



**INVALID BALLOTS IN DUHOK GOVERNORATE, IRAQ'S 2025
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
THROUGH BOUNDED RATIONALITY**

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ABSTRACT

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Invalid ballots are votes that cost the voter time and effort but are not counted, yet ballot-level evidence from Iraq and the Kurdistan Region is scarce. In Duhok Governorate, 5.55% of the ballots cast in the 2025 parliamentary election were invalid, slightly below the reported national share of about 6%. This study asks how these ballots are distributed across marking patterns and registration centers, and what a bounded rationality perspective can and cannot say about them. All 34,694 invalid ballots were classified from scanned images into seven patterns following the criteria of the Independent High Electoral Commission. The classification was carried out under the supervision of the author with five trainers of the same electoral office, and results are summarized with frequencies, percentages, and the minimum, median, and maximum share of each pattern across centers; no inferential tests are applied. Overvotes dominate: ballots marking three or more lists account for 42.00% of invalid ballots and those marking two lists for 39.38%, followed by blank ballots (7.96%), candidate number without a list (6.37%), marks outside the range (2.79%), marks between two lists (1.12%), and marks with a different pen (0.38%). Composition varies widely across the 41 registration centers, with the share of three-or-more-list ballots ranging from 0% to 72.76%, and an abrupt break between the first five centers and the rest cannot be separated from differences in classification. The patterns are heterogeneous, and the data cannot distinguish procedural error from protest. The results suggest that ballot format and voting instructions are a natural focus for further study. The findings are limited to one election in one governorate, contain no information on voter intent, and rely on internal coding.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Invalid ballots are cast by citizens who bear the cost of going to the polls but whose choice is not counted. In Iraq's parliamentary elections of 11 November 2025, which followed special voting for security forces and displaced persons on 9 November (Shafaq News, 2025), roughly 730,000 ballots nationwide, about 6% of all votes cast, were invalid (Dagher, 2025). According to the European Union Election Observation Mission (2022), invalid ballots accounted for 7.5% of the roughly 9.6 million votes cast nationwide in the 2021 election. In Duhok Governorate, 34,694 of 625,429 ballots (5.55%) were invalid in 2025, slightly below the national level and well below the other two Kurdistan Region constituencies, Sulaymaniyah (18.54%) and Erbil (14.60%), according to an analysis of data from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) reported by Rodgers (2025). Such volumes of discarded votes matter for representation and for confidence in the electoral process, yet ballot-level evidence from Iraq and the Kurdistan Region remains scarce.

Economic models of voting offer a natural starting point for interpreting this behavior, but they do not predict error-free voting. The rational choice tradition treats voting as a calculation of benefits and costs, including the costs of acquiring information (Downs, 1957), and later work adds civic-duty and expressive motives (Brennan & Lomasky, 1993; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). Sen (2002) cautions that rationality cannot be reduced to the pursuit of self-interest or to the internal consistency of choices. Bounded rationality emphasizes that decisions are made under limited information, time, and cognitive capacity, so that people settle for satisfactory rather than optimal alternatives (Simon, 1982), while institutional economics stresses that rules and procedures shape the constraints voters face (North, 1990). Throughout this paper, bounded rationality refers to decision-making under such informational, cognitive, and institutional constraints. From this perspective, an invalid ballot may reflect a procedural error under a complex ballot, a deliberate protest, or a mixture of both.

The empirical literature on invalid voting distinguishes these possibilities without settling between them. McAllister and Makkai (1993) find for Australian elections that invalid voting is shaped by institutional, social, and political factors at once, with part of it reflecting deliberate protest. Ugglä (2008) frames the question as one of incompetence, alienation, or calculation and concludes that no single explanation suffices. Driscoll and Nelson (2014) ask whether blank and spoiled votes in low-information, politicized settings reflect ignorance or opposition, and find that limited information raises the likelihood of error without explaining all invalid votes. Power and Garand (2007) relate invalid voting in Latin America to institutional, socioeconomic, and protest-related factors. A second strand focuses on ballot design: Kimball & Kropf (2005) link design features of paper ballots to unrecorded votes, Wand et al. (2001) argue that the butterfly ballot produced aberrant votes in Palm Beach County, and Herron & Sekhon (2003) examine overvoted ballots in Broward and Miami-Dade counties and their implications for representation.

