members rejoining the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI), as well as development programs framed as a path toward “independence” through development rather than secession. Open Separatist covers KNPB actions, the Free West Papua movement, and referendum demands. Development Policy Critique covers criticism of development programs, land disputes over national strategic projects, and Special Autonomy implementation seen as not being felt by residents. Security Operations Critique covers content framing TNI-Polri military operations as excessive or escalatory actions. For Aceh, five frames are likewise used. Delegitimization-Repressive covers criticism of security forces seen as too harsh in dispersing protesting crowds. Delegitimization-Neglect covers criticism of the state seen as indifferent to disaster response and land disputes. Legitimation-Responsive covers appreciation for officials who responded through direct dialogue. Open Separatist Declaration covers open statements supporting independence that question the legitimacy of the Unitary State of Indonesia, including referendum discourse. Symbolic-Neutral covers historically toned stories and memories surrounding the peace commemoration.

All framing classification was carried out by a single coder following the procedure above. Where a unit could plausibly fit more than one frame, for example content criticizing a security operation while also raising development-policy complaints, it was placed in the frame with the stronger emphasis, judged by which of Entman’s (1993) four elements stood out most clearly in the text. Two Aceh issue clusters (Issue 14 and Issue 17) contain a mixture of criticism toward security forces and appreciation for the dialogical approach within the same cluster, so their conversation counts were divided equally between Delegitimization-Repressive and Legitimation-Responsive.

Because no second coder was involved, no reliability figure such as Cohen's kappa can be reported, so the framing results are approximate and serve as a complement to, not a replacement for, the securitization analysis in Section 3. All sentiment-percentage figures per framing group cited in Section 3 (including the finding on development-policy critique) are the author's own calculations from the raw data (Reportica, 2026b, 2026a), not quotations from other academic sources cited in this study.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Papua: State Securitization, Competing Frames, and the Limits of Social Media Data in Testing Wangge's Claim

Twitter/X was the platform with the most content (25.6%), followed by Instagram (15.8%), Facebook (14.8%), news media (14.2%), Threads (11.7%), TikTok (9.8%), and YouTube (8.1%). Daily content volume was fairly stable in the first half of July, then rose sharply entering August and peaked on August 3, 2026 with 107 pieces of content in a single day, about 15 times the daily average at the start of the period (Figure 1), before declining again. This spike did not stem from any single clear-cut event, consistent with the nature of the Papua issue, which is persistently present and can be spotlighted again at any time. This differs from Aceh, which was triggered by a single event.




Figure 1. Daily content-volume trend for Papua, July 14 to August 12, 2026
Source: Reportica data, processed (2026)




Figure 2. Sentiment distribution of Papua content
Source: Reportica data, processed (2026)




Figure 3. Top 10 most frequently occurring keywords on social media about Papua
Source: Reportica data, processed (2026)

Overall, 55.4% of content is negative in sentiment, 25.6% positive, and 19.0% neutral (Figure 2). News media recorded the highest proportion of negative sentiment (around 60%), consistent with the nature of the Papua human-rights issue, which is indeed often reported from a conflict perspective (Musaddad et al., 2024). The phrase “papua merdeka” (free Papua) appeared most frequently (489 times), far outnumbering other terms such as “free west papua” (106 times). This indicates that the demand for self-determination remains a prominent frame of Papua discourse (Pan & Xiao, 2023), even though the state has long applied a security approach to this conflict (Wangge, 2023). Most content (62.9%) came from ordinary individual accounts, rather than media or official institutional accounts.

