THE NAMES OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN EGYPT: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL PARTY NAMES AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 2011

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ABSTRACT

Keywords:
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name.

The Egyptian Islamic political movement gained momentum for freedom along with the 2011 Arab Spring event. The political agenda is to realise that Islamic life has the opportunity to grow again. The Egyptian Islamic political power welcomed it by establishing a political party. However, the Egyptian Law of 2011 prohibits the use of religious symbols as party identities. Therefore, the Egyptian Islamic power established it by using names from more commonly used secular concepts. This presents a distinct issue in the form of framing Islamic politics within secular discourse. This discussion attempts to examine this phenomenon by first examining the linguistic aspects of the names used by Egyptian Islamic parties. The morphological and semantic approaches are the basis of the discussion. It is concluded that the form used as the name of this party is a basic noun with an ideal meaning. The structure used is a genitive phrase as a form that gives strength to the identity carried.

الملخص

الكلمات المفتاحية:
مصر؛ هوية؛ الحزب
السياسي الأسلامي؛
اسم.

اكتسبت الحركة السياسية الإسلامية المصرية زخمًا من الحرية بالتزامن مع أحداث الربيع العربي عام 2011. وحصلت الأجندة السياسية الرامية إلى تحقيق الحياة الإسلامية على فرصة للنمو مجددًا. وقد رحبت بها السلطة السياسية الإسلامية المصرية من خلال تأسيس حزب سياسي. ومع ذلك، يحظر القانون المصري لعام 2011 استخدام الرموز الدينية كهويات حزبية. لذلك، أسستها السلطة الإسلامية المصرية باستخدام أسماء من مفاهيم علمانية أكثر شيوعًا. وهذه مشكلة منفصلة تتعلق بتأطير السياسة الإسلامية في الخطاب العلماني. تحاول هذه المناقشة رؤية هذه الظاهرة من خلال النظر أولاً في الجوانب اللغوية للأسماء المستخدمة كأسماء للأحزاب الإسلامية المصرية. ويشكل النهج الصرفي والدلالي أساس المناقشة. ويخلص إلى أن الشكل المستخدم كاسم لهذا الحزب هو اسم أساسي ذو معنى مثالي. والبنية المستخدمة هي عبارة حالة الجر كشكل يعطي قوة للهوية التي تحملها.

INTRODUCTION

The Arab Spring has brought about significant changes to the political landscape of the Arab world. The dictatorial governments that dominated the Arab world fell due to revolutions by their people. Political figures also took this opportunity to reorganize their political strength and form new political institutions along with the rhythm of political freedom that echoed (Guidere, 2012: 255). In the context of Egypt, this freedom ended with the 2013 coup against President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, which allowed nationalist and

military forces to regain control of the government. However, Sherin and Alunaza (2021) show that President al-Sisi subsequently succeeded in strengthening the Egyptian economy. Elsässer (2025) suggests that these changes stemmed from disappointment with Egypt's Islamic political movement, which failed to demonstrate concrete changes in political and economic life. Furthermore, Mittermaier (2025) observed that the younger generation of Egyptians following the 2011 revolution was more inclined to identify as individuals with spiritual passions, rather than being bound by traditional religious norms.

Nevertheless, Labidi (2019) said that the 2011 revolution marked a significant milestone in the history of the Egyptian Islamic movement, and they also enjoyed this wind of freedom due to the revolution. Egyptian Islamic political figures immediately built their strength and formed new political institutions in the form of parties. The political agenda gained momentum to be realised through the 2011 Law as the basis for holding elections under the control of *al-Majlis al-A'lā li-l-Quwwāt al-Musallaḥah* (High Council of the Armed Forces). However, in Alaghbsary's notes (2014), this law still provides stumbling blocks because it prohibits the use of religious symbols in practical politics. Therefore, political forces are creative in order to participate in the election, one of which is not using an Islamic name. The name of the Islamic political movement does not contain Islamic attributes, but Islamic identity and values remain the main entity to be conveyed in the party's vision.

The study of the phenomenon of naming Islamic political organizations in Egypt after the 2011 Arab Spring will be carried out by observing the study of naming Islamic political organizations previously from several aspects. Istadiyantha (2018) emphasized that the Middle East is a key spectrum of Islamic political movements, consistent with political processes and historical developments. It is observed on the Shiite sect from Iran took a role by establishing the resistance organization Hezbollah (*Ḥizb Allāh*) in Lebanon, a name given by Imam Khomenei with the legitimacy of sources from the Qur'an (Ali, 2018: 200). Previously, a social movement was established in 1974 under the name *Ḥarakat al-Maḥrūmīn* (Movement of the Marginalized) which was later renamed *Afwāj al-Muqāwamah al-Lubnānīyah* (Lebanese Resistance Detachment) (Milton-Edwards, 2005: 56). The identity of resistance was also shown by Islamic groups in Iraq who opposed the entry of the USA, as conveyed by Tripp (2013: 44).