Taken together, these strands imply different expectations. A procedural account would lead us to expect more invalid ballots where ballots are longer or more complex, in special voting with different formats, and where voter education is weaker, whereas a protest account would point to associations with turnout, local vote shares, or boycott intensity. The data used here cannot test these expectations, which are stated only to clarify what descriptive patterns can and cannot reveal. Ballot-level studies of overvoted and spoiled ballots have mostly examined U.S. counties (Herron & Sekhon, 2003; Wand et al., 2001), and, to the best of our knowledge, no study has documented how invalid ballots are distributed across marking patterns and across registration centers in an Iraqi governorate.

This study therefore has a descriptive aim. Using a complete count of the 34,694 invalid ballots in Duhok Governorate in the 2025 election, it asks how invalid ballots are distributed across seven marking patterns at the governorate level, how the composition of these patterns differs across the 41 registration centers, and how the bounded rationality perspective helps interpret these patterns while acknowledging what the data cannot show. The interpretations offered are tentative. The study contributes a complete ballot-level classification of invalid ballots for one governorate in a setting that has rarely been examined, which can serve as a reference point for future comparative work.

Its scope is correspondingly narrow: a single election in a single governorate, without information on voter intent. Section 2 describes the data and coding procedure, Section 3 reports and discusses the results, and Section 4 concludes.

2. RESEARCH METHODS

This study is a descriptive analysis of ballot-level data. It applies content analysis to the scanned images of all invalid ballots in Duhok Governorate in the 2025 Iraqi parliamentary election, classifying each ballot into a marking pattern and summarizing the results with frequencies and percentages. The design does not observe voter intentions. The election in Duhok was administered through 41 registration centers, 344 polling centers, and 1,684 voting stations. The study population is the complete set of invalid ballots from general voting and from special voting (displaced persons and military personnel), a total of 34,694 ballots, so no sampling was involved. The Duhok office of the IHEC received the data from the Commission's national office as PDF files containing scanned images of the ballots. Contextual indicators on registered voters, turnout, turnout by gender, and the share of invalid ballots among votes cast are reported in Tables 1–3 as background only and are not linked to individual invalid ballots.

The national office's file recorded only two classes of invalid ballots, so the Duhok office reclassified each ballot into seven categories following the Commission's counting criteria: voting for two lists only, meaning marks on two party lists; voting for three or more lists; marking between two lists, meaning a mark placed so that it cannot be attributed to one list; selecting the candidate number without the list; blank ballot, meaning no mark; marking with a different pen, meaning a mark made with an instrument other than the one prescribed; and marking outside the range, meaning a mark outside the designated area of the ballot. Because each ballot was assigned to a single category, the seven counts sum exactly to the total of 34,694 (Table 4), and any overlap between patterns, for example three lists marked with a different pen, is not visible in the data.

The classification was carried out under the supervision of the author, who is Head of the Training Section at the Duhok Electoral Office, with the assistance of five certified trainers from the same section, and the manual review took approximately three months. Because the coders belong to the same office whose operations are reflected in the data, there is a potential conflict of interest and a risk of observer bias, and the classification should be regarded as an internal product of the electoral office and not as independent coding. The ballot images were analyzed in the course of the author's official duties, and results are reported only as aggregated counts and percentages at the governorate and registration-center levels, so that no individual voter is identified. The coding team reported complete agreement (100%) among coders for each of the seven categories in its internal review. Because the procedure used to obtain this figure was not documented in detail, and because the coders worked within the same section as the author, it is reported only as an internal consistency check and is not interpreted as a chance-corrected reliability statistic or as independent validation of the classification.