Viewed through securitization theory (Buzan et al., 1998), the state has long treated demands for self-determination in Papua as a major threat to sovereignty requiring extraordinary handling. Wangge (2023) argues that this approach has failed to convince its actual intended audience, namely the Papuan indigenous community itself, causing them to increasingly disengage from the state’s official narrative, while armed violence on the ground continues. To better understand how this issue is actually framed on social media, this study groups all Papua content into five framing directions, based on the author’s own analysis of the raw data (Reportica, 2026b). The Delegitimization-OPM frame (168 pieces of content, 78.6% negative) portrays OPM/TPNPB as the perpetrator of violence against civilians, for example in the shooting incident in Yahukimo that killed road-project workers, and has an average engagement of 455, the highest of the five frames. The Legitimation-Reintegration frame contains only 9 pieces of content but has an average engagement of 3,365, by far the highest per post, and covers narratives of former OPM members rejoining the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI), as well as development programs such as Food Estate framed as a path toward “independence” through development rather than secession. The Open Separatist frame (159 pieces of content, 44.0% negative) covers KNPB actions, the Free West Papua movement, and referendum demands calling for recognition of colonization, with an average engagement of only 76, far lower than Delegitimization-OPM despite a similar content count. The Development Policy Critique frame (47 pieces of content) records 85.1% negative sentiment, the highest of the five frames, and covers alleged dangers of the free-nutrition program (MBG), land disputes over national strategic projects, and criticism of Special Autonomy implementation seen as not being felt by residents. Finally, the Security Operations Critique frame (50 pieces of content, 66.0% negative) frames TNI-Polri military operations as excessive or escalatory actions.

This is precisely where it differs from Wangge’s (2023) claim. His claim is specifically about the Papuan indigenous audience, whereas the social media data in this study is aggregate and does not disaggregate account identity, whether from Papuan indigenous residents, Indonesian nationalist netizens, mainstream media, official TNI accounts, or international accounts.

Because of this limitation, this study can neither prove nor disprove Wangge's specific claim about the Papuan indigenous audience. What can be shown is only a pattern at the level of general public digital discourse, and that pattern turns out to be more complex than initially assumed. The 55.4% negative sentiment might at first glance appear to be evidence of public rejection of the state's security narrative, consistent with Wangge's claim. Once disaggregated through the framing analysis above, however, most of that negative sentiment turns out to be directed at condemning OPM/TPNPB violence (the Delegitimization-OPM frame), rather than rejecting the state's security operations. This frame also has a far higher engagement than the Open Separatist frame, despite having a nearly equal content count. In other words, some of the negative sentiment initially read as "evidence of securitization's failure" actually, at the level of public digital discourse, runs in the same direction as, rather than against, the security framework used by the state. A different kind of risk for the state may instead come from the Development Policy Critique frame, which has the smallest volume but the highest negative sentiment of the five frames. Because its volume is small, this figure reflects the intensity of sentiment within the frame rather than its social or political weight. It may be that the securitization failure Wangge refers to is felt more through eroding trust in slow development policy than through open rejection of the security narrative itself, though this remains a hypothesis that needs further verification through field research capable of directly disaggregating audience identity.

Aceh: Triggering Event, Securitization by the System, and Five Competing Framing Directions

Threads was the channel with the most conversations (30.0%), followed by X (17.6%), TikTok (17.5%), News/Media (16.7%), and Instagram (15.7%). Unlike Papua, the volume of Aceh conversations was relatively low and stable during August 9 to 13 (22 to 63 conversations per day), then spiked sharply on August 15, 2026 to 1.4 thousand conversations in a single day, about 36 times the average of the first five days (Figure 4). This spike coincided with the 21st commemoration of Aceh Peace Day, when an incident involving the raising of the Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon and Star) flag in place of the Red-and-White flag at the Baiturrahman Grand Mosque triggered unrest between the crowd and security forces. This pattern, old conflict memories that can be reignited by a specific moment even though peace has lasted more than two decades, is consistent with readiness theory (Schiff, 2013).




Figure 4. Daily conversation-volume trend for Aceh, August 9 to 16, 2026

Source: Reportica data, processed (2026)

Of the conversations whose sentiment could be analyzed (42.1% of the total), the majority were neutral (66.2%), indicating that most content consisted of news reporting events rather than netizens' personal opinions. The finding most important for securitization theory, however, lies in how the system clusters issues. Of the 20 issue clusters detected, the largest indeed concerned the flag incident (380 conversations), but eight other, much smaller clusters, including symbolic issues

such as “21st Anniversary Reflection on the Helsinki MoU” (13 conversations), were displayed on equal footing in the top ten (Figure 5). More surprisingly, two of the four “High”-priority issues actually had small volumes (“Potential Horizontal Conflict,” 20 conversations; “Jusuf Kalla’s Response,” 24 conversations). This shows that the system’s danger-level assessment does not always align with conversation volume.