The name of the Islamic movement that was founded also contains certain nuances. The nuance of hope was raised by Yasser Arafat through the *Ḥarakat Taḥrīr Filasṭīn* movement (Palestinian Liberation Movement) which was abbreviated backwards to FTH and spelled in Arabic as Fatah with the meaning of 'victory' (Scott-Baumann, 2009: 79). The centralistic nuance is a further development by Osama bin Laden who gave the name al-Qaeda (military base) to the organization he founded (Lesch & Hass, 2018: 372). A new nuance emerged in the early 21st century in the form of *al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah*, namely the Islamic state and region along with all its apparatus (Akbarzadeh & Mansouri, 2007:64). The Islamic State in Iraq and Shams (ISIS), with its Arabic name *al-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fī al-'Irāq wa-al-Shām*, became a new form of radical Islamic movement (Lesch & Hass, 2018: 377).

The 2011 Arab Spring event also brought a new direction to the Egyptian Islamic movement. Brown (2013: 12) said that the new political organizations that were established were more practical because their goal was to win the election. From here, the names used were more 'secular' names, such as *'adālah* (justice), *tanmīyah* (development), *waṭan* (nationalism), and others. Related to this phenomenon, Burdah (2014) mentioned the emergence of the affirmation of new general values, namely adherence to democracy, humanitarian values, and moderate Islamic values.

In general, the naming process in the Arab world is a process of objectification

because external factors are more dominant, so that the entity bearing the name is only passive. However, the discussion related to the names of Islamic political parties in Egypt after the Arab Spring will see the naming process as a subjectification. In this process, the founders of the organization play an active role in determining the name used. The larger role of the subject leads this name study to the discourse aspect because the naming of this political organization involves many factors, both language factors and political conditions that support the selection of a particular name. Another factor is the religious situation, as the social background of the Islamic organization that was founded.

This study utilizes material objects in the form of the names of Egyptian Islamic political parties after the 2011 Arab Spring and information related to the motives for using the name. The name used as the object of research is the official name of the Egyptian Islamic political party in the standard Arabic version (*al-ʿArabīyah al-Fuṣḥá*) The name and information to be collected from Rasywan (2017). The data collected includes two types, namely the name of the party and information related to the use of the name. Additional information will be collected from valid Arabic and English language sources in the form of books and articles. The analysis was conducted based on the fact that the name of the Islamic political party in Egypt as a linguistic narrative is a form of representation of experience and memory, as emphasized in Bruner in Hodges (2010: 5).

As a reference in discourse analysis are the three levels of analysis presented by Fairclough (2013: 21-22), namely the levels of description, interpretation, and explanation. The level of description requires a study of the formal linguistic form of the discourse text used. The relationship between the discourse text and its production process in an interaction becomes part of what is studied at the level of interpretation. At this level, aspects that cannot appear will be seen. The level of explanation looks at the relationship between this interaction and the social context with implicit ideological content.

As an implementation of the level of description, the lingual aspect of the Islamic political party in Egypt will be carried out by referring to the dictionary by Ibnu-Manzur (2007). The study of phrases as a practice of lingual study is based on grammatical principles as described by Brustad (2002). At the level of interpretation, the naming process by each party is carried out to build an image that will be offered in the political process. With the interpretation step, the surface structure, meaning, coherence, and scheme applied in building the image will be seen. Analysis at the level of explanation is carried out to see the function of the name used as an affirmation of ideology in the framework of power relations and the struggle process of Egyptian Islamic political parties.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In the 2011 Egyptian general election, Auf (2016) explained that Islamic political power was fragmented into various parties along with the dynamics of relations between Islamic groups that were colored by differences of opinion and division. There were fifteen Islamic political parties founded by various Islamic movements. In terms of structure, the names of the Islamic political parties are in the form of phrases in two forms, namely genitive phrases and conjunctive phrases. There are variations in the form of genitive phrases related to their attributes, namely, genitive phrases with single-word attributes and genitive phrases with adjective phrase attributes. The first form of the genitive phrase is represented by six parties, namely *Ḥizb al-Nūr, Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah, Ḥizb al-Aṣālah, Ḥizb al-Ḥaḍārah, Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ,* and *Ḥizb al-Waṭan*. The second form of the genitive phrase is represented by five parties, namely *Ḥizb al-ʿAmal al-Miṣrī, Ḥizb al-Tiyār al-Miṣrī, Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ al-Miṣrī, Ḥizb al-Tawḥīd al-ʿArabī,* and *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawīyah*. The conjunctive phrase structure is used in four forms by *Ḥizb al-Ḥurrīyah wa-al-ʿAdālah, Ḥizb al-Bināʾ wa-al-*

Tanmīyah, Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ wa-al-Nahḍah, and *Ḥizb al-ʿAdālah wa-al-Tanmīyah.*

