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Shifting Profession from Service to Online Business in ASEAN Region

A Driving Forces of ASEAN Economic Excellence during Pandemic

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Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic is pushing a multidimensional crisis, especially in the economic field. The most affected sector in this regard are service workers. With the type of work that was supposed to interact directly is now constrained by government policies; stay at home, lockdown and more. This article aims to examine the phenomenon of Termination of Employment in the ASEAN Region and analyze its adaptive solution through transformation. This article utilizes various software such as Publish or Perish for searching the amount of previous literature and VOSViewer for bibliometric analysis. Within the conceptual framework of New Regionalism, this article finds an opportunity in shifting profession of layoff victims in the service sector into an online businesser (e-commerce) as a survival and superior way forASEAN's economic during pandemic. This article expected to give benefits both in terms of literature academics and practicality for the micro community in order to drive ASEAN development from the buttom-up scheme.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic often brings recession. ASEAN economic growth is estimated to contract 2.7% due to the corona virus phenomenon. This collective economic impact is mapped on par with the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998. Not only ASEAN, but also in developed regions such as Europe, a very significant recession occurred. Data shows that European economic growth slumped to touch the figure of -12.1%. This is concrete evidence that the presence of a pandemic in the era of global interconnectedness is an obstacle to the economic conditions of a region [1].

The economic sector most affected by the closure and stay at home policy due to this pandemic is service-specific labor activity. There are more than 30 million workers in ASEAN forced to become unemployed. The sluggishness of the service sector that requires direct interaction, such as tourism, public services, transportation and industry, has become an economic shock that requires solutions [2].

In the case study of ASEAN 5 countries, the Covid-19 pandemic has impacted more than 9 million workers in Indonesia with a percentage of 28.9% [3]. In Malaysia, more than 100,000 affected workers lost their jobs. In Thailand, in the publication of CNBC (2021) it was explained that the airline Thai Airways went bankrupt and laid off service workers with a total of nearly 400 pilots. In the Philippines, at least 428,701 workers were laid off due to the pandemic and millions more are working without pay. While in Vietnam, as many as 900,000 [4].

The rapid pace of digitalization is often the main touch on the issue of survival in the pandemic era. The Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning declared that digital flows play a massive role as a buffer for the Indonesian economy in the midst of a recession [5]. In line with this, the national money transfer platform PromtPay created by the Thai Government, has increased to 55.6 million users. To become an indirect transaction solution under the wheels of the 'keep distance' economy [6] .In Brunei Darussalam, digitization is packaged in various government programs; eKadaiBrunei and Community for Brunei or National e-Commerce Platform [7].

This article aims to provide measurable outcomes that economic transformation can be a great opportunity for the victims of Dismissal. The scheme used is bottom-up which collectively encourages the economic superiority of the ASEAN Region. There are several summaries, research and previous policy recommendations that map the great potential of the digital economy during the pandemic, such as ASEAN Policy Brief 2020, The ASEAN: The Fourth Industrial Revolution, Pandemics, and The Future of Work (2020), Reimagining emerging ASEAN in the wake of COVID-19 by McKinsey & Company (2020), and E-commerce Connectivity in ASEAN from the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia. In searching for the previous literature, this article uses the Publish or Perish software, which is then analyzed bibliometrically on the VOSViewer software to see new gaps.

Figure 1. Previous Literrature by Publish or Perish
(Source: Author)



Figure 2. Results of Bibliometric Analysis by VosViewer Software
(Source: Author)

There was a vacancy in discussion regarding the shift in victims of Dismissal and their shift in optimizing online business platforms in the ASEAN region. This article will discuss; The phenomenon of increasing social media and E-Commerce users during the pandemic, case studies of the displacement of victims of layoffs from services to online businesses, and E-Commerce regulations in the ASEAN Region.

II. METHODOLOGY

A. *Theoritical Background and Literature Review*

The concept of Regionalism was born massively in the post-bipolar era (1990s). Regionalism is becoming a complex contemporary trend and model. Its scope has a multidimensional character. This article refers to the book Theories of New Regionalism which was present in the midst of debate and brought the core of previous theories such as Barry Buzan, Richard Falk, Anthony Payne, Timothy Shaw, Andrew Gamble, and Morten Boas [8].

The term New Regionalism believes that there is a difference in the spotlight of the new model of a region. In addition to the more concretely defined spatial elements, New Regionalism focuses on the relationship between regions and other extra-regional environments. Previously, an area was always synonymous with exclusivity and even isolated from the world. The existing dynamics tend to be closed and only played by the countries concerned. In this context, the existence of ASEAN is a new model of regionalism. As an institution, ASEAN has won recognition from around the world. There are various relationships, mutual dialogues, and collaborations that have been established with external entities such as; China, Australia, Turkey, France, Russia, USA, ASEAN+3, and more.

The development of New Regionalism also eliminates the European-centric system which was originally used as the mecca of the regional concept. This gives space to the Non-Western literature to use references that can be more relevant to the characteristics of the area it has. Amitav Acharya (2013) classifies ASEAN as an entity rich in diversity; even on the economic side. In a region, economic, sociocultural, and political identity is a very significant thing. With it, identified factors, values, norms that have the power to encourage the rapid pattern of interdependence in the region [1].

The existence of ASEAN as a region is studied as a potential entity that needs to face various challenges. Managing economic advantages and facing non-traditional security threats is a driving factor for the establishment of a more massive cooperation in order to perpetuate this institution. Doing region building does not have to come from the decision makers above, but can also be intensified through phenomena that occur below (the field), such as individual initiatives to be adaptive to digitalization during a pandemic [9].

Although the Covid-19 virus pandemic caused a major multidimensional crisis in all entities; both countries and regions. The concept of regionalism seems to be the answer to the post-pandemic world order [10]. Lean supply chain systems allow new versions of manufacturing to emerge. The proximity of the distance becomes an advantage that offsets the costs and benefits of specialization in global trade schemes [11]. Thus, a special analysis is needed regarding the latest symptoms that can be used as a milestone for the resilience and excellence of the ASEAN region during the economic recession due to the pandemic.

B. *Data gathering Method*

This article refers to the references sought through the help of various software. Data and information collected through primary, secondary sources (from published articles or news) were analyzed in detail. The researcher identified the congruence and accuracy of the referenced sources. Researchers accumulate evidence from nearby issues, so that readers can see the relevant and actual reality.

ANALYSIS

A. *Increasing Social Media and E-Commerce Improvement in the Pandemic Period*



Data of Increasing Application during a Pandemic
(Source: Databooks, 2020)

The data above shows an increase in media users up to 38% and E-Commerce users increasing up to 23%. The stay at home policy is the strongest driver of this phenomenon, especially in the Southeast Asia Region. As many as 85% of Southeast Asians admit to using new applications since the first quarter of 2020. According to Santitarn Sathirathai, a Group Chief Economist at a global consumer internet company in Singapore, presenting the results of a survey with the World Economic Forum (WEF) which shows that young people encourage greater adoption. digital; 50% of young people increase their purchases in e-commerce [12]. The countries that pushed the most were Indonesia and Singapore, where out of 68,574 ASEAN youth respondents, 20,397 respondents were from Indonesia [13].

CNBC Indonesia noted that as many as 40 million new internet users grew in Southeast Asian countries such as: Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand in the early days of the pandemic to be precise in 2020. So it is predicted that internet users in Southeast Asia will reach 400 million users [14].



Figure 4. Percentage of Spending in a Pandemic by Medium

(Source: Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2020)

It is not surprising that purchases in e-commerce have increased, according to data. Figure 4 shows that the Covid-19 pandemic has encouraged people to shop online. The increase in the shopping index and online transactions reached up to 45% and physical shopping activities were reduced by 50% [15].

It is known that COVID-19 can accelerate the expansion of e-commerce to new companies, customers, and product types. This allows customers to get a large number of products in the comfort and safety of their homes, and allows companies to continue operations with access restrictions and other restrictive measures. Despite persistent cross-border differences, the COVID-19 crisis has increased the vitality of the national e-commerce landscape and expanded the scope of e-commerce, including through start-ups, consumer groups (e.g. seniors) and products (e.g. groceries). At the same time, e-commerce transactions in many countries have shifted in part from luxury goods and services to everyday necessities associated with large numbers of individuals.

Most governments prioritize the short-term response to the pandemic, but some are also starting to address the long-term strategic requirements for recovery. Several governments in developing countries have intervened to protect corporate and personal income. For example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the government of Costa Rica has launched platforms, smartphone applications, and text messaging services for companies that do not have an online business to promote trade between producers of agricultural, meat and fish products. In Africa, Senegal conducts information, education and advocacy activities on the benefits of e-commerce among all populations. In Asia, Indonesia has launched a capacity building program to accelerate the digitization and digitization of small, medium and micro enterprises.



Figure 5. Digital Investment Agreement (Source: Google, Temasek, dan Bain & Company, 2020)

B. *Case Study of Shifting Profession from Service Sector Workers to Online Business*

The stay at home policy during a pandemic like this encourages many business opportunities to be created, this online-based entrepreneurial activity can be one way out for countries in the Southeast Asian region to face the challenges of massive layoffs due to the pandemic. Field data comes from Indonesia, precisely in Sleman. Fifteen youths affected by the break-up took the initiative to build a portable sink and managed to produce 350 units of demand for goods at a price of Rp. 750,000 to Rp. 1,000,000/unit. This is one of the representations of evidence that social media is a power of business opportunity in the midst of an unstable world condition today.