Figure 5. The ten issue clusters with the highest conversation counts, excluding predominantly positive-sentiment clusters (Aceh)
Source: Reportica data, processed (2026)

This pattern is further evident in the near-identical recommended actions across all 20 issue clusters, namely “field verification,” “heightened security alert status,” and a “12-hour” deadline, without distinguishing how great the actual danger is, even for issues with predominantly positive sentiment such as Peace Day greetings. In terms of who is speaking, the “Official Media Accounts” cluster was the most active (8 accounts, 5.3 million interactions), yet a single individual account (reset.feeds) in fact recorded the highest interaction count for a single post alone (9.4 million interactions). This is consistent with the finding that a single individual voice in the digital world can sometimes carry greater influence than official institutions, alongside the ongoing phenomenon of buzzers (Masduki & Wendratama, 2025; Miqdad, 2024).

In the Aceh case, securitization appears to have shifted from the state to the media intelligence system itself. The uniform recommended actions across nearly all 20 issue clusters, including small ones with positive sentiment, can be read as showing how issues that are actually merely symbolic and historical are still framed as security threats. Reading the monitoring system itself as a securitizing actor is an extension of the framework of Buzan et al. (1998) rather than something this study measures directly. It is inferred from the uniformity of the system’s recommendations, not demonstrated as a causal mechanism. Just as with Papua, this study groups Aceh issues (particularly those surrounding the August 15 flag incident) into five framing directions, based on the author’s own analysis of the 20 issue clusters in the data (Reportica, 2026a). The Delegitimization-Repressive frame has the largest volume, about 468 of 804 conversations across the 20 clusters, but an explicit negative ratio of only 27.3% (Issues 5, 11, 13, 15, 20, and half the share of Issues 14 and 17), and contains criticism of security forces seen as too harsh in dispersing protesting crowds. The Delegitimization-Neglect frame has the smallest volume, 52 conversations, but a 63.5% negative ratio, the highest of the five frames (Issues 2, 3, 4, and 10), and contains criticism of the state seen as indifferent to disaster response and land disputes, consistent with Kadir (2018), who notes that progress in Aceh’s economic and human-rights fields is still felt to be lagging.

The Legitimation-Responsive frame, about 83 conversations with a negative ratio of only 10.9%, the lowest of the five frames (Issues 6, 7, 9, and half the share of Issues 14 and 17), contains appreciation for officials who responded through direct dialogue, such as the Wali Nanggroe, the Deputy Governor, and the Aceh Regional Police Chief. The Open Separatist Declaration frame, about 167 conversations with a negative ratio of 41.5% (Issues 1, 18, and 19), contains open statements supporting independence that question the legitimacy of the Unitary State of Indonesia, including referendum discourse. Finally, the Symbolic-Neutral frame, about 35 conversations with a negative ratio of only 5.8% (Issues 8, 12, and 16), contains historically toned stories and memories surrounding the peace commemoration, tending to be neutral to positive in nature. Issue 14 (the Regional Police Chief's Efforts to Calm Crowd Tensions) and Issue 17 (Jusuf Kalla's Response) are each split between Delegitimization-Repressive and Legitimation-Responsive, since both clusters contain a mixture of criticism toward security forces and appreciation for the dialogical approach within the same cluster.

Just as with the pattern in Papua, the Delegitimization-Neglect frame, despite having far fewer conversations than Delegitimization-Repressive, in fact recorded the highest negative-sentiment ratio among the five frames. Conversely, statements from national figures characterizing this unrest as merely an "internal ex-GAM matter" spread widely as neutral news, and public officials' steps to engage directly in dialogue (the Legitimation-Responsive frame) consistently received positive sentiment. This pattern suggests, without proving it, that a human presence and a willingness to respond may help build public trust, even within an automated system that otherwise treats every issue as equally dangerous.