Description of the Islamic political parties names

In this section, a linguistic study is conducted on the names of Egyptian Islamic political parties after the 2011 Arab Spring. The word *ḥizb* is used as the parent because it is a representative name to accommodate the political collectivity that will be built. However, this understanding of *ḥizb* is limited to the understanding of *ḥizb siyāsī* as cited by al-Kayyalī (1985), not in the sense of *jamaʿah* as its basic meaning. Thus, *ḥizb* is intended to contain the official name according to the law, vision and mission, management structure, and other details. The word *ḥizb*, as the base, is equipped with attributes in the form of words containing a secular political vision, but the party's vision and mission are filled with Islamic ideals. The Islamic mission was not abandoned by Egyptian Islamic political figures as the basis for their political ideals.

Genitive phrases with single word attributes

As previously mentioned, the names of Egyptian Islamic political parties after the 2011 Arab Spring are in several forms of phrases. The first form is a genitive phrase with a single word attribute consisting of the names of six parties. Four of the parties are Salafī , namely *Ḥizb al-Nūr, Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah, Ḥizb al-Aṣālah* and *Ḥizb al-Waṭan*. The other two are moderates, namely *Ḥizb al-Ḥaḍārah* and *Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ*. The explanation of both of them is arranged through their ideology.

The first Salafī party to be formed was *Ḥizb al-Nūr*, which was founded by Salafī s in the city of Alexandria. Ibnu-Manzur (1981: 4572) said that this word means 'light' and is the most beautiful name among the Arabs with its contextual meaning. Linguistically, this name means light, brightness, sign, beauty, and height of plants. This word is also mentioned a lot in the Qur'an with different meanings, such as guidance, knowledge, illumination, and the light of Allah. According to Noha Mellor's study, in Springborg et al. (2021:126), *Ḥizb al-Nūr* originated from a *Salafī Daʿwah* group founded by students at Alexandria University in the 1970s and became the most popular Salafī organization in Egypt. *Ḥizb al-Nūr* also includes several leaders from the National Democratic Party (NDP) formed by Hosni Mubarak. This political party managed to gather 5,000 founding members and convinced the government that the party had no religious, gender, class or other sectarian bias. Female representatives and Coptic Christian founding members were included as party administrators to reject sectarian bias.

In the same situation, Noha Mellor continued that a group of Cairo-based Salafī Muslims declared *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah* on May 15, 2011. Ibn-Manzur (1981: 3428-3430) explained that *faḍīlah* is interpreted as 'excellence' with the basic meaning of increase, although not every increase is an advantage. Imam al-Ghazali mentioned the meaning of advantage as an increase that leads to perfection. If an increase in something causes a decrease in its benefits or a decrease in its value, then this increase is not included in the advantages.

Ḥizb al-Aṣālah is the third Salafī -leaning Egyptian Islamic party founded by Adel Abdel Maqsoud Afifi in July 2011 after leaving *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah*. In Ibn Manẓūr's explanation (1981: 89), the word *aṣālah* means 'native', which linguistically refers to origin, so that it is said that someone has an origin, then he has proof of a strong bond with his place of origin. The consideration of the indigenous category is to maintain their identity and indigenous attributes so that they do not change. This is done by relying on the origin of descent and adhering to authentic beliefs and identities.

The fourth *Salafī*-leaning Egyptian Islamic party is *Ḥizb al-Waṭan*. Ibn Manẓūr's study (1981: 4868) states that the word *waṭan* means 'homeland' and is considered a

connecting concept between humans and their land of residence. By using the word *waṭan*, everyone has the freedom to live throughout the country. Freedom is an inherent right for everyone who declares themselves as citizens.

In addition to the Salafī-leaning Islamic parties, there are also moderate Islamic parties represented by *Ḥizb al-Ḥaḍārah* and *Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ*. Basically, this middle party became a bridge between the Islamic and nationalist movements. The word *al-Wasaṭ* is an explanatory identity of the word *ḥizb*, which plays a role in specifying the meaning. Ibn-Manzur's explanation (1981: 4832) states that *wasaṭ* means 'middle' and is a moderate description so that both extreme points are the same. This word in Arabic refers to a position between the two ends. Every situation and condition in which there is an agreement is said to be a middle way. In another context, *Ḥizb al-Ḥaḍārah* is an Egyptian political party founded in 2011 after the January 25 Revolution. Ibn-Manzur (1981: 907) said that *ḥaḍārah* means civilization, which is linguistically taken from the verb *ḥaḍār* as the opposite of *badāwah* 'nomadism', which is when people live their lives moving from one area to another. Civilization is characterized by rural or urban life with a lifestyle in a settled community environment.