In addition to online entrepreneurs who suddenly appear on social media, E-commerce managers are also competing to attract consumers with the discounted prices they offer. Social media is a place for entrepreneurs to show their superiority with almost the same sales products. In fact at this time, apart from being active users of social media who only enjoy features on various applications, people are required to innovate in order to solve problems in life by taking advantage of existing conditions to become business opportunities.

C. *Effectiveness of Online Business in ASEAN on Economic Countermeasures*

The pandemic has had a bad impact on some economic sectors, but not for the digital economy sector. Based on research conducted by Google, Temasek Holdings and Bain & Company, by 2020 the digital economy in Southeast Asia will increase to US$105 billion or Rp. 1,470 trillion. During a pandemic like this, the service sector experienced a contrasting decline, the online travel segment experienced a decline of minus 58%, but on the other hand e-commerce business in Southeast Asia increased to 63% in 2020. This situation made the ASEAN Region a growing internet market. fastest in the world [14]. So it attracts many global investors to enter startups in Southeast Asia

The previous explanation was reinforced by a report from e-Conomy SEA 2020 whose research was carried out by Google, Temasek, and Bain & Company reporting that there were 202 digital investment deals in the first half of 2019, increasing the highest percentage in Southeast Asia to 55.6% or equivalent. with IDR 39.4 trillion. There are two countries with the highest percentage of digital economy value in Southeast Asia in 2020, namely Indonesia which reached US$ 44 billion and Thailand which reached US$ 18 billion. While the percentage of the value of state investment agreements with the highest value remains Indonesia in Semester II, the investment agreement value reached US$ 2.8 billion and Singapore reached US$ 2.5 billion in 2020 [16]. Of course, one of the driving factors is the Covid-19 pandemic with the increasing number of internet users.



Figure 6. Malaysia: E-Commerce Value
(Source: Katadata, 2020)

The digital economy is one of the effective economic supports for Southeast Asian countries during a pandemic such as Malaysia as one of the fastest growing e-commerce in Southeast Asia. According to the data above, Malaysia's e-commerce market increased by 24.7% in 2020. Malaysia has even launched a fund of MYR 140 million or equivalent to US$ 34.2 million to encourage e-commerce adoption for small traders. It is projected that in 2021, the market will reach a value of MYR51.6bn or equivalent to US$12.6bn [17]. The same thing happened in Indonesia in the second quarter of 2020, Kominfo noted that based on BPS data, the growth of the infocom sector increased to 10.88%. From a variety of digital businesses, the Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) online business grew by 400% [18].

In the last 15 days of Q1 2020 digitalization of businesses and consumers gained up to 41% global digital revenue. Across Asia there has been explosive sales growth during the Covid-19 pandemic, increasing the percentage of online shopping by 50% according to digital advertising solutions provider Criteo. The Shopee platform experienced a 74.3% jump in merchandise or earned $6.2 billion in the first quarter with 429.8 million orders. Gojek experienced 10% transaction growth in food deliveries (Go-Food) in early May 2020, and some snack food vendors on Go-Food experienced a 30% surge [19].

From the data presented above, it shows that the impact of the growth of digital business during the pandemic is very helpful in supporting the economy in ASEAN countries during the Covid-19 pandemic. Even the increase in the number of digital media users such as social media and e-commerce has increased the attractiveness of global investors so that the investment value and ASEAN digital economy will be boosted and will help the ASEAN economic recovery process. The region's digital economy is recorded at US$100 billion in Gross Merchandie Value with Vietnam and Indonesia increasing in double digits. Of course, this has great potential in the economic recovery of the ASEAN region [20].

D. *Harmonization and Regulation of E-Commerce in the ASEAN Region*

On the other hand, there is a fear felt by consumers. That is, systemic challenges related to connectivity, financial inclusion, skills and trust (such as digital security, privacy and consumer protection) have been greatly reduced. To address this problem, governments can extend affordable, high-quality broadband to rural and poor areas, increase financial inclusion, and promote trust and skill acquisition to participate in e-commerce. For companies, policy makers must reduce regulatory uncertainty to support the creation of innovative business models, in order to increase complementarity between offline and online sales strategies. Governments also need to meet the specific needs of SMEs, including ensuring a level playing field in intermediary services (such as online platforms).

Online shopping and business activities during this pandemic have been supported by an agreement that was agreed in 2018 before the pandemic occurred, so that online activities can run easily and smoothly. The ASEAN Agreement on E-Commerce, which became the first agreement in ASEAN and the world, was held in Singapore, at the 33rd ASEAN Summit. The potential for the development of e-commerce in ASEAN has been realized for a long time, even attracting Alibaba and Amazon to establish themselves in this region. Moreover, companies that grow in the ASEAN region themselves have managed to have a valuation of over one billion US dollars, namely: Tokopedia from Indonesia and Lazada from Singapore. It is not surprising that ASEAN protects and regulates electronic commerce activities into an agreement that regulates: cross-border trade between member countries, realizing a secure and integrated electronic payment system [21].

This e-commerce agreement was signed in the context of a regional Free Trade Agreement (FTA) so as to create a conducive and innovative environment for cross-border trade. It is also hoped that MSMEs can use the e-commerce platform in ASEAN that can penetrate the global market [22]. In more detail, there are 3 important points in the agreement:

1. The ASEAN Agreement on E-Commerce is the implementation of AEC-ASEAN 2025 in order to increase e-commerce cooperation between member countries. The aim is to facilitate cross-border transactions in ASEAN, create conducive conditions in the e-commerce ecosystem in ASEAN and can also reduce gaps in ASEAN.
2. The ASEAN Agreement on E-Commerce consists of 19 articles. In article 7.4 discusses market access such as cross border transfer of information, article 7.6 discusses the location of computing facilities and article 9 which regulates electronic payments.
3. This agreement regulates the movement of data across ASEAN members, creates a secure payment system and does not require localization and still provides space for the policies of each country.

This agreement does not include the issue of customs duties which regulate the imposition of customs duties for products in electronic transmission, member countries still maintain the commitment of the WTO Moratorium [23]. This digital economy was proclaimed as an economic recovery for the Region after the Covid-19 pandemic and of course very relevant in maintaining the economy during the pandemic, therefore ASEAN leaders accepted the recommendations of the ASEAN Business Advisory Council (ASEAN-BAC) in order to strengthen digital economic cooperation and economic recovery. post-pandemic on June 26, 2020 in Jakarta. Minister of Trade Agus Suparmo as the representative of Indonesia at that time stated that the digital economy has become an economic reality today, so there is a need for cooperation regarding the use of e-commerce in the core effort to increase the competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in various conditions [24].

Harmonization of law in ASEAN can occur because member countries have the same characteristics and characters in drafting various rules regarding e-commerce and IT. Moreover, IT standardization which relies on five pillars of information assurance, namely: confidentiality (confidentiality), integrity (integrity), non-repudiation non-repudiation, availability (availability) and authenticity (authenticity) allows e-commerce to form its laws independently.

The unification of markets among ASEAN member countries regulated by the MEA creates the interconnectedness of the ASEAN community, thus forming Lex Informatica which creates harmonization of ASEAN laws [25]. That way, online buying and selling activities in the Southeast Asia region are not constrained by regulations between member countries, in fact ASEAN has recognized and saw great potential so that digital economic growth during the Covid-19 pandemic can run smoothly. Thus, the continuity of regulations from each ASEAN country on the use of the digital economy becomes the effectiveness and concrete foundation of regional economic excellence amidst pandemic.

III. Conclusion

ASEAN as a rich region that already have a big potential to be a central in future world, requires an adaptive strategy to support its economic development. The coronavirus pandemic that has been spread since Q1 2020, shove many economic recessions for countries. Victims of disconnection in the service sector who switch professions to become online businessmen often help the growth of the digital economy in this region. The massive flow of digitalization has been well utilized by ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. ASEAN as the largest market and user of social media is visited by various technology investors. During this Covid-19 pandemic, there has been an explosive growth in digital transactions on various national or transnational platforms. ASEAN's already strong online trade regulations have become a foundation for this region to immediately rise up and pick up its advantages. The Covid-19 pandemic brings an answer that the concept of a Region like ASEAN is a more relevant order in the era of globalization. This phenomenon eliminates Europe centricity in economic modeling. This event is a reflection that strategies can be utilized from what is faced by individuals in the field; take advantage of opportunities even by building an online-based micro-business unit. This bottom-up scheme can be an efficient solution for post-pandemic economic countermeasures and strategies.

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Thailand Government Strategy and Policy in Handling The COVID-19 Pandemic

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Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic destroyed various countries from various aspects. One of the countries affected is Thailand. For Thailand itself, they are more disadvantaged in the economic sector. Given that one of the leading economic suppliers in Thailand is from the tourism sector. The sector has also been devastated due to the absence of foreign tourists visiting Thailand due to the pandemic. With this, the local Government has taken various ways to restore the situation to normal. Four things are under the Government's spotlight, including the health insurance system, the application of social distancing, the imposition of national emergency status, and economic stimulus. With these several things, it can be said that this journal will discuss how the Thai government policy in fighting Covid-19 from the health sector, the economy, and others. In his efforts, many polemics occurred due to quite controversial policies. One example is when the Government asked rich people in Thailand to help solve the problem. It brought a lot of negative response on social media, for example, is much-scattered hashtag #BeggarGovernment.