Percentages are calculated relative to the total number of invalid ballots, for the governorate (Table 4) or for each registration center (Table 7). Across centers, the minimum, median, and maximum share of each pattern are also reported (Table 5); the medians are not weighted by the number of ballots. Because only the composition of invalid ballots is analyzed, the study cannot report invalid-ballot rates relative to ballots cast at the registration-center level, and differences between centers are described but not tested statistically. Table 7 is organized by registration center and not by voter category, so general and special voting cannot be compared. Two further features of the data limit what can be inferred: the ballots analyzed are only those that counting staff classified as invalid, so adjudication practices at polling stations are part of how the dataset was produced, and because the ballots were available as scanned images, image quality may have affected how some markings were classified.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. RESULTS

Of 805,269 registered voters in Duhok, 625,429 cast a ballot, a participation rate of 77.67% (Table 1). Men accounted for 52.69% of voters (329,511) and women for 47.31% (295,918) (Table 2); because the number of registered voters by gender is not available here, these shares cannot be converted into gender-specific turnout. Of the votes cast, 590,735 (94.45%) were valid and 34,694 (5.55%) were invalid (Table 3). These indicators describe the setting and are not linked to individual invalid ballots.

Table 1. Frequency and relative distribution of electoral participation

Voter Category	Frequency	Percentage
Voters	625,429	77.67%
Non-Voters	179,840	22.33%
Total registered voters	805,269	100%

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on IHEC data (2026)

Table 2. Frequency and relative distribution of participation by gender

Voter Category	Frequency	Percentage
Males	329,511	52.69%
Females	295,918	47.31%
Total votes cast	625,429	100%

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on IHEC data (2026)

Table 3. Frequency and relative distribution of invalid ballots among total voters

Voter Category	Frequency	Percentage
Total invalid ballots	34,694	5.55%
Total valid ballots	590,735	94.45%
Total votes cast	625,429	100%

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on IHEC data (2026)

Two patterns dominate the invalid ballots. Voting for three or more lists accounts for 14,571 ballots (42.00%) and voting for two lists only for 13,664 (39.38%), together 81.38% of all invalid ballots (Table 4). Blank ballots (2,760; 7.96%) and ballots on which only the candidate number was marked (2,210; 6.37%) follow, then marks outside the range (969; 2.79%), marks between two lists (388; 1.12%), and marks with a different pen (132; 0.38%).

Table 4. Distribution of Invalid Ballot Patterns at the Governorate Level

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Voting for two lists only	13,664	39.38%
Voting for three or more lists	14,571	42.00%
Marking between two lists	388	1.12%
Selecting the candidate number without the list	2,210	6.37%
Blank ballot	2,760	7.96%
Marking with a different pen	132	0.38%
Outside the range	969	2.79%
Total	34,694	100.00%

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on IHEC data (2026)

The composition varies considerably across the 41 registration centers. Table 5 summarizes the minimum, median, and maximum share of each pattern across centers, and the complete center-level distribution is reported in Table 7. The share of ballots with three or more lists ranges from 0% (Duhok 1 and Zawita 1) to 72.76% (Bardarash 3), with a median of 36.97%, while the share of ballots with two lists ranges from 13.63% (Aqrah 2) to 79.73% (Zawita 1), with a median of 42.29%.

The remaining patterns differ in how much they vary across centers (Table 5). Among the patterns with a substantial share, blank ballots are the most stable, ranging from 5.64% (Qasrok 3) to 12.41% (Aqrah 2), with a median of 8.27%. Ballots marked only with a candidate number range from 2.36% (Bardarash 3) to 10.84% (Deralun 3). Marks between two lists never exceed 3.39% (Deralun 3) and are absent in Media 2, and ballots marked with a different pen never exceed 1.09% (Qasrok 3) and are absent in 12 centers. Marks outside the range run from none (Bajil 1 and Aqrah 1) to 19.23% (Qasrok 2) and are concentrated in a few centers: besides Qasrok 2, shares above 10% appear in Deralun 3 (13.77%), Qasrok 4 (11.72%), and Batofa 2 (10.42%).