From the names of the post-Arab Spring 2011 political parties, the first form, it can be seen that the word *ḥizb* in the context of *ḥizb siyāsī* is the main choice because the process to be undertaken is a political process. This word is equipped with other attributes that carry out identification functions. The Salafī group chose the words *nūr*, *faḍīlah*, *aṣālah*, and *waṭan* according to Salafī teachings, which emphasize the cleanliness of the soul. As for the moderate movement, it prefers names that are oriented towards the middle flow, such as *wasaṭ* or have idealistic connotations, such as *ḥaḍārah*.

Genitive phrase with adjective phrase attributes

The second form of the name of the Egyptian Islamic political organization after the Arab Spring of 2011 is a genitive phrase with attributes in the form of an adjectival phrase. The name of this organization includes five parties, namely *Ḥizb al-ʿAmal al-Miṣrī, Ḥizb al-Tiyār al-Miṣrī, Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ al-Miṣrī, Ḥizb al-Tawḥīd al-ʿArabī,* and *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawīyah*. The word *ḥizb* is again used as base. The adjectival phrase as an attribute has a choice of words with a nuance of Islamic society reform.

Regarding the concept of *ʿamal* in Arabic, Ibn-Manzur (1981: 3109) explains that this word refers to any activity that requires effort to achieve a certain goal or result and often refers to a profession or expertise that someone does. Technically, *ʿamal* refers to any routine task that an individual does, either intellectually or physically, to carry out a task that requires continuous or ongoing effort in exchange for wages or other rewards, whether the work is an assignment or coercion. The name of this party is associated with the country of Egypt, with the use of the relative adjective *yāʾ al-nisbah*. This means giving an Egyptian identity as an indication that the scope of work of this party is the country of Egypt.

A similar context is *Ḥizb al-Tiyār al-Miṣrī* and *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ al-Miṣrī*. Ibn Manẓūr (1981: 458) notes that the meaning of *tiyār* refers to the waves and flow of sea and ocean water. Analogously, this meaning also refers to the speed of a group of people on a particular path or activity. For *iṣlāḥ*, in the explanation of Ibn-Manzur (1981: 2479), it is an Arabic word that means 'improving, repairing, or placing something in a better position'. It is used in religion and politics as well as personal names and place names. The basic meaning of the word is 'recovering oneself' or 'reconciling people with each other'.

Ḥizb al-Tawḥīd al-ʿArabī is the next party with an attribute form in the form of an adjectival phrase. In terms of language, Ibn-Manzur (1981: 4779) said that tauhid comes from the word *waḥḥada*, which means the only or single. From this word, its derivative is

formed, namely, *waḥḥada*, which means making, knowing, or considering something as single. *Waḥḥada* also means 'unification' or 'upholding unity'. The core of Islam lies in the main principle of tauhid, which is based on the testimony that there is no God but Allah. The name of this party is complemented by *yā' al-nisbah* in the word 'Arab as an indication of the struggle for Arabism.

The last party is *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawīyah*. The name of the country of Egypt is used as the name of this party as an illustration of identification with the country where this party is dedicated. The name of this country is then complemented with the adjective form *qawīy* 'strong' or 'mighty'. Ibnu-Manzur (1981: 2787) said that *qawīy* comes from the word quwwah, which means strength. *Qawīyy* comes from the root word *qawīyah*, which refers to three meanings, namely, powerful, strong, and victorious. *Al-Qawīyah* is the highest power whose power never decreases and never needs to rest.

In general, the names of the political parties above are associated with positive social activities among the Arab people. *'amal, iṣlāḥ,* and *tawḥīd* are social goodness that the Arab people strive for in collective life. The three are a depiction of a harmonious life (*insijām*) idealized by the Arab people. To realize this, the word *tiyār* is used as a depiction of a young generation full of enthusiasm and dedication. A country characterized by *qawīyy* 'strong' becomes the idealistic goal of a country. These five names are then completed with the name of Egypt as the country and nation that is the goal of dedication of all these political parties.

Genitive phrase with conjunctive phrase attribute

The third form of the Islamic political movement after the Arab Spring is a genitive phrase with an attribute in the form of a conjunctive phrase. The word *ḥizb* is also used as base. The conjunctive phrase as an attribute is connected with the particle waw as a connector. The names of these movements are *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa-al-'Adālah, Ḥizb al-Binā' wa-al-Tanmīyah, Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ wa-al-Nahḍah,* and *Ḥizb al-'Adālah wa-al-Tanmīyah*. The base and attribute in this phrase also use political terms with idealistic nuances. The function of the attribute connected with the connector waw gives a combined meaning and affirmation.

The first party is *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa-al-'Adālah. Al-Hurriyyah* 'freedom', in the study of Ibnu-Manzur (1981: 829), is rooted in the word *hurr*, which refers to a free person, not a slave. Freedom is a person's status that is not controlled by anyone. Legally, freedom is the ability of an individual to carry out desired activities without coercion by submitting to applicable laws. Everyone can act to fulfil their rights without arbitrariness or aggression. The complementary identity for *al-hurriyyah* is *al-'adālah* 'justice', the opposite of injustice to act straight. Justice is interpreted as giving according to the rights that must be received (Ibn-Manzur, 1981: 2838-2842).