Commonalities Between the Two Cases: Neglected Policy as a Shared Weak Point

The most consistent finding to emerge across both cases, presented as a qualitative thematic commonality rather than a cross-data statistical test result (see Section 2), is that criticism of development-policy negligence records the most negative sentiment compared to criticism concerning armed-security incidents or particular symbols, namely 85.1% in Papua and 63.5% in Aceh, based on this study's own framing analysis of the raw data (Reportica, 2026b, 2026a). The number of conversations in this frame is far smaller in both cases than criticism surrounding security incidents, so its high negative-sentiment ratio reflects emotional intensity rather than social or political importance. Even so, this pattern is relevant for the development of securitization theory, because whether a securitization attempt succeeds or fails may not be adequately judged solely by whether the public believes a suddenly-emerging threat narrative (violent incidents, flag-raising). It may be equally important to consider how public trust could gradually erode because people feel the state is absent from everyday problems, such as land, health, and disaster aid, that rarely go viral but are felt more directly by those experiencing them.

Comparing the two cases also suggests that the actor performing securitization can change over time. In Papua, the primary actor remains the state, confronting an organized political movement directly. In Aceh, the primary actor appears to have shifted to an automated analytical system that operates in the name of security without considering the context of each issue. This is an interpretive extension of securitization theory rather than a directly measured finding. If this interpretation holds, it matters for the future development of securitization theory, because monitoring technology could itself become the actor performing securitization, no longer just state officials or political elites as originally envisioned by Buzan et al. (1998). Assessing whether a securitization attempt succeeds or fails would then also require attention to how an automated system continuously produces a uniform impression of "this is dangerous," and how quieter but longer-lasting issues, such as development-policy critique, may become a source of long-term public distrust that is harder to detect than narratives surrounding sudden incidents. Both possibilities remain propositions that require further empirical testing.

Securitization vs. the Public Sphere: A Habermasian Deliberative Democracy Perspective

As a complement to the securitization theory and framing analysis that form the main framework of this study, this section adds a further layer of analysis from a different perspective, namely Jürgen Habermas's theory of communication and deliberative democracy. Whereas securitization theory explains how an issue is removed from "normal politics" and framed as a threat that justifies extraordinary action, Habermas instead proposes the opposite ideal, the public sphere (Öffentlichkeit), an arena in which citizens engage in rational-critical debate, exchanging reasons with one another (rather than relying merely on power or money), to reach mutual understanding through communicative action (Habermas, 1984). Within Habermas's framework of deliberative democracy, the legitimacy of public policy ideally arises from an inclusive, domination-free communicative process, rather than from decisions made beyond the reach of public debate in the name of a "state of emergency" (Habermas, 1996).

This tension between the logic of securitization and the logic of deliberation has long been debated in international relations scholarship. Aradau (2004) shows that securitization and desecuritization are fundamentally a choice between two types of politics, namely democratic politics upholding universal norms and slow but inclusive procedures, versus a politics of exception (exceptional politics) that is fast-moving and excludes parties deemed "enemies." From this standpoint, the more an issue is securitized, the less room remains for a Habermasian deliberative process to take place, since securitization by definition means removing that issue from the normal channel of public debate.

When this framework is applied to the Papua and Aceh data, complementary patterns emerge. On the platform side, research on political social media in Indonesia generally shows that digital spaces which ideally could serve as a Habermasian deliberative public sphere often fail in practice to fulfill that function. Platforms tend to be polarized and concentrated around a small number of influential accounts, functioning more as arenas for asserting identity than spaces for deliberation (Wahyuana et al., 2025). A similar pattern may well be occurring in the Papua and Aceh discourse examined here. The dominance of negative sentiment and the five competing framing directions in both cases suggest that this digital space more closely resembles a fragmented arena of framing contestation than the rational-critical deliberative forum envisioned by Habermas.

On the side of the actor performing securitization, the interpretation that securitization in Aceh has shifted from the state to a "media intelligence system" is consistent with Aradau's (2004) argument above. An analytical system that uniformly recommends "field alert status" and a "12-hour SLA" for nearly every issue, including symbolic issues with positive sentiment, can be read as a form of exception from deliberative politics. The system does not open room for public argumentation about how dangerous an issue really is, but instead immediately places it within a security-response framework. This aligns with concerns that the algorithmic governance of digital platforms risks replacing citizen deliberation with a closed, technocratic logic (Nugroho, 2026).