Table 5. Minimum, Median, and Maximum Share of Each Invalid-Ballot Pattern across the 41 Registration Centers (%)

Invalid-ballot pattern	Minimum (%)	Median (%)	Maximum (%)
Voting for two lists only	13.63 (Aqrah 2)	42.29	79.73 (Zawita 1)
Voting for three or more lists	0.00 (Duhok 1, Zawita 1)	36.97	72.76 (Bardarash 3)
Marking between two lists	0.00 (Media 2)	1.27	3.39 (Deralun 3)
Selecting the candidate number without the list	2.36 (Bardarash 3)	7.36	10.84 (Deralun 3)
Blank ballot	5.64 (Qasrok 3)	8.27	12.41 (Aqrah 2)
Marking with a different pen	0.00 (12 centers)	0.30	1.09 (Qasrok 3)
Outside the range	0.00 (Bajil 1, Aqrah 1)	2.64	19.23 (Qasrok 2)

Note: Medians are computed across centers and are not weighted by the number of ballots, so they differ from the governorate-level shares in Table 4.

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on IHEC data (2026)

The ten registration centers with the highest shares of three-or-more-list ballots are presented in Table 6. These shares range from 43.62% to 72.76%, led by Bardarash 3 (72.76%), followed by Aqrah 2 (61.28%), Bajil 1 (60.35%), Bardarash 2 (57.93%), Qasrok 3 (57.58%), Bardarash 1 (55.59%), Qasrok 1 (50.60%), Aqrah 1 (50.53%), Bajil 2 (46.60%), and Batofa 3 (43.62%). Because the shares within each center sum to 100%, a high share for one invalid-ballot pattern necessarily reduces the shares of the others. In Bardarash 3, for example, the highest share of three-or-more-list ballots coincides with the lowest share of ballots marked only with a candidate number (2.36%).

Table 6. Ten Registration Centers with the Highest Share of Three-or-More-List Ballots

Rank	Registration center	Invalid ballots	Three or more lists, n (%)
1	Bardarash 3	3,087	2,246 (72.76%)
2	Aqrah 2	1,152	706 (61.28%)
3	Bajil 1	1,556	939 (60.35%)
4	Bardarash 2	1,980	1,147 (57.93%)
5	Qasrok 3	1,188	684 (57.58%)
6	Bardarash 1	2,074	1,153 (55.59%)
7	Qasrok 1	1,253	634 (50.60%)
8	Aqrah 1	1,136	574 (50.53%)
9	Bajil 2	1,000	466 (46.60%)
10	Batofa 3	972	424 (43.62%)

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on IHEC data (2026)

In absolute terms, the five centers with the most invalid ballots, Bardarash 3, Bardarash 1, Bardarash 2, Bajil 1, and Qasrok 1, account for 9,950 ballots, or 28.7% of the total, while the three Bardarash centers alone account for 7,141 ballots (20.6%). All five also appear in Table 6. These figures represent counts of invalid ballots rather than invalid rates, because the number of ballots cast at each center is not available.

A discontinuity appears at the top of Table 7. In the first five centers (Bilind 1, Cegerxwîn 1, Media 1, Duhok 1, and Zawita 1), which together account for 3,675 invalid ballots (10.6% of the total), ballots with two lists account for 72.54% to 79.73% of invalid ballots,

while ballots with three or more lists account for no more than 6.86% and are absent in Duhok 1 and Zawita 1. From the sixth center onward, two-list ballots never exceed 60.65% and three-or-more-list ballots are never below 21.79%. Table 7 does not identify voter categories, so these differences cannot be attributed to general or special voting.

The coding team reported complete agreement (100%) for each of the seven patterns in its internal review. As noted in Section 2, the procedure behind this figure was not documented in detail and the coders belonged to the same office whose operations are reflected in the data, so it is not independent validation. This caveat matters for the discontinuity above, because a break of this kind could arise from classification practice as well as from differences among voters or ballots.

3.2. DISCUSSION

More than four in five invalid ballots in Duhok (81.38%) are overvotes of two or more lists. Overvoted ballots have been studied at the ballot level by Herron and Sekhon (2003), and the literature reviewed above offers both procedural and protest readings of them. The data used here do not allow a choice between these readings: a ballot with three lists marked and a ballot with five lists marked look the same in Table 4, and neither shows what the voter intended. What the data do show is that overvoting, and not omission, is the main form of invalidity, which makes the clarity of the ballot format and of voting instructions a natural subject for further study (Kimball & Kropf, 2005).