I. INTRODUCTION

The COVID 19 pandemic cases are still ongoing in various countries in the world. The disease is believed to have started in Wuhan's city in Hubei Province, China, around the beginning of January 2020 and began spreading to other countries in the middle of the same month. One of the countries infected by this disease in Thailand, one of China's closest countries. It was noted that the first positive cases of COVID 19 outside China were in Thailand. This case was found on January 13, 2020, suffered by tourists from Wuhan itself [1]. Since a long time ago, Thailand has often received tourists from China, one of which is Wuhan.

Throughout 2019, tourists from China who came to Thailand counted around 10-11 million people. It was also noted that there were more than 540 Thai flights, both to and from Wuhan [1]. The Thai and Wuhan flight traffic remained active until entering 2020 until finally they closed the flight paths of these two regions since the discovery of Wuhan tourists in Thailand who were exposed to COVID 19, as well as flight routes with other overseas regions. Gradually, local Thai residents also became infected, requiring the central Government to take immediate action to deal with this pandemic before conditions worsened.

The Thailand central Government enforces several rules and policies. For example, (1) Enlisted COVID 19 as one of the disease that receive health insurance for the Thai. (2) Implemented the social distancing by stopeped all teaching and learning activities and face-to-face lectures accompanied, and subtitute with online classes. (3) Established a National

Emergency Status, like restrictions on the sale of alcoholic drinks and the cancellation of the Songkran festival to prevent mass gatherings, and the provision of economic stimulus packages [1].

The Thai Government also issued policies to undergo a new normal there which were implemented after the decline in the number of positive cases of COVID 19 in Thailand since April 8, 2020. On May 13, 2020, no new cases were found [2]. This policy includes loosening permits to open public places such as markets, parks, sports venues, and shopping centres. Then, opening domestic flight routes at Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang airports, and launching an application called Thai Chana by the Government, which monitors people who are infected with corona and providing QR Code facilities for non-cash transactions [2].

The latest news from the Reuters news portal regarding the COVID 19 case in Thailand reported that until mid-June 2020, the total number of new COVID 19 cases was still increasing, but in small numbers and there were no new cases of death due to this disease. For example, on June 5, Reuters reported one new case and no new deaths. As of June 11, there were no new cases or deaths. Then, on June 16, the conditions were still the same; namely, there were no new cases and deaths. On June 18, Reuters reported six new cases of freelance citizens travelling from India and Saudi Arabia, and no new deaths [3]. In fact, since May 2020, the number of new cases and deaths found has rarely exceeded 2-digit numbers, so this is proof that the handling of COVID 19 cases in Thailand can be considered good. However, sustainable handling must be carried out so that the risk of COVID 19 transmission in Thailand can be continuously reduced.

The explanation regarding Thailand government solutions outlined above are only the general outlines. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze further the Thai central Government's strategy in dealing with COVID 19 and the results obtained from this strategy. Prior to that, the author will also explain how Thailand has felt the impact of the spread of this virus to their country.

II. Formulation of The Problem

After the authors provide the background of this paper, the authors formulate two questions that will be discussed here, including:

1. How has Thailand had the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in their country?

2. What are strategies and policies that Thai Government adopted in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic? and how are the results of these strategies and policies?

III. Methodology

A. Data Gathering Method

To gather data and information used for this paper, authors are using **literacy method**. This method relies on written sources like journal articles, books, official news, and official website data. For this paper, authors tend to gather information and data from official websites and news updates. This is because there have not many journal articles which are the research cannot be synchronized with the topic authors discuss this time. However, it can be understood because the topic is relatively new.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. COVID-19 Impact toward Thailand

With the pandemic that has plagued Thailand, one sector that has had an impact is the economy. This is based on two main factors, namely tourism and domestic activities, that have stopped completely. According to the Prime Minister of Thailand, Prayut Chan-Ocha, who was quoted on the Reuters news site, said that it is likely that the economic impact of the pandemic will last for the next nine months [4]. The Thai Government also predicts that the country's economic situation would decline to 40 billion US dollars [5].

To reduce this quite bad impact, the Thai Government asked for help from people with high economic status to overcome the economic downturn [6]. This has been done a few months ago when Covid-19 broke out in Thailand, where the Government has asked for help from the 20 richest people in Thailand, one of which is the King of Thailand, Maha Vajilongkorn, who donated medical equipment to support treatment and care both for COVID 19 patients and the public. As a result of this unusual thing, a few moments after that the hashtag #BeggarGovernment was also widely discussed on social media, especially Twitter. Despite receiving many cons from the community, the central Government of Thailand continues to do this for the sake of the sustainability of all sectors of national life [7].

The Central Bank of Thailand also predicts that the country's economy will fall by around 5.3 per cent in 2020 [8]. This can be categorized as the worst economic recession since the crisis year in 1998. The main cause of the economic downturn in Thailand is the decline in income from the tourism and domestic activities. For the tourism sector, it usually manages to contribute 20 per cent of the country's GDP. The decline was based on the dominance of Chinese tourists who frequently visited Thailand. Because the hotspot of the pandemic is China, the Thai Government has stopped and blocked foreign tourists' arrival to cover the spread of the virus that has occurred. Last year, 39 million tourists managed to contribute US $ 60 billion in income [9]. Of the nearly forty million tourists, it is noted that 10 million of them are Chinese.

As a result of foreign tourist arrivals' blockade, the souvenir center and various tourist attractions were deserted. This was also supported in January where pollution by smog caused tourist visits to decrease. This was mentioned by the Association of Thai Agents, which was reported on the tatnews.org website, which stated that smog and the rising bath currency were the main causes (TAT issues travel advisory on Bangkok's air pollution, 2020). TAT also stated that as many as 25 thousand tour guides have become unemployed due to the reduced number of tourists visiting. With this, the Vice President of the Phuket Tourism Association said that the Government's role was a big part in restoring all the conditions caused by the pandemic.

Moreover, the tourism sector has previously stated that it contributes one-fifth of the country's income in terms of the economy. However, this can be quite a dilemma because all parties must feel disadvantaged due to this. So, the Government prioritizes assistance as a whole and is not differentiated.

An example of tourism that requires government attention is the elephant sanctuary. When there are not many tourists visiting, the Government also has a stake in maintaining tourist attractions and ensuring that various animals in the area can eat. One of the leading tours in Thailand is an elephant sanctuary which has succeeded in attracting local and international tourists. With this, the Government created an agency that aims to take care of all the elephants in the area so that they are well. The agency is called Elephant Asia Rescue and Survival [10]. The Government expected that all aspects its impact on the Thai economy is not crushed when the pandemic has ended.

The polemic that has emerged between the Government and several tourism sectors is the policy that states that the state has banned foreign tourists visiting Thailand. Whereas usually in July-August each year, the peak of foreign tourists visiting Thailand for vacation. Both the government and local tourism workers are also at a disadvantage. Also, tourism businesses such as online gambling games have decreased in visitors due to the rampant online crime cases due to Covid-19. Reporting from Thailand-business-news.com Asian GClub Casino as a businessman stated that previously many players visited the site, but now it decreases due to rampant fraud caused by the pandemic [11]. Paying taxes to the Government is hampered, which is one of the reasons for the economic decline.

B. Efforts by the Thailand Government

The first case of COVID 19 outside China occurred in Thailand on January 13, 2020. At that time, a tourist from Wuhan visited Thailand. Thailand itself often receives foreign tourists, including Chinese tourists, especially in 2019 there are 10-11 million Chinese tourists who come. On the same day, the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) Thailand, Nonthaburi province, headed by Anutin Charnvirakul, carried out various protocols to stop the virus's spread. Anutin Charnvirakul said that Thailand had implemented a fever screening protocol for all Wuhan visitors since January 3, 2020, at 4 international airports in Suvarnabhumi, Don Mueang, Phuket, and Chiang May [12]. By combining surveys in public and private hospitals, Thailand identified 12 patients under surveillance (PDP) or patient under investigation (PUI). Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha who was aware of this situation, then emphasized MOPH the importance of providing accurate and reliable information to the public.

On January 21, 2020, Thailand intensively increased surveillance and monitored both from within and outside the country [12]. Many tourists are anticipated not to travel to Thailand during the Chinese New Year Festival. Moph implement measures of supervision and control that includes four aspects:

1. Increasing surveillance, screening every tourist who has made poor flights from Wuhan and placing tourists who are suspected of being infected in 5 separate international airports
2. Maintain standardization of clinical management and diagnosis for patients under surveillance
3. Improve the referral system for public and private hospitals
4. Increase surveillance in areas popular with tourists across the country.

Furthermore, the central Government of Thailand advises everyone visiting areas that have contracted COVID 19 to self-isolate by avoiding crowds, avoiding places selling animals, and avoiding people who have respiratory symptoms. People who have respiratory symptoms are encouraged to contact medical service at the hospital regarding travel history to China. Every passenger and flight crew who flew from Wuhan from January 3-21, 2020 received screening with a total of 19,480 passengers. Finally, the Government provides a hotline number for people who need more information.

On February 1, 2020, 12 confirmed cases have received treatment, and 7 patients have been discharged, so 19 cases. However, on January 3 to 31 alone, 334 people have been given PDP status. At this time, around 9,819 people in the world contracted the COVID 19 virus, with 9.692 people being Chinese citizens and the number of deaths reaching 213 people. The important thing to note is that there is an appeal from the Thai Government to the public not to spread fake news or hoaxes, especially those from unknown sources. The Thai Government insists that anyone who causes panic by spreading fake news will be punished by the Thailand Computer Crime Act of 2017 [12]. The Government also encourages people to be diligent in maintaining cleanliness and paying attention to the food they consume.