The second organization with this construction is *Ḥizb al-Binā' wa-al-Tanmīyah*. Ibn-Manzur (1981: 365-367) explains that *binā'* 'construction' is a word that refers to a building or collection. The initial use of this word was related to the construction of ships, so it did not refer to buildings made of earth or stone. These two materials are building materials for houses inhabited by Arabs in the desert. Analogously, this word is then also used for buildings with certain locations, such as houses, mosques, churches, or similar buildings that are specifically made as places for human activities, with the characteristic of having a roof. The word *binā'* is given an additional complement in the form of the word *tanmīyah*. This word refers to growth and increase. The origin of this word was used when humans first realized the changes that occurred around them and then associated it with life experiences and reflections on the differences that occur in many things, such as the seasons, plants, humans, and animals (Ibn-Manzur, 1981: 4551-4553).

The third organization is *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ wa-al-Nahḍah*, which was founded in July 2011. From the explanation of Ibnu-Manzur (1981: 2479) regarding the word *iṣlāḥ*, this is the encouragement of the *iṣlāḥ* or 'peace' step to reduce conflict in society. This *iṣlāḥ* is specifically for peace between conflicting groups so that normal life can run. The important point in this process is dialogue to reach a mutual agreement. The complement to the identification of the name of this party is *nahḍah*, which means to wake up actively. In battle, it means that each group rises and rushes to fight the enemy. *Nahḍah* means energy, strength, and a leap towards social or other progress. In reality, *nahḍah* is in the form of activity or movement in a stagnant environment because it does not want to move (Ibn-Manzur, 1981: 4560).

The next organization is *Ḥizb al-ʿAdālah wa-al-Tanmīyah Ḥizb al-Salāmah wa-al-Tanmīyah*. In terms of language, *tanmīyah* itself means continuous growth. *Salāmah*, explained by Ibn-Manzur (1981: 2074), means 'perfection' or 'security'. This word comes from the root word *salima*, which is the root of many common words such as Islam, Muslim, and *salām*. *Salām*, the meaning of 'peace' is used as a common greeting by Muslims. From the Arabic root word *salima* comes other related words such as Islam 'submission to God' and *salāmah* that means 'security'. A safe condition is a stable condition that can allow for *tanmīyah* 'growth', in the sense of an increasingly better social life.

From the study above, it can be seen that the names of Islamic political organizations in Egypt after the 2011 Arab Spring are in the form of conjunctive phrases using words that connote political idealism without showing Islamic characteristics. Issues such as freedom, justice, revival, safety, peace, and development become the guides in determining the choice of name to be taken. Each party then completes this naming with the completeness of the party concept, which includes the goals of the Islamic struggle.

In the context of this study, the level of descriptive, the analysis was carried out at the level of words and phrases. The study at these two levels leads to the conclusion that the names contain an individuation, as cited by Brustad (2002: 56), namely, as the bearer of the Islamic struggle. This Islam is not simply abandoned, but is expressed in the party's conceptual design, in the form of the party's vision and mission. In the party's design, it is still stated that these parties, although not using Islamic names, are still fighting for Islamic political ideals.

Interpretation of the Islamic political parties names

The fragmentation of the Islamic movement concept after the 2011 Arab Spring was centered on three streams, namely *Salafī*, *Islāḥī*, and *Jihādī*. The interpretation of naming the Egyptian Islamic political organization is related to the response of the three streams of the Egyptian Islamic movement that established political parties and registered them with the general election institution. The applicable law prohibits the use of names with religious nuances, but Islamic nuances appear as references to the party's vision and mission (Nasira, 2011). On this basis, the *Salafī* movement gave rise to several political parties, namely *Ḥizb al-Nūr, Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah, Ḥizb al-Aṣālah, Ḥizb al-Waṭan,* and, *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ al-Miṣrī.*

It is firmly stated that *Ḥizb al-Nūr* is a purely Egyptian party, although its principles, goals, and orientation are built from a *Salafī* perspective. The name *'nūr'* is taken as a depiction of the achievement of the ideals of a society filled with the light of *hidāyah* (Hasyim, 2011).In formulating the party's identity, the founders followed the same method as the Salafī's elsewhere, namely balancing commitment to change and rejection of political violence. Several notes related to this party were conveyed by Abū-Hilāl (2013). This party confirmed that the requirements for the head of state must be

Muslim and male. There is no objection to this party on the issue of relations between Egypt and Israel with the principle of a peace agreement, but recognizing the state of Israel is still rejected. Bayumi (2014) added that *Ḥizb al-Nūr* declared itself as an open party and was able to enter the political world with high pragmatism, far from the image of *Salafī Da'wah* as an ideological movement. Therefore, al-Hakawī (2015) said that this party views tolerance in sharia as good, not through coercion and violence. Through the return of true religious teachings, people will become obedient and motivated to implement Sharia.