The smaller patterns admit a similar range of readings, although some are more plausible than others. A ballot with only a candidate number marked shows a preference for a candidate without the completed procedure, which is more naturally read as a procedural problem than as protest, although the data cannot confirm this. Blank ballots are treated in the literature as possible expressions of disengagement or opposition (Driscoll & Nelson, 2014), but they may equally reflect uncertainty at the moment of voting. They are also comparatively stable across centers (5.64% to 12.41%, Table 5), in contrast to the wide variation in overvote composition, although the data do not show why. Marks between two lists and marks outside the range are ambiguous by construction, and ballots marked with a different pen are so rare (132 of 34,694) that reading them as a deliberate act, rather than as a marking error, would go beyond what Table 4 supports.

Differences across centers are large, but their interpretation is limited by what the center-level data (Table 7) contain. The centers with high shares of three-or-more-list ballots, notably those of Bardarash, Bajil, and Qasrok, also account for the largest numbers of invalid ballots in absolute terms (20.6% for the three Bardarash centers alone). This fits an account in which ballots in these areas were more often invalidated deliberately, and it equally fits one in which local conditions, voter composition, or ballot handling differed. Neither can be assessed without ballots cast per center, voter categories, or covariates, none of which this study has. The concentration of marks outside the range in a few centers is likewise a descriptive finding whose explanation lies outside the data. Whether the dominance of overvotes is specific to Duhok, which has a much lower invalid share than Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, cannot be judged without comparable pattern-level data from those constituencies.

Seen through the bounded rationality perspective introduced above, the results show that invalid ballots in Duhok are not a single phenomenon: they combine overvotes, blank ballots, incomplete markings, and rare marking errors, each of which could arise from different constraints. This is a statement about the heterogeneity of the ballots, not evidence that voters behaved rationally or irrationally. The discontinuity at the top of Table 7 calls for a further caution. If the contrast between the first five centers and the rest reflects real differences among voters or ballots, it is one more example of the variation described above; if it reflects differences in how ballots were classified or adjudicated, it would qualify the internal agreement figure reported in Section 2. The available data cannot distinguish between the two, and the profiles of individual centers should therefore be interpreted with care. Complete agreement

among coders from the same office would also not reveal a shared coding convention, such as how ballots with overlapping features are assigned to a single category. Finally, the dominance of overvotes is compatible with the procedural expectations stated in the Introduction, but the data contain no information on ballot length, voting format, or voter education, so these expectations remain untested.

4. CONCLUSION

This study classified all 34,694 invalid ballots from Duhok Governorate in the 2025 Iraqi parliamentary election into seven marking patterns and described how they are distributed across the governorate and its 41 registration centers. Its main result is that invalidity in Duhok is mostly a matter of overvoting. Ballots marking three or more lists (42.00%) and two lists (39.38%) together make up 81.38% of invalid ballots, while omission (blank ballots, 7.96%) and other marking problems account for the rest. Composition differs sharply across centers: the share of three-or-more-list ballots ranges from 0% to 72.76%, and the three Bardarash centers alone contribute 20.6% of all invalid ballots.

These results are descriptive. From a bounded rationality perspective, the heterogeneity of the patterns suggests that invalid ballots are not a single phenomenon and may arise from different informational, cognitive, and institutional constraints. The data, however, contain no information on voter intent, so they cannot show whether a given overvote or blank ballot reflects error, hesitation, or protest, and they do not show that voters acted rationally or irrationally. The interpretations offered here should be read as hypotheses for future work rather than as findings.

The results nonetheless point to practical priorities. Because overvoting is the dominant form of invalidity, the clarity of the ballot format and of voting instructions deserves systematic review and pilot testing before further changes are made. Electoral authorities could also record ballots cast and voter category for each registration center alongside the classification of invalid ballots, so that invalid rates and general-versus-special-voting comparisons can be calculated. Finally, a written coding protocol with precedence rules and independent double coding of a random subsample by coders from outside the electoral office would make future classifications more credible than internal coding alone.