As of April 13, 2020, reported by Worldometers, Thailand had 2,579 positive cases but with a death toll of 40 people with a death percentage of 3% and the number of patients who had recovered reached 1,288 people. This figure is relatively small compared to countries such as Italy, England, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Indonesia, which have a mortality rate of over 10%. Reporting from the Center of Area Studies, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (P2W-LIPI) revealed several important points in Thailand during the COVID-19 pandemic, including:

1. Health Insurance System

The small number of cases of the COVID 19 virus could have been caused by the small number of people who also tested it. According to Worldometers, as of April 2020 1,440 per 1 million people have tested in Thailand. This is far below Malaysia and Singapore's population with 2,525 and 12,423 people testing per 1 million population. While Indonesia's conditions are much more severe, only 99 out of 1 million people take tests [1]. This shows that community participation or activeness is also an important thing in this matter. Perhaps Indonesia is experiencing coordination difficulties because it has an archipelagic form, and there are many cultural differences.

Compared to Singapore, which has a small area and population, Indonesia will certainly lose in coordinating its population. However, the level of community activity is different. In Indonesia the level of awareness of the population is still minimal. Thailand has included the COVID-19 pandemic into its health insurance system [1]. So that every patient will get treatment for free, including for every foreign student who is studying at universities in Thailand. Mulyasari also said that even though surgical masks or N95 masks are rare items, hand sanitizers' availability is sufficient. Thailand itself is known as a country with the best health insurance system in Southeast Asia. The Thai Government, apart from conducting a large-scale screening at the airport, also provides a self-screening website for people who feel they have symptoms of COVID-19.

2. Digital Application Specialized of Social Distancing Program

Thailand, like other countries, applies social distancing to its people. As we know, social distancing means everyone is expected to reduce contact with other people. This is done by staying away from the crowd and not leaving the house if it is not necessary. Thailand admits that its people are obedient in carrying out this social distancing. A survey conducted by the Bangkok Post to 26,000 residents found that 70 per cent of respondents ran the social distancing protocol [1]. Starting in March 2020, schools and campuses in Thailand will be closed and replaced with online or online learning. Every student who returns is required to carry out self-quarantine for 14 days without exception. Every office and workplace has implemented work from home, which is no different from Indonesia. Furthermore, tourism places are closed. The closure of the tourism sector has a big impact on the economy, for example, in Phuket or Bangkok's tourist areas.

3. Enforcement of a National Emergency Status

Since March, 26th 2020, the Thai Government has imposed a National Emergency Status. This period will last until April 30. The National Emergency Status is the same as a lockdown in Indonesia and several other countries such as Italy. This means that every access in and out of Thailand will be closed, there will be a ban on activities involving crowds, restrictions on domestic travel, and closure of shops except for shops selling necessities [1]. Restaurants, including hawker street (street food), shopping malls, stores, and traditional markets are closed except for service home delivery of food, the grocery store or supermarket, drug store or pharmacy, grocery store items - a staple item, and stores or mini -market. Important places such as ATMs, banks, gas stations, hospitals, postal services and factories remain open. During this National Emergency Status, the

Thai Government actually did not set a curfew, but a curfew was set starting April 3, 2020. People must stay at home from 22.00 to 04.00 and fined or jailed if they violate [1]. This National Emergency Status also led to the Songkran Festival's cancellation, which is a major celebration in Thailand. This festival used to celebrate the end of the dry season with a visit to a shrine, but nowadays the festival is celebrated with a new culture, namely the famous water feast. In the run-up to the Songkran Festival celebrations, the Government limits the sales of alcoholic beverage to prevent people from gathering for drinking party.

4. Enacting economic stimulus

In the period from March to April the Thai Government provided the economic stimulus for its people. Economic stimulus means financial assistance to help an economy that is threatened by COVID-19. The Government provides funding of ฿5,000 or equivalent to Rp 2.4 million to 9 million people for 3 months [1]. The second aid package was launched on April 7, 2020. And the third is in the form of an extension of cash assistance until September, investment in infrastructure and creating jobs, and soft loans for small and medium enterprises. Afterwards, the 6 largest banks in Thailand also provided loan interest discounts.

Reporting from the Bangkok Post, on July 1, 2020 Thailand announced that all forms of a lockdown or National Emergency Situations would be lifted, including international flights and travel between provinces. Even so, Secretary-General Gen Somsak Roongsita said that "Everyone's cooperation is important. This concerns the use of masks, social distancing , and limiting activities. During this outbreak (COVID-19) is still spreading in the world, we have to fight for a while". In the future, the curfew will be relaxed and flight restrictions removed.

A series of steps taken by the Thai Government succeeded in stopping the spread of the COVID-19 virus. The latest Department of Disease Control (DDC) report on June 25 stated that one new patient was a Thai citizen who had just returned from Egypt. This patient has now been treated, mostly when the DDC wrote that this is a lesson that other countries need to monitor when people return to their normal lives. Despite the increasing number of patients, the DDC report said that the total number of cases reached 3,158 with 3,038 successfully cured or the equivalent of 96.2% of the total cases. There were no new reports of deaths, so the death rate remains at 58 cases.

V. CONCLUSION

Thailand is the first area outside China to be directly affected by the COVID-19 virus, because a tourist from Wuhan was detected with the disease when they visited Thailand. This news was announced on January 13, 2020. Thailand became the first country to be infected, apart from being close to China, because it was known that Thai and Chinese flight flows were very dense. In 2019, Thailand received around 10-11 million tourists from China. Air traffic connecting Thailand and Wuhan also reached 540 airlines. It is a fairly dense number until they finally closed the flight paths of these two regions since the discovery of Wuhan tourists in Thailand exposed to COVID 19 well as flight routes with other overseas regions.

With the outbreak of COVID 19 in Thailand, we can see that the pandemic has a considerable impact on the Thai economy, especially in the tourism sector. As one of the countries in the world rich in culture, Thailand feels many bad effects because all tourism activities have died. This is because many tourists visiting Thailand come from abroad, and this pandemic has forced Thailand to close overseas flight routes. With the blocking of entry to tourists from abroad, Thailand's Gross Domestic Product has also experienced a significant decline. In addition, many residents engaged in tourism also lost their jobs. This followed because there were no visitors, so the owners could not pay them.

To overcome this community, the Thai Government also made a unique breakthrough by asking for help from people with high economic status there to participate in domestic economic recovery. Finally, where finally there were 20 of the richest people in Thailand who also donated for handling. COVID 19. This is done so that all aspects that are affected can be controlled thoroughly. Even though some of the Government's steps have drawn pros and cons, they are still running it for the benefit of all sectors of national life there.

The Government's move to impose a National Emergency Situation was a decisive step, which was still implemented despite opposition from some people. Not only that, as compensation, the Thai Government is trying to help the middle- and lower-class society by providing what is called an economic stimulus. The next step was followed by a cut in loan interest by the six largest banks in Thailand.

Another thing that needs to be underlined is that the Thai Government is moving fast. Since the first case appeared, which is also the first COVID-19 case outside China, the Thai Government immediately imposes a screening at every international airport. Good medical personnel and health insurance can bring Thailand to an average cure rate of 96.2%, which is arguably very high. It should be noted that apart from the Government, the Thai people themselves also reflect supportive measures, which based on the survey, their participation rate is quite high. The central Government also banned one of its biggest festivals, the Songkran festival, and banned liquor sale to prevent crowds from gathering. The decision not to impose access and exit closure may be a separate consideration for the Thai Government.

Although there is still an increase in positive patient cases and deaths due to COVID-19, but not large numbers. As reported by the news portal Reuters, the number of positive patients and deaths due to COVID-19 in Thailand during the month of June 2020 did not show a sharp increase. As quoted by previous authors, Reuters reported on June 5 that Thailand had only 1 new case and no new deaths. Furthermore, on June 11 there were no new cases or deaths. On June 16, the conditions were still the same; namely, there were no new cases and deaths. Finally, on June 18, Reuters reported 6 new cases of citizens who had escaped from India and Saudi Arabia, as well as no new deaths. Thus, we can conclude that a series of policies and actions by the Thai central Government, coupled with its people's supportive attitudes and behaviour, have effectively reduced the number of COVID-19 transmission in the country.

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Unveiling Choice: Debate on the Use of Hijab Religious Studies and Feminism in Malaysia

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Abstract

Hijab is an important symbol for Malaysia as a country that implements Islamic values in its social system. However, Maryam Lee sees that the decision of Malaysian Muslim women to wear the hijab is largely influenced by social demands. Maryam also sees that women who decide to take off their hijab are often criticized by society. These views Maryam wrote in her book entitled Unveiling Choices. In this book, Maryam narrates her views and decision to remove the hijab. Maryam also explained that women should be freed in deciding whether to wear or take off the hijab. This study aims to understand Maryam Lee's view of the hijab and how Malaysians respond to it. Therefore, this study will also look at the position of the hijab for the Malaysian people, Maryam Lee's thoughts on hijab, and the public's response to Maryam's thoughts. This research was conducted using a descriptive qualitative research method, namely by describing the thoughts of Maryam Lee and the public's response to her thoughts. Feminist Standpoint Theory chosen to understand Maryam's views and the public's response to her views. The results show that Maryam's view of the hijab contradicts the general view of Malaysian society. So that Maryam's view has sparked pros and cons from Malaysian society, this polarity occurs because there are groups who see Maryam's thoughts as a form of deviation from Islamic identity while other groups consider Maryam's actions as a form of resistance to the patriarchal system that demands justice for Malaysian women.