The second party from the Salafī school is *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah*. Al-Buḥairī (2011) said that this name refers to the ideals of a glorious and prosperous Egyptian society. The goals that *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah* wants to achieve are mainly the restoration of Egypt's leadership role in the Arab and Islamic world through pioneering enlightenment projects and pushing for the city of Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. In the internal context of the Egyptian state, this party wants to establish justice and equality among members of Egyptian society from all backgrounds and sects and ensure a fair distribution of wealth, accompanied by the rule of law.

Another *Salafī* group founded *Ḥizb al-Aṣālah*, which was founded by Adel Abdel-Maqsoud Afifi after leaving *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah*. Qudrī and al-Qaḍī (2013) said that this name refers to the ideals of establishing Egyptian society according to its original values. In its program, this party supports the establishment of a religious Islamic state in Egypt and also the reform of the Egyptian state and society towards Islam. However, all Egyptian citizens will be treated fairly regardless of their political or religious beliefs.

The next *Salafī* party is *Ḥizb al-Waṭan*, which was formed by Imad al-Din Abdel Ghafour on January 1, 2013, after a split within *Ḥizb al-Nūr*. Ramaḍān (2013) emphasised that the name of this party refers to the spirit of building the homeland of the Egyptian nation. This party was formed when Imad Abdel Ghafour, former chairman of the Nour Party, and 150 other members resigned in protest of a dispute with Yasser Burhami, the main advisor to the an-Nour Party and a *Salafī* cleric.

The Islamic reformist views of the Muslim Brotherhood inspired the establishment of several parties, namely *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa-al-'Adālah*, *Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ*, *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawīyah*, *Ḥizb at-Tiyār al-Miṣrī*, *Ḥizb al-Ḥaḍārah*, *Ḥizb al-Shabāb al-Miṣrī*, *Ḥizb at-Tawḥīd al-'Arabī*, *Ḥizb al-Islāḥ wa-al-Nahḍah*, *Ḥizb al-'Adālah wa-al-Tanmīyah,* and *Ḥizb al-Islāḥ wa-al-Tanmīyah.* The founders of these parties were the main cadres of *Jama'ah al-ʾIkhwān al-Muslimīn* and founded their parties with the support of their factions and also differences with the main leaders of the *jamā'ah* (Nassar, 2017). Sabi' (2011) stated that *Jamā'ah al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* officially established *Ḥizb al-Ḥurrīyah wa-al-'Adālah*. The main idea of this party appears in the name '*ḥurriyyah*', namely the ideal of a society that is free to determine its destiny. In addition, the name *'adālah* was added as an embodiment of the ideal of justice in the state. (Roll, 2013). This cannot be separated from the party's program, which is based on activities to purify the soul, purify the heart, elevate feelings, and perfect morals by calling for a commitment to worship, morals, *mu'āmalah*, and faith in God.

Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ is an Egyptian political party that is classified as a middle party with Islamic references. In Sumaikah's (2011) presentation, this name refers to a popular ideology related to state life and religiosity, namely moderation (*wasaṭīyah*). *Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ* adheres to the principles of Islam as a political system of government. This party aims to guarantee public freedom, political and constitutional reform, judicial independence, eliminate the state of emergency, build intellectual and political pluralism and encourage democracy. Utnik (2005) then continued that this party presents itself as a civic party with an Islamic reference that includes Egyptian Christians and recognizes equality between

men and women. *Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ* offers a modern Sharia concept. General issues in Islam have general provisions, while personal issues have details.

The idea to establish *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawīyah* emerged from the presidential campaign of Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh after failing to advance as a presidential candidate from *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa-al-ʿAdālah*. Hays (2018) explained that this name refers to the hope of realising an Egyptian state that has a strong political position. *Ḥizb Miṣr al-Qawīyah* presents an ambitious program that tends to be liberal in political aspects and socialist in economic aspects. The party set a mission to contribute to building a strong, independent, and inspiring nation and upholding humanitarian values.

Ḥizb at-Tiyār al-Miṣrī was founded by several youth of the January 25, 2011, Revolution and former members of the Muslim Brotherhood.The name of this party shows the idea of its founding, which will strengthen the '*Tiyār*' group, namely the young generation. This party is a revolutionary youth party that believes in the necessity of completing the goals of the revolution, adopting the values of decentralization, empowering the marginalized, overcoming ideological polarization, and developing participatory democracy.

Ḥizb al-Ḥaḍārah is an Egyptian political party founded in 2011 after the January 25 Revolution. Al-Miṣrī (2011) stated that the idea of strengthening Egyptian civilization emerged in the name of this party through the use of the word '*ḥaḍārah*'. This party describes itself as a middle party because it agrees with the free-market economy and fully supports the economic justice of society. This party is determined to eliminate the differences between social groups in unity and equality between Egyptians, Muslims and Copts, so that everyone participates in the struggle to achieve Egypt's progress through democracy, moderation, and socialism.