Several limitations apply. The study covers a single election in a single governorate, so its results cannot be generalized to other Iraqi governorates. The classification was carried out by staff of the same electoral office, and the reported 100% agreement is an internal consistency check, not independent validation. The ballots analyzed are only those that counting staff classified as invalid, so adjudication practices are part of the data. Because the ballots were available as scanned images, image quality may have affected some classifications, and because each ballot was assigned to a single category, overlaps between patterns are not visible. Invalid rates relative to ballots cast could not be computed at the center level, general and special voting could not be compared, differences between centers were not tested statistically, and the break between the first five centers and the rest may reflect classification practice rather than voter behavior. Future research could combine several elections (2018, 2021, and 2025), center-level invalid rates with covariates such as turnout and voter category, post-election surveys or cognitive interviews, and experiments on ballot layout to separate procedural error from protest.

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Table 7. Distribution of Invalid Ballot Patterns across Registration Centers

No.	Registration center	Invalid ballots	Two lists only	Three or more lists	Between two lists	Candidate number only	Blank ballot	Different pen	Outside the range
1	Bilind 1	1,041	784 (75.31)	47 (4.51)	20 (1.92)	86 (8.26)	90 (8.65)	0 (0.00)	14 (1.34)
2	Cegerxwîn 1	539	391 (72.54)	19 (3.53)	3 (0.56)	52 (9.65)	62 (11.50)	0 (0.00)	12 (2.23)
3	Media 1	598	438 (73.24)	41 (6.86)	12 (2.01)	44 (7.36)	52 (8.70)	0 (0.00)	11 (1.84)
4	Duhok 1	1,053	798 (75.78)	0 (0.00)	29 (2.75)	113 (10.73)	89 (8.45)	0 (0.00)	24 (2.28)
5	Zawita 1	444	354 (79.73)	0 (0.00)	8 (1.80)	25 (5.63)	39 (8.78)	0 (0.00)	18 (4.05)
6	Sumail 1	889	376 (42.29)	336 (37.80)	6 (0.67)	73 (8.21)	60 (6.75)	6 (0.67)	32 (3.60)
7	Amedi 1	277	168 (60.65)	62 (22.38)	3 (1.08)	19 (6.86)	20 (7.22)	1 (0.36)	4 (1.44)
8	Zakho 1	1,124	415 (36.92)	468 (41.64)	6 (0.53)	103 (9.16)	96 (8.54)	2 (0.18)	34 (3.02)
9	Deralun 1	734	327 (44.55)	247 (33.65)	1 (0.14)	64 (8.72)	71 (9.67)	4 (0.54)	20 (2.72)
10	Batofa 1	551	230 (41.74)	220 (39.93)	7 (1.27)	29 (5.26)	50 (9.07)	4 (0.73)	11 (2.00)
11	Qasrok 1	1,253	440 (35.12)	634 (50.60)	6 (0.48)	41 (3.27)	107 (8.54)	0 (0.00)	25 (2.00)
12	Aqrah 1	1,136	381 (33.54)	574 (50.53)	12 (1.06)	73 (6.43)	94 (8.27)	2 (0.18)	0 (0.00)
13	Bardarash 1	2,074	587 (28.30)	1,153 (55.59)	15 (0.72)	109 (5.26)	136 (6.56)	2 (0.10)	72 (3.47)
14	Bajil 1	1,556	395 (25.39)	939 (60.35)	19 (1.22)	42 (2.70)	151 (9.70)	10 (0.64)	0 (0.00)
15	Batil	445	232 (52.13)	100 (22.47)	2 (0.45)	47 (10.56)	34 (7.64)	0 (0.00)	30 (6.74)
16	Shiladze	693	309 (44.59)	238 (34.34)	18 (2.60)	49 (7.07)	63 (9.09)	5 (0.72)	11 (1.59)
17	Bilind 2	833	378 (45.38)	308 (36.97)	18 (2.16)	62 (7.44)	58 (6.96)	3 (0.36)	6 (0.72)
18	Cegerxwîn 2	518	219 (42.28)	192 (37.07)	7 (1.35)	38 (7.34)	60 (11.58)	0 (0.00)	2 (0.39)
19	Media 2	655	256 (39.08)	282 (43.05)	0 (0.00)	43 (6.56)	40 (6.11)	6 (0.92)	28 (4.27)
20	Duhok 2	1,023	433 (42.33)	410 (40.08)	13 (1.27)	86 (8.41)	67 (6.55)	0 (0.00)	14 (1.37)
21	Zawita 2	163	61 (37.42)	51 (31.29)	5 (3.07)	15 (9.20)	17 (10.43)	1 (0.61)	13 (7.98)
22	Sumail 2	900	374 (41.56)	335 (37.22)	3 (0.33)	51 (5.67)	59 (6.56)	6 (0.67)	72 (8.00)
23	Amedi 2	379	196 (51.72)	119 (31.40)	3 (0.79)	22 (5.80)	25 (6.60)	4 (1.06)	10 (2.64)
24	Zakho 2	1,005	414 (41.19)	374 (37.21)	13 (1.29)	79 (7.86)	91 (9.05)	4 (0.40)	30 (2.99)
25	Deralun 2	1,003	460 (45.86)	375 (37.39)	10 (1.00)	71 (7.08)	61 (6.08)	1 (0.10)	25 (2.49)
26	Batofa 2	336	155 (46.13)	85 (25.30)	6 (1.79)	34 (10.12)	20 (5.95)	1 (0.30)	35 (10.42)
27	Qasrok 2	390	168 (43.08)	85 (21.79)	6 (1.54)	28 (7.18)	26 (6.67)	2 (0.51)	75 (19.23)
28	Aqrah 2	1,152	157 (13.63)	706 (61.28)	17 (1.48)	99 (8.59)	143 (12.41)	11 (0.95)	19 (1.65)
29	Bardarash 2	1,980	548 (27.68)	1,147 (57.93)	9 (0.45)	87 (4.39)	161 (8.13)	1 (0.05)	27 (1.36)
30	Bajil 2	1,000	357 (35.70)	466 (46.60)	17 (1.70)	52 (5.20)	98 (9.80)	2 (0.20)	8 (0.80)