I. INTRODUCTION

Malaysia is a country with a majority Muslim population. So that apart from being a source of state law, Islamic values have been used as norms and culture inherent in Malaysian society. The use of hijab by Muslim women is one example of the implementation of Islamic law in Malaysia. In other words, the hijab has become an identity for Malaysian Muslim women. Although the state does not require the wearing of the hijab, the wearing of the hijab for Malaysian Muslim women seems to be an obligation because the use of the hijab has become inherent in the norms in society. For Malaysians, wearing the hijab is not only a form of religious observance but also a form of implementing social norms. So often the decision of Malaysian Muslim women to wear the hijab is influenced by their family and social environment. Maryam Lee wrote about this view in her book, Unveiling Choice.

In her book, Maryam Lee tries to tell her journey in deciding to stop wearing the hijab. Through her book, Maryam criticizes the hijab culture of Malaysian society which requires Muslim women to wear the hijab. Maryam also criticized the social criticism that women get when they decide to take off the hijab. Maryam thinks that women should have the freedom to wear or take off the hijab. Maryam's view has received various responses from the Malaysian people. This is because Maryam's view is different from the view of the majority of Malaysians regarding the hijab. Therefore, the author seeks to understand Maryam Lee's view of the hijab which contradicts the views of the general Malaysian public. Furthermore, this study also aims to see the response of Malaysian society to Maryam Lee's thoughts on the hijab.

II. Literature Review

The journal entitled Islamic Law and Human Rights in Malaysia written by Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil, and Nisar Mohammad Ahmad published in Islam and Civilizational Renewal in January 2014 [1], discusses the implementation of legal law in Malaysia which is influenced by two main factors, namely Sharia law and human rights. man. This journal does not specifically explain the limitations of the implementation of Sharia law in Malaysia but concludes that Sharia law has the potential to support the implementation of human rights so that this journal provides an important overview to explain the position of Sharia law in Malaysia.

The journal entitled Sisters in Islam Thinking Methodology on Hijab: Analysis of Criticism Based on Fiqh al-Hadith written by Shah Rizul Izyan Zulkiply, Mohd Muhiden Abd Rahman, Mohd Zahir Abdul Rahman and published in Al-Basirah Journal in December 2016 [2] discusses the recommendation to wear the hijab based on the argument - the arguments of the Qur'an and Hadith as well as criticizing the ideas of Sisters in Islam which are considered to deviate from religious teachings. This journal through the elaboration of these arguments denies that wearing the hijab is an option, but an obligation. This journal helps us to see Maryam Lee's actions, namely to see the feminism movement and its resistance to patriarchy which is at the same time faced with Sharia law that applies in Malaysia.

The journal, entitled Is Hijab a Fashion Statement, was written by Fadila Grine and Munazza Saeed which was published in the Journal of Islamic Marketing in 2017 [3]. This journal examines whether the hijab habit of the Malaysian Muslim community is based on religious obligations or based on fashion trends. The results showed that the majority of the Malaysian Muslim community who wear hijab is based on religious obligations rather than fashion trends. Malaysian Muslim women regard the hijab as a religious obligation and as a spiritual content regardless of whether it is attractive or not. For them, the hijab does not only cover the head but the body must also be covered by wearing loose clothing under Islamic rules. This journal provides an overview of how the habit of wearing the hijab is influenced by social characteristics and norms that exist in Malaysia. This journal helps the author to understand the social system of Malaysian society in the context of the hijab.

III. Research Methodology

This research was conducted using descriptive qualitative research methods. Through this method, the writer tries to explain and describe the object under study descriptively. This study specifically describes Maryam Lee's thoughts on hijab and how Malaysians respond to these thoughts. The process of collecting data was obtained through a literature review by analyzing documents collected from various sources, such as journals, research, surveys, news portals, and other relevant sources. The keywords used in the data search process are the value of hijab in Malaysia, Maryam Lee's thoughts on hijab, and the public's response to Maryam's thoughts. Based on the data that has been obtained, the researcher will reduce the data by categorizing the data into several categories, arranging them into patterns, selecting important information, narrowing the data, and making conclusions.

IV. THEORY

Feminist Standpoint Theory

Feminist Standpoint Theory assumes that a person's knowledge is obtained based on his position in social society. A person with a unique social position determines how he lives his life and influences his knowledge. Because it is related to the social structure, this social position has a level according to the distribution of power. The dominant social group usually controls the social structure and cultural expectations which results in the mastery of control over the minority group. Therefore, this theory is useful for explaining the experiences of minority and marginal groups. In contrast to feminist theory which focuses on the discussion of restrictions on women, Standpoint theory focuses more on the sources of women's experiences that are often ignored [4].

In other words, this theory focuses on seeking a clearer understanding of women's communication choices and the meaning of understanding their experiences. Communication is very important in this theory. Feminist Standpoint Theory tries to see the interpretation and meaning of someone's experience which usually starts from dialogue, discourse, and changes in perspective. Furthermore, this new perspective becomes a dominant thought that continues to experience and changes in the understanding of changing experiences. In the end, women who see the world from a feminist perspective witness how power works in their position as a marginal group, feel its effects in life and decide to reject patriarchal control [4].

Malaysia's dominant group may perceive the hijab as a national identity, but women who decide to stop wearing the hijab like Maryam Lee may have different views on the hijab. Feminist Standpoint Theory seeks to see women's experiences as a communication and how these experiences are influenced by various sources of demands. This theory seeks to understand Maryam Lee's decision to stop wearing the hijab as a symbolic expression and reflect her perspective on the hijab that is different from the dominant concept. This theory also attempts to explain how the dominant concept of hijab in Malaysian society has higher power than the marginal concept of hijab such as Maryam's thought.

V. ANALYSIS

A. *The Position of Hijab for Malaysian Society*

The spread of Islam in Malaysia began in the 14th century due to the conversion of King Parameswara (hereinafter known as Sultan Iskandar Shah) after marrying the daughter of the Islamic Kingdom of Samudra Pasai. This religious conversion was followed by Malaysians. Sharia law was then applied because of the increasing influence of Islam in the state life of Malaysian society. The implementation of Sharia law was also influenced by the great support from the Sultanate of Malaysia which is still respected by the Malaysian people. Today, Islam is the official and majority religion for the Malaysian population. Because of this history, Islamic values have become very embedded in the social life of the people. Malaysia was then known as a culturally Malay country with Islamic characteristics from the Sultanate of Malaysia [1].

The characteristics of Malaysian Islam can be seen, one of which is about how to dress women who are closed or through the habits of women wearing the hijab. Malaysia calls the hijab 'hood', which is to functions as a hair and neck cover accompanied by brackets [5]. The use of hijab has become an identity for Muslim women, especially for countries with a majority Muslim population such as Malaysia. This is because Islam requires its adherents, especially women, to wear the hijab. However, the use of the hijab, which is a form of religious observance, has turned into a demand for the family and social environment [6]. There are two groups of women who wear the hijab in Malaysia, namely those who wear the hijab based on religious observance and the basis of fashion trends. [7]

Media such as Hijabista and Nur magazines play a role in building the conception of the use of hijab in Malaysia. The content presented by Hijabista magazine leads to the hijab as fashion because the magazine provides opinions about hijab fashion trends, while Nur magazine provides more content towards conventional hijab by not giving the feel of the modern hijab [8]

Based on a survey to look at the factors that encourage the use of hijab among 362 Malaysian Muslim women with an Islamic higher education background and aged under 24 years, it was found that parents and social environment have a greater influence than the media (referring to social and mass media). to encourage the use of the hijab for Muslim women in Malaysia. In the same survey it was found that the reasons for wearing the hijab in Malaysia began to shift, with the highest reason being to follow fashion trends followed by reasons related to religion, also found reasons to facilitate communication with other Muslims. The survey concludes that Muslim women get great encouragement from their parents and the surrounding environment, but the shift in the value of using the hijab is influenced by the media [9]. Celebrities who are active on social media also have a considerable influence in shifting the value of hijab to fashion trends. Celebrities who promote hijab fashion often make the products they promote to become the latest hijab trends [10].

A similar survey was also conducted by Sandra Hochel in 2010 in Malaysia with the respondents being Malaysian Muslim women. The results show that most Malaysian Muslim women feel the demand to wear the hijab [11].

There are three aspects of piety that women have, namely hijab, polygamy, and caring for children [12]. Hijab is one of the social imaginations about the piety of Malaysian Muslim women. Society determines the level of the piety of Muslim women through the hijab they wear. This social imagination is then transformed into a social obligation for Malaysian Muslim women to wear the hijab. This obligation is further supported by countries where Malaysia is an Islamic country [13].

B. *Hijab from Maryam Lee's View*

Maryam Lee has become a widely discussed figure in Malaysia because of her views on the hijab. Through her book, Unveiling Choice, Maryam tells the story of her journey in deciding to take off her hijab. Through this experience, Maryam tries to voice the importance of freedom for Muslim women to choose to wear the hijab or not. In her book, she writes that "What people need to understand is that the hijab can be both liberating and oppressive, depending on the situation and context." Maryam also criticized the wearing of the hijab which has been imposed by the social environment, especially for children, at the behest of their parents and the surrounding environment [14].