From the discussion above on the interpretation of the name of the Islamic movement, it is clear that the ideals espoused are the improvement of Islam in society. Differences arise in the referential aspect of this change. The dynamics following the 2011 Egyptian revolution presented an opportunity for Islamic political forces to take a greater role. *Salafī*, *Islāḥī*, and *Jihādī* groups participated, although Islamic names were not permitted. Ultimately, a nationalist-oriented name was adopted, with a vision and mission formulated using Islamic references. This action ensured that Islamic political forces could continue to participate in the 2011-2012 elections.

After discussing the naming through the concept of thinking of the Egyptian Islamic political movement in the interpretation stage above, the discussion will continue with the influence of the concept on each attitude towards external conditions through an explanatory study. The three forms of Islamic ideas above (*Salafī*, *Islāḥī*, and *Jihādī*) are references in compiling the party's vision and mission. These three things are also related to the explanatory narrative when each party gives its views on the other parties.

Lacroix (2016) said that the rise of *Ḥizb al-Nūr* on the Egyptian political stage was to balance other political forces, such as *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa-al-ʿAdālah*, which embodies the principles and orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The rise of this party is inseparable from the *Salafī Daʿwah* movement, considering that this movement is an ideological reference and electoral machine for the party. McCants (2012) also stated that *al-Nūr* experienced a series of political attacks through the media, considering that media owners have an agenda to distort the Nour Party as the political wing of the *Salafī Daʿwah* in Egypt. The *al-Nūr* Party also denied the photos and videos that were considered slander against the leaders of the *al-Nūr* Party. The actors in the photos and videos were never part of the *Salafī Daʿwah* movement or *Ḥizb al-Nūr*.

Regarding the relationship between *Ḥizb al-Nūr* and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which was declared a terrorist organization, Steuer (2017) emphasized that

this party has stated its denial. This was conveyed through a documentary film containing the party's relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood since the January 25 Revolution in 2011. The film is an effort to stop attacks by the Muslim Brotherhood and several political forces against *Ḥizb al-Nūr* and the Salafī's. The closeness of *Ḥizb al-Nūr* to the government was noted by Abū-Hilāl (2013). It is known that the al-Nour Party participated in formulating the future map agreed upon by the military and other political forces after the overthrow of former President Mohamed Morsi from the Muslim Brotherhood, in July 2013. *Ḥizb al-Nūr* has also expressed its readiness to join the new government formed by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This step is part of the strategy to replace the banned Muslim Brotherhood as the largest Islamic movement in Egypt.

Al-Buhairy (2011) pointed out that Salafī's outside *Ḥizb al-Nūr* collected signatures to announce *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah*. This party refuses to be described as *Salafī*, but a party with Islamic references, the main source of which is law, and all segments of society are welcome to join. *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah* experienced a split in July 2011. This split was triggered by a conspiracy to change the party's principles based on a commitment to legitimacy, the rule of law, and moderate Salafī Islamic methods, and change its principles into extremist ideas that are detrimental to the public interest and Islamic civilization.

Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah itself, in Ramaḍān's notes (2013), split when Adel Abdel Maqsoud resigned from *Ḥizb al-Faḍīlah* along with several members of the Political Bureau and founded *Ḥizb al-Aṣālah*. *Ḥizb al-Aṣālah* called for purification in all state institutions from deviations. It is emphasized that liberalism with an Egyptian character is not far from religion. Regarding the coalition in the election, Qudrī and al-Qaḍlī (2013) stated that *Ḥizb al-Aṣālah* would only coordinate with religious movements and national civil parties that did not fight the Islamic movement. Together with other Islamic movements, *Ḥizb al-Aṣālah* insisted on conveying a message to calm the Egyptian people regarding its firmness in matters related to the lives of citizens.

In Fahmi's explanation (2015), although Salafī-oriented, *Ḥizb al-Waṭan* allows Copts to join and allows women on the voter list. The party is described as having a *Salafī* character and will form a national alliance in the parliamentary elections. This party rejected the military coup on July 3, 2013 and boycotted the Committee of 50 referendum. The same thing was done by *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ al-Miṣrī*. Although it mostly consists of the young *Salafī* generation, the program proposed is different and relies on Al-Azhar scholars as a reference. This party cooperates with all Islamic parties in the parliamentary elections while hoping to unite all Salafī parties into one strong party.