As a matter of practical relevance, the finding that the persuasive steps taken by the Aceh Regional Police Chief and Deputy Governor Fadhlullah recorded the lowest negative-sentiment ratio (the Legitimation-Responsive frame) can be read as a small example of what Habermas envisioned, namely presence and direct dialogue rather than one-sided threat framing. Rather than continually framing symbolic issues as security threats (the logic of securitization), room for open dialogue among the state, the media, and citizens has the potential to become a public-communication strategy closer to Habermas's deliberative ideal, although whether such a strategy builds long-term public trust would need to be tested directly.

Even so, applying the Habermasian lens to this study's data carries the same limitations as the study's limitations in general (see Section 2). The data used is aggregate and derived from automated sentiment labels, so it cannot directly assess the quality of communicative rationality of each individual post as strictly required by Habermas's deliberation theory. The analysis in this section is therefore interpretive-qualitative, consistent with the overall descriptive nature of the study, rather than a direct measurement of the degree of deliberation in Papua and Aceh discourse.

4. CONCLUSION

This study shows that digital narrative monitoring can capture recent issues concerning post-conflict regions on social media, whether issues that are persistently present, such as self-determination demands in Papua, or issues that suddenly erupt from a single symbolic moment, such as the flag incident in Aceh. Viewed through securitization theory and complemented by framing analysis, both cases suggest that the logic of “this is dangerous” can continue to be applied even when the actual threat on the ground is small. However, the direction of framing turns out to be more complex than the simple assumption that “social media always weakens the government.” In Papua, the narrative with the highest engagement in fact condemns violence by separatist groups rather than the government, even though, as argued in previous studies, state securitization still has not stopped the armed conflict itself. In Aceh, the media intelligence system gives uniform security recommendations even to symbolic issues, which this study interprets as a shift of securitization from the state to the system, amid five competing framing directions, some disadvantageous to the government and others in fact advantageous.

These conclusions should be read with caution. What the data directly show is the diversity of narratives in both regions, the differences between the two datasets described in Section 2, and a development-policy critique frame that carries disproportionately negative sentiment in both cases despite its small volume. Claims that securitization has shifted from state actors to an automated system, that development-policy criticism feeds long-term public distrust, or that direct dialogue is more effective at building trust are theoretical interpretations consistent with the observed patterns, not findings that this study’s aggregate data can measure directly. These claims are therefore best treated as propositions for further research rather than as settled conclusions.

The highlights of the findings are 1) criticism of development-policy negligence, rather than the more widely reported security issues, is in fact the most emotionally charged, and may become a source of lasting public distrust, although this still requires further testing; 2) media intelligence practice and public-communication strategy need to be able to distinguish which issues genuinely risk escalating and which are merely symbolic, while also paying sufficient attention to everyday grievances that rarely go viral; and 3) Papua and Aceh must still be regarded as two distinct cases, not to be directly compared, given the major differences in conflict-resolution stage, data-collection method, and observation period.

This study has several limitations. First, sentiment, emotion, and issue-cluster labels are generated by Reportica’s automated system and have not been manually validated. Second, sentiment and emotion labels for the Aceh data cover only 42.1% to 59.1% of all conversations, and the Aceh data is only available in summarized form. Third, the framing analysis was carried out by a single coder without a reliability check. Fourth, the two datasets differ in observation period (30 days vs. 8 days) and level of granularity, so they cannot be statistically compared. Fifth, the data is aggregate and cannot identify audience characteristics, so it cannot show whether securitization succeeds or fails among a particular audience. Together, these limitations make this study descriptive rather than causal in nature.

Further research is therefore needed, particularly to identify the actors behind the accounts, to validate the automated sentiment and issue-cluster labels through manual content coding, to apply the framing scheme with more than one coder and a reported reliability score, and to draw on longitudinal or interview-based data that can directly test claims about public trust and the extent to which the public genuinely believes security-threat claims.

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