According to Maryam, wearing the hijab should be a matter of individual choice, because Maryam sees that Islam has become an instrument of power and control for Malaysian Muslim men. Maryam also criticized how they did not even hear women's voices in decision-making. He also criticized how women until recently could not become imams and ulama, because the role of leader was exclusively for men. (Hunt, 2020). In addition, Maryam also emphasized that the common enemy for women is men who try to tell women what to wear [15].

Maryam has been wearing the hijab since she was 9 years old. In her mid-20s, Maryam realized that the reason she wore the hijab was only to satisfy social expectations rather than a form of religious observance. Therefore, Maryam finally decided to stop wearing the hijab. For Maryam, her decision to open the hijab is a step to get out of the patriarchal form and not out of Islam. In her book Maryam asserts that "I was born a Muslim, I'm still a Muslim - I'm no less of a Muslim because I removed my hijab". Maryam also emphasized that she was not calling on the public to take off the hijab, but rather inviting the public to rethink the teachings that have been given to them, in this case regarding the hijab issue. In Maryam's view, Malaysian women experience social criminalization if they decide to remove the hijab. Maryam also said that women were "imprisoned by social expectations" [14].

Unveiling Choice is Maryam Lee's attempt to inspire women who are on a spiritual journey and knowledge that makes them decide to do things that are against the social system. For Maryam, she is a reminder to the government and society that freedom of expression is not a crime and freedom of religion is not part of an insult to Islam, and the protection of freedom is a fundamental right in human rights [14].

C. *Malaysian Society's Response to Maryam Lee's Action*

Maryam Lee's views on the hijab began to be widely discussed after she became a speaker at the launching of her book entitled "Malay Women and De-Hijabbing". Maryam's view got pros and cons from Malaysian society. Those who are against Maryam Lee's action are of the view that the hijab is an obligation that must be fulfilled by women. They even criticized women who only wore turbans. Based on the arguments of the Qur'an and Hadith, as well as the belief that the hijab is part of the hereditary history of the Malay community, this group views women who do not wear the hijab as violating religious rules and have committed a very big sin. Meanwhile, women who wear turbans are considered individuals who do not carry out the Shari'a according to religious guidelines, because their aurat is still visible in the form of a neck and chest that are not neatly covered [16]. In looking at the position of women, Malaysian society demands 'idealism' in which the way women dress must be adapted to the customs of Malay culture and Islam. Based on this, there will be social demands for demands in dressing for Malaysian women which are required to cover their aurat, so that if a woman does not wear clothes that cover her aurat or her hijab does not comply with the 'idealism', she will receive criticism and social criticism [6].

In addition, the contra group also considers Maryam Lee's view of the freedom to wear the hijab as a form of deviation from Islamic identity. This counter attitude was also shown by the Malaysian government when the Minister of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Prime Minister Mujahid Yusof Rawa worried about Maryam's actions and thoughts and immediately contacted the Selangor Islamic Religion Office for follow-up [17]. The government is concerned that Maryam Lee's actions could trigger the actions of other women to participate in removing the hijab. This counter attitude was finally continued through the legal process by bringing Maryam Lee for questioning under a law that prohibits insulting Islam, namely Article 58 (1) of the 2003 Sharia Criminal Procedure Code (Selangor) [18].

However, Maryam Lee also received support from various parties who felt that wearing the hijab was a form of coercion by the family and the surrounding community. These proponents argue that Maryam's thinking is not to promote a ban on the wearing of the hijab, but rather to respond to social demands that Malaysian women wear the hijab. This group considers Maryam Lee's action as a form of women's independence and self-determination that does not depend on certain people's assumptions about the obligation to wear the hijab. They also think that society should be able to reduce blasphemy and respect each other's personal decisions and have a relevant understanding of women who decide to remove the hijab so that ultimately women who do not wear hijab can still live comfortably in society. [18].

Sisters in Islam (SIS) also voiced support for Maryam Lee's stance. SIS is an Islamic organization that was born in 1993 to uphold women's emancipation such as positions in institutions and voices in democracy [2]. SIS is a movement that claims to support female empowerment in the Islamic world debate [18]. SIS has an opinion that is in line with Maryam's view that women have equal rights with men who are entitled to positions as imams and scholars. SIS also voiced the same thing as Maryam regarding the position of women who do not wear hijab, who tend to be intimidated by their environment [19].

VI. Conclusion

Islamic values have been embedded in the social life of Malaysian society, one of which is the hijab. Apart from being a form of religious observance, wearing the hijab for Malaysian Muslim women has become a social identity. However, along with social changes, from the wearing of the hijab by Malaysian Muslim women from being based on religious teachings to being coercive, either subtly through social and mass media approaches or with direct approaches by parents and the surrounding community. Maryam Lee in her book Unveiling Choice describes how Malaysian women's decision to wear the hijab is influenced by demands from their family and social environment. Maryam criticized the behavior of society which often discriminated against women who did not wear the hijab or who chose to remove the hijab. In this book, Maryam tells of her journey in deciding to take off the hijab. For Maryam, women should have a choice in deciding whether to wear the hijab or not.

Even so, Maryam's thoughts received support and criticism from the Malaysian public. Several supporters such as Sisters in Islam agree with Maryam's opinion which also states that women who do not wear the hijab are often intimidated by their social environment. However, criticism also came from various parties, based on religious arguments this party stated that this thought was a form of deviation from Islamic identity. Feminist Standpoint Theory seeks to understand Maryam's changing perspective on the hijab, namely as a social demand from the dominant concept. This theory also explains that the dominant concept of hijab that forms hijab culture in Malaysia has control over marginal concepts such as the Maryam concept. For the dominant group, the hijab is an obligation and identity for Malay Muslims. So that the use of hijab for Malaysian women has become a must. For Maryam, wearing the hijab should be a woman's absolute decision and should not be influenced by the demands of society.

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ASEAN PLUS THREE EMERGENCY RICE RESERVE (APTERR): An Analysis on Its Role to The ASEAN Food Security in The Global Pandemic

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Abstract

ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve or APTERR is a rice bank cooperation between ASEAN member states as well as China, South Korea and Japan (as +3 or Plus Three). This collective commitment is made in order to ensure food security, particularly in the form of rice, in their member countries. Initiated due to the crisis that occurred from 2007 to 2011, APTERR is now facing the global COVID-19 pandemic that has been going on for more than one year. This, of course, presents a threat to the availability of rice due to limited mobility in the production or distribution sector, while the needs of rice in the community remains the same. In this paper, we will discuss further efforts and actions that have been taken by APTERR in assisting ASEAN members who are in an emergency status in their availability of rice. The research method which this paper used is a literacy review method, which will provide facts related to the background of APTERR, problems that threaten the threat of rice in the ASEAN region, and the latest presentation data to answer whether or not the APTERR plan will succeed in overcoming this pandemic crisis.

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Introduction

This Research is based on our interest in the unique action that is being taken by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to further ensure the food security of its member countries through the creation of a collective rice bank. This rice bank is created in the form cooperation that goes by the name of ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) which is based on an agreement between the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) Nations which consist of ten ASEAN member nations that is Brunei Darussalam, Singapura, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, The Philippines, and Vietnam as well as three East Asian nations that is China, Japan, and South Korea. The cooperation was first enacted on 7 October 2011 at the Conference of ASEAN Minister on Agriculture and Forestry Plus Three (AMAF+3) which is being held in Jakarta, Indonesia. The main function of the APPTER is to provide assistance in the field of food security to the member nations of the ASEAN+3 that are undergoing an emergency status that causes them to be unable to fulfill their own food security needs (APTERR, 2021). Numerous examples can be found in the abundance of calamity that happened in the ASEAN member nations that ranges from natural disasters, such as Tsunami in Aceh and Typhoon in The Philippines, to economic calamity that happened in

1997. Moreover, the condition in which the majority of ASEAN member countries are in that are less developed, with exception of Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, often made them less able to deal with their own problems, particularly in the economic and food security fields. The emergence of the global Covid-19 pandemic that has been going on for more than a year is causing various global crises which covers not only medical sectors but also in social and economic sectors. The disruption of the stability of global economics is one of the reasons for the decreasing food security, particularly in the ASEAN region where the majority of the countries are less developed. This food security threat that is experienced by most of the Southeast Asian countries mainly happens due to the inability of farmers to do their usual farming activities and distribute their products which are caused by tight health protocols that are being implemented by their governments in order to control the spread of Covid-19. Moreover, the ability of the population to fulfill their own daily food needs are continually decreasing due to the fact that there are more and more people that are forced to leave their job because the company that hired them can no longer afford to pay their salaries. In thi research, we will further analyze the various attempts that APTERR has done in order to overcome the food security problems that are being experienced by a lot of ASEAN member countries.