The idea of Islamic reform formulated by the Muslim Brotherhood became the main reference, even though the cadres of the movement did not form a single party. In the election, el-Sherif (2014) showed that the party formed by the Muslim Brotherhood, namely *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa-al-ʿAdālah*, achieved a high electoral victory. As an additional explanation, Sulṭān (2021) stated that the *Ḥizb al-Ḥurriyyah wa-al-ʿAdālah* program is not specific to Muslims alone, but is an approach adopted by the monotheistic religions, especially Christianity, which pays great attention to morals and social interaction. Parties that do not agree with this approach will face the law. This approach not only concerns individuals, but also concerns the family as the foundation of a larger national community. This approach underlies a good family, in which tasks and responsibilities are distributed fairly and based on the values of love, loyalty, sincerity, and guidance.

Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ, stated by Sumaikah (2011), supports the prohibition of the formation of parties based on religion, but provides criticism regarding defining parties based on religion. The definition of a religious party, as meant by the *al-Wasaṭ* Party, is a party whose membership is limited to one religion or is based on theocratic ideas, namely the government of the ulama. The formation of a party based on religion like this must be

rejected because the basis for forming a party must be the principle of citizenship.

The same approach was launched by *Ḥizb al-Tiyār al-Miṣrī*, which aims to build, support, and protect a true democratic state. Abū-Rummān (2011) notes that the party also seeks the involvement of citizens, as individuals, and civil society organizations, as entities, in the management of all public affairs of the country. In addition, the party emphasizes the importance of empowering all marginalized groups, such as women, youth, and people with special needs. On the other hand, al-Miṣrī̄ 2011) said that the party program presents something different because its mission is to build a civilized dialogue in Egypt with the freedom to support or oppose and kindly suggest amendments, revisions, additions, or deletions.

Specifically, Ghafar (2016) stated that *Ḥizb al-Shabāb al-Miṣrī* encourages young people to use their energy to oppose globalization and care about the issue of civilizational dialogue in the framework of Arab economic cooperation. Another concern is the implementation of appropriate laws to deal with the problem of population growth, accompanied by the development of the education system and paying greater attention to scientific research. The unity for building civilization is asserted by *Ḥizb at-Tawḥīd al-Arabī*. In Abū-Zaid's (2011) explanation, the idea of national unity is stated by stating that support must be given to all sincere efforts aimed at uniting the forces of the revolution and the people to end the crisis that the country is facing and threatens its future. Political forces must work together to find a political solution to the crisis to end division, strengthen respect for the will of the people, restore the path of democracy, and protect the goals and principles of the revolution.

Abū-Rummān (2011) explained that countering terrorism is an important topic for *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ wa-al-Nahḍah*, which supports the holding of a seminar against extremist thinking and the role of youth in combating terrorism. This seminar is included in the framework of the party's plan to improve the concept of national security and social security for the community. The enforcement of religion for political participation engaged by *Ḥizb al-ʿAdālah wa-al-Tanmīyah*. This party agrees with the constitutional foundations of the state and contributes to the enforcement of religion by emphasizing that the basic functions of this movement are advocacy, education, and training. *Ḥizb al-Iṣlāḥ wa-al-Tanmīyah* also offers a program of good governance, the supremacy of law, religion as a source of values, a complete separation of powers, and a peaceful transfer of power. This party supports a responsible economic reform process through a neutral model for sustainable development that will support a free-market economy and continue to fight poverty while ensuring the principles of social justice and equal opportunities for all citizens.

From the discussion of the explanatory section above, it can be concluded that the Islamic movement, both Salafī, *Iṣlāḥī*, and *Jihādī*, began its explanatory view by calling the Egyptian nation a nation suffering from tyranny and injustice. In addition, there was also corruption, oppression of the people, plundering of state wealth, and submission to Western and Zionist politics. Death of conscience, moral decay, and neglect of God are some of the most important reasons that triggered the Egyptian people's revolution. All of this emphasizes the need for a modern civil state that is by the times, namely one that fulfils the wishes of the people.

CONCLUSION

The names of Egyptian Islamic political organizations after the 2011 Arab Spring are in the form of conjunctive phrases using words that connote political idealism without showing Islamic characteristics. Issues such as freedom, justice, revival, salvation, peace, and development became the guides in determining the choice of name to be taken. Each

party then completed this naming with the completeness of the party concept, which included the goals of the Islamic struggle. This shows a shift in naming compared to the previous period. The Arab Spring event brought about a change in the choice of names for the secular political idealist concepts commonly found in Egyptian society.

The interpretation study in this study shows that the ideals carried out are the improvement of Islam in society. There are differences that emerge in the referential aspects of the changes, both in the Salafī, Islamic and *jihādī* movements. The 2011 Egyptian revolution, which allowed Islamic political power to take a bigger role, was utilized by the three Islamic groups, although the name Islam was not allowed to be used. Finally, the nationalist-oriented name was taken with the formulation of a vision and mission that used Islamic references. From the explanatory study that shows that the Egyptian nation is an oppressed nation, Islamic parties encourage the formation of an Egyptian society that is just in all areas.

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