No.	Registration center	Invalid ballots	Two lists only	Three or more lists	Between two lists	Candidate number only	Blank ballot	Different pen	Outside the range
31	Cegerxwîn 3	550	240 (43.64)	202 (36.73)	16 (2.91)	46 (8.36)	33 (6.00)	1 (0.18)	12 (2.18)
32	Zawita 3	578	289 (50.00)	162 (28.03)	8 (1.38)	44 (7.61)	37 (6.40)	2 (0.35)	36 (6.23)
33	Sumail 3	774	352 (45.48)	236 (30.49)	3 (0.39)	66 (8.53)	73 (9.43)	6 (0.78)	38 (4.91)
34	Deralun 3	443	166 (37.47)	115 (25.96)	15 (3.39)	48 (10.84)	37 (8.35)	1 (0.23)	61 (13.77)
35	Batofa 3	972	369 (37.96)	424 (43.62)	6 (0.62)	82 (8.44)	55 (5.66)	7 (0.72)	29 (2.98)
36	Qasrok 3	1,188	340 (28.62)	684 (57.58)	10 (0.84)	37 (3.11)	67 (5.64)	13 (1.09)	37 (3.11)
37	Bardarash 3	3,087	544 (17.62)	2,246 (72.76)	14 (0.45)	73 (2.36)	177 (5.73)	19 (0.62)	14 (0.45)
38	Bajil 3	729	269 (36.90)	311 (42.66)	7 (0.96)	35 (4.80)	90 (12.35)	5 (0.69)	12 (1.65)
39	Zawita 4	175	94 (53.71)	52 (29.71)	4 (2.29)	7 (4.00)	11 (6.29)	0 (0.00)	7 (4.00)
40	Qasrok 4	256	95 (37.11)	81 (31.64)	6 (2.34)	19 (7.42)	25 (9.77)	0 (0.00)	30 (11.72)
41	Zawita 5	198	105 (53.03)	45 (22.73)	5 (2.53)	17 (8.59)	15 (7.58)	0 (0.00)	11 (5.56)
All centers		34,694	13,664 (39.38)	14,571 (42.00)	388 (1.12)	2,210 (6.37)	2,760 (7.96)	132 (0.38)	969 (2.79)

Notes: Cells show n (%), where the percentage is the share of the center's invalid ballots. "Candidate number only" refers to selecting the candidate number without the list.

Percentages sum to 100% within each row.

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on IHEC data (2026)