One of the things that really captured our interest is the unique way of APTERR to assist ASEAN+3 member countries in overcoming their food security problems, that is by focusing their assistance on rice, and only rice. This assistance that are being provided by APTERR that only focused on rice is based by a couple of factors, that is: 1) The majority of the Southeast Asian countries population chooses rice as its main consumption, and 2) Food products on the Southeast Asian countries are dominated by those that came from the agriculture sector. Taking into account those factors, the rice-focused assistance that is being provided by APTERR can be deemed reasonable because it will simultaneously fulfill the main consumption needs of the people in the Southeast Asian country and activate the strongest sector in Southeast Asia that is the agricultural sector. Interestingly, APTERR also provides a specific part of their aid using rice not in a form of money, but in a physical form which until now has gathered an estimated amount of 700,000 tons.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the positive and negative effects of APTERR to the ASEAN member countries. This analysis will be based on our observation of the steps and mekanism that are applied by APTERR in order to give assistance to the member countries that are in a state of emergency and therefore cannot fulfill their own food security needs. We will also analyze the effectivity of these steps and mekanism on its application. The analysis will be conducted by reviewing the assistants and aids that APTERR have given to its member countries in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic. We will also be analyzing the rice-focused assistance realization in supporting its member countries that are in a state of emergency.

Hypothesis: APTERR will bring good impacts to its member countries in solving its food security problems in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Research methods

In this research we will also analyze the reason behind the establishment of APTERR in the Southeast Asia region. In order to better understand the base of the establishment of APTERR we will be reviewing the theories of International Relations that, presumably, can explain the reason behind the establishment of this cooperation. One of the teoris that we will be using is the securitization theory which explains that the emergence of non-traditional issues, such as Covid-19 pandemic, can be categorized as a security problem of a country. This theory, presumably, can explain the main reason for the establishment of APTERR, considering the main purpose of this cooperation is to guarantee the food security of its member countries that are categorized as non-traditional security.

Theories

In order to learn from the past crises and prevent future crises from happening, researchers have found three main factors that caused the 2005-2008 crisis. The food crisis that happened in 2005-2008 are caused by three interrelated factors that is: 1) the increase of the price of the world's oil that caused the increased price of food ingredients, 2) the increase of the demand of food ingredients from oil-importing countries, and 3) the increased demand of biogas that are caused by the increased price of oil. The increasing price of food ingredients also affects the supply of those food ingredients, countries that are the main exporters of food ingredients will implement restrictions to their exports and there will also happen panic buying of food ingredient products. Rice as a main food commodity among the ASEAN member countries experienced a massive price escalation because of the decrease of the export rate of rice-exporting countries, which only 10% are sent to the international market while 90% are allocated to their own local market. Weather factors and trade restrictions made the price of wheat escalate for up to two folds the normal price. Droughts that happened in Australia and export restrictions from wheat-exporting countries due to harvest failure made supplies of wheat increasingly threatened (European Commission, 2011).

In order to handle the crisis that has been happening, ASEAN conducted a meeting to establish a prevention measure to prevent similar crises from happening in the future. On the meeting that are held on June 2012 in Cambodia, there are established three important preventive measures to prevent food ingredients crisis to happen in the future, that is:

1. ASEAN member countries can be more sustainable in the middle of crises if they established deeper trade strategies, maintaining a certain amount of rice at the regional and national levels, and correctly read market information.
2. ASEAN member countries can maintain the price of rice at an affordable level by developing the regional rice prices index and standardize the quality of rice.
3. ASEAN has to increase reserves in order to prepare for future calamities that are caused by climate change.

On facing this food security issue, ASEAN apparently sees the issue as a non-traditional isse in the level of regional security complex. Securitization are defined as an effort to maintain the survival of a nation when being faced with an issue that can potentially threaten the existence of the nation itself. Issues that can be securitized by a country, according to the Copenhagen School, is an issue that came from five categories, that is: 1) Military Security, 2) Political Security,

3) Economic Security, 4) Societal Security, and 5) Environmental Security (Caballero, Anthony, and Emmers. 2006).

Regional security complex, according to Barry Buzan, is a unit in the process of securitization, desecuritization, or both that are interconnected. This means that security problems that happen in countries in the same regional territory cannot be divided in its analysis and resolution and have to be solved on the regional level, not on the national level of every country in that region (Buzan 2012).

The concept of food security that brought upon by ASEAN member countries are initiated by planning a rice reserve for ASEAN member countries on 1979 that is ASEAN Food Security Reserve (ASFR) in order to establish ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) which has the main purpose to help population in poverty and in a condition of malnutrition which often found in the rural areas of the less developed ASEAN member countries. The main component of AERR is the donation of rice from its member countries that add up to about 50.000 Metric tons. After ASEAN have established a good relationship with East Asian countries (China, South Korea, and Japan) they started to establish a cooperation that goes by the name of ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3). On 7 October 2011 the former rice reserve cooperation that was established by ASEAN member countries that is ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) was revised into ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) due to the involvement of ASEAN+3 member countries (Kim and Paula P. Plaza 2018). The main component of this agreement are:

1. In achieving the emergency condition and humanitarian purposes, APTERR still use the ASFR definition of 'state of emergency'.
2. In its programs APTERR uses allocation of rice and physical reserve of rice. The reserve that APTERR has can be allocated in the form of cash or physical rice in a state of emergency.

Results and Discussion

APPTER Cooperation: The post 2007-2011 Food Crisis Calamity Prevention Measure

The food crisis that struck the world in 2007-2008 started when India and Vietnam, the main rice exporters in the world's economy, decided to implement restrictions to its rice exports. These restrictions cause a panic in the international world which cause the increase in the price of food products, particularly rice which spiked for up to two fold than before. Another food crisis also happened in 2011 when Russia implemented restrictions on its wheat exports due to the massive drought that beset the country. These food crises have a massive impact on the well-being of food security in different countries around the world, especially Southeast Asean Countries (Asian Development Bank, 2012). This happened because Asian countries, particularly Southeast Asian countries, are the biggest consumers of rice in the world. Rice, for the people of the Southeast Asian countries, is one of the main necessities that cannot be separated from their daily lives and we can imagine how big of an impact would it be if the price of the thing that people consume three times a day spiked for more than two folds of its former price. These food crises also can be more extensively perceived by Southeast Asian countries considering there are still a lot of under the middle class population that are still dependent on the availability of rice because they can't afford other alternatives. In responding to the massive effects of food crises to the well-being of food security in the Southeast Asian region, countries come together and formed a cooperation that has a main purpose of maintaining the balance of food security and overcome food insecurity in the Southeast Asian region that is ASEAN Integrated Food Security (AIFS) that pioneered the rice reserve cooperation of the ASEAN+3 member countries that is ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR).

Before further reviewing the decision that has been made by APTERR in preserving and resolving the food security of the ASEAN+3 region countries in the middle of the global pandemic that has been going on for more than a year, we first going to be reviewing the decisions that has been made by APTERR in preserving and resolving the food security of the Southeast Asian countries outside of the pandemic era. In achieving its purposes, APTERR divided its rice-aid programs into three tiers, which is:

1. First Tier
   The first tier of the aid programs covers all of the forms of aid that are given by APTERR to the requesting member countries that are based on agreements that have been made beforehand in a form of contract. Through the contract, APTERR and the aid-requesting countries will make an agreement regarding the quantities and qualities of rice that are going to be sent, payment and delivery requirements, and other necessary requirements.
2. Second Tier
   The second tier of the aid programs covers all of the forms of aid that are given by APTERR to the requesting member countries through spontaneous agreements that are made to respond unanticipated emergency situations. This tier covers all of the things that are not covered by the first tier.
3. Third Tier
   The tier three programs covers emergency rice aids that are released in response to severe emergency situations and humanitarian crises such as poverty prevention and malnutrition eradication. Tier three programs can be proceeded without agreements between aid-sending countries and aid-receiving countries beforehand.

From the time APTERR was made until present day, it has been observed that the rice aids that are given by APTERR to its member countries are dominated by the implementation of the tier three programs instead of the tier one and tier two programs. Based on the track record of APTERR activity from the time that it was made until 2013, there are at least four recorded implementations of its tier three programs.

In 2010 there were two recorded rice aids that are given by APTERR through its tier three program. The first one is the rice aid from Thailand to the Philippines in response to the emergency status caused by the Ketsana Typhoon, the Megi Typhoon, La Nina, and massive floods. The rice aid that was given by Thailand is delivered in a physical form of rice with an estimated amount of 520 metric tons in order to assist the Philippines in preserving its food security. The second one is the donation of 347 metric tons of rice from Japan to Laos that was also in an emergency situation due to the Ketsana Typhoon (Jongskul, 2012). There are also recorded rice aid through APTERR in a form of tier one program that is given by Vietnam to the Philippines with an amount of 10.000 tons (Briones, 2011).

In 2012 to 2013 there were also recorded two implementations of the tier three programs that is first on December 2012 where APTERR donated 50 tons of rice to assist six villages in Indonesia that are impacted by long periods of drought and second where Japan donated 200.000 US Dollars through APTERR to assist the Bopha Super-Typhoon victims that took place in Philippines on February 2013 (Mission of Japan to ASEAN, 2013). The voluntary donation from Japan to the Philippines were not included in the mandatory contribution which supposedly can by only in a form of physical rice. However there are no recorded implementations of APTERR's tier two programs.

Why Rice?

Unlike the South Asian and a couple of countries in the East Asian regions, the Southeast Asian region didn't have a sustainable wheat production which made its population relies on rice more for consumption and the working sector (Dawe, 2013). The abundance of rice resources in the Southeast Asian region became a factor behind the tendency of rice exports in its member countries. However, not all of it is in abundance, because the data suggests that the annual increase of rice production doesn't necessarily means the increase in a country's self sustaining capabilities, this can be seen on Indonesia and the Philippines imports rate that are the highest in the Southeast Asian region while Thailand and Vietnam have the highest export rate in the region (Bandumula, 2017). One of the cause factors of this phenomenon is the explosion of population numbers in Indonesia and the Philippines. Even though APTERR member countries portray themselves as rice-producing countries, in reality they themselves are also vulnerable to rice shortage which is the main food source in their region.

APTERR member countries also realise their similarity in needs, good qualities, and trust between each member country, considering geographically their regions have a massive potency on becoming fertile lands. The pretty big similarity between countries on the needs of rice also means a pretty big similarity in their food problems. With the formation of APTERR, instead of creating market, member countries are signaling mutual interest to prevent rice shortages in each country and minimize price spikes in the future.

Table 1. Impacts of Covid-19 on food security and poverty (Cole, 2020).

However, in reality price changes in all of the ASEAN member countries. The price changes that negatively affect the food security of ASEAN member countries are caused by the Covid-19 global pandemic. The severity of this pandemic forces countries to implement lockdown policies which caused the disruption of the economic wheel which caused the disruption on the agricultural sector production in the ASEAN region that still relies heavily on manual labor (Qurani & Choiruzzad, 2021). The poor distribution of technology in this sector caused the massive decrease in the supply of rice, as a consequence of the population demand that are not decreasing. This results in the increase of the price of rice which cause the increase in the unemployment rate.



Table 2. Food products price increase from Febuary 2020 to January 2021 2021 (FAO, 2021).

The price increase can be reviewed from the date of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It can be seen that all of the ASEAN member countries with Myanmar in first place with an estimated 32% increase and Vietnam in last place with an estimated increase of 4%. The extreme increase of rice price in Myanmar is also caused by the lengthy crisis that continues to heathen up in 2021. The Myanmar internal conflict of Rohingya humanitarian crises and the military coup d'etat cause food instability. It has to be mentioned that the data did not only consist of rice price, but also other food products such as vegetable oil, soy, and sugar. However, the availability of rice as a main food source of the ASEAN region population made the data presented more or less valid.

On the other hand, other ASEAN member countries such as Thailand and Vietnam can become the main exporters of rice which indicates an abundance of rice or rather they don't consume as much rice as their neighboring countries. Through APTERR, member countries have to send an annual rice contribution for the purpose of filling the emergency rice banks as well as maintaining their identity as rice-producing countries which represented by ASEAN's organization symbol that is the golden paddy. Food security, if simplified, can be accounted from the difference between production and consumption of food. APTERR offered rice reservoirs so that ASEAN Plus Three member countries can contribute together (Trethewie, 2012). The contribution of the East Asian countries that is China, South Korea, and Japan has also been proven by respectively donating 300.000 tons, 250.000 tons, and 150.000 tons of rice while ASEAN member countries collectively gather a total amount of 87.000 tons of rice. As a simplified illustration of food security, APTERR member countries have been estimated to consume a total of 542.000 tons of rice every single day (United States Department of Agriculture, 2021). From this data, it can be estimated that the system that has been implemented by APTERR have a potential to briefly create food security if an emergency situation occurred in all of the member countries.

The Effectivity of APTERR in The Pandemic Era

The Covid-19 pandemic brings negative impacts to the economic and agricultural sector of the people. The spike on the price of products and farming tools which are caused by high demands and low supplies is causing a panic in the society which are not well prepared in responding the pandemic situation. In the economic sector, the population experienced a turmoil due to the implementation of social restrictions policies which disturb economic activities of the people. In the Southeast Asian countries, the production activities at the agricultural sector experienced depression for as much as 3,11% or an estimated amount of 17,03 million tons and the increase of production will be futile due to the restricted distribution activities (Choiruzzad & Qurani, 2021).

Another impact in the economic sector is the high rate of unemployment because of thigh social restriction regarding production activities that requires a massive amount of labor. The unemployment rate escalation was recorded in Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines for up to twofold in December 2020 compared to January 2020. Indonesia and Malaysia experienced the escalation of unemployment rate for up to 50% while other ASEAN countries such as Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam experienced unemployment escalation at a much lower rate (Choiruzzad & Qurani, 2021).

This disruption in the economic sector also negatively impacts the population's capability to maintain its own food products needs due to the increase of the price of food products and decrease of income. In Malaysia a lot of people choose to decrease their food consumption in order to save some money, in Myanmar there are a shortage of healthy food that caused pregnant mothers struggling to find good nutritions, in Vietnam a lot of the population are force to consump poor quality food with an expensive price, and in the Philippines the starvation rate increased significantly from 8,8% in 2019 to 21,1% (Choiruzzad & Qurani, 2021).

In assisting its member countries in the middle of the pandemic, APTERR tends to use more of the third tier programs because in the first and second tier there are still a couple of things that haven't been finished such as the determination of price which will be used to give money-based donations. Rice reserve aids that are owned by APTERR in 2013 have a total amount of 787.000 tons with the data of total rice consumption of all APTERR member countries of 542.000 tons. The amount of rice reservoir that APTERR has is a result of the contribution of its member countries which consist of 300.000 tons from China, 250.000 tons from South Korea, 150.000 tons from Japan, and 87.000 tons from ASEAN member countries. However APTERR member countries prefer to solve this problem internally (Trethewie, 2012).

In delivering food security aids to APTERR member countries that are in a food security crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic, there are a couple of reports which are displayed in APTERR official website that is:

1. The donation of 300 metric tons (MT) of rice from Japan to assist Cambodia that was in a food security crisis. This delivery of rice aid is implemented through the use of APTERR's tier three program which means the aid comes in a form of physical rice. This aid will be allocated for as much as 222 MT to help civilians that are unable to fulfill their own food needs while 78 MT will be allocated for future reservoirs.
2. A rice donation by Japan with a total amount of 1.779 MT to three APTERR member countries that is Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Philippines which are going to be used as prepositioned and urgent request systems.
3. A rice donation by Japan and South Korea with a total amount of 1.350 MT for the people of Myanmar. This rice donation was initiated by South Korea by donating 600 MT of rice as an emergency donation to prevent a food security crisis in Myanmar.

From the data mentioned above, can be concluded that APTERR as a cooperation that has a purpose to overcome food insecurity in its member countries has done its job quite well. However the participation that came from ASEAN member countries in rice contribution are much lower than those that came from the ASEAN Plus Three member countries namely China, Japan, and South Korea. Although the crisis that we are in came suddenly, there are still some hope that APTERR can independently guarantee the food security of its member countries.

Conclusion

The establishment of APTEER by ASEAN alongside China, Japan, and South Korea has proven to be able to overcome or assist its member countries that are in an emergency situation and therefore cannot maintain its own food security. The effort to overcome food availability problems is still there despite the fact that the collective rice contribution from the ASEAN member countries is still far less than East Asian nation contribution. The food stock disparity situation that are experienced by APTERR member countries can be overcome with the tier one, tier two, and tier three donation programs.

In the case of food insecurity that are caused by the Covid-19 global pandemic, APTERR often used the tier three donation program rather than tier one and two programs which can be seen from how APTERR takes care of food insecurity problems in Cambodia, Myanmar, and the Philippines. This happened because tier three programs enable APTERR to act faster in case of an emergency situation in its member countries, while tier one and two programs have to be proceeded with much more complicated steps which make donations much harder to be delivered in a case of emergency.

Through simple efforts such as rice contributions and diversification donation program tiers, APTERR can do a pretty good job in providing, anticipating, and guaranteeing the main food needs of the people of its member countries. Moreover, the existence of APTERR can also generate a better utilization of the Southeast Asian countries resources which are dominated by the agricultural sector with rice as its main commodity. The existence of this cooperation can also create an opportunity to observe more rice production acceleration potential while cooperating with China, Japan, and South Korea. Therefore, ASEAN member countries can learn a little bit more about the utilization of technology and other efforts to increase rice production, considering the decrease of labor that is willing to work in Southeast Asian countries' agricultural sector.

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China's COVID-19 Vaccine Diplomacy as China's Effort in Increasing Its Influence in the ASEAN Region

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Abstract

The coronavirus outbreak (now known as COVID-19) is rapidly spreading throughout the world, and Southeast Asia is no exception. COVID-19 has affected many aspects of human life. The threat of this global pandemic is transnational, so regional and multilateral cooperation is needed. Therefore, it is necessary to find a vaccine to defeat the pandemic. Developed countries began to race to find vaccines and put the first access to vaccines for the benefit of their countries. In this case, China is a country that offers cooperation in providing massive vaccines to developing countries, including ASEAN member countries through its vaccine diplomacy scheme. This offer of cooperation cannot be separated from China's own interests. This research uses a qualitative case study method with analytical descriptive. This study uses an approach to China's interests and geopolitics in the Southeast Asia region. This article intends to explore and elaborate on China's efforts to increase its influence in the ASEAN region as a form of its geopolitical strategy in the form of vaccine diplomacy. The results of the research in this article are that China seeks to improve its image and achieve geopolitical interests in ASEAN by taking advantage of opportunities from the distribution of Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccines.

I. INTRODUCTION

Large outbreaks of infectious diseases have always been a global challenge. From the Spanish Flu to the Coronavirus disease 2019 abbreviated as Covid-19, it has disrupted all aspects of the world. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), COVID-19 is a virus that causes the common cold to more severe illnesses such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-CoV). This outbreak was first recorded in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, in December 2019. More than 100 countries and regions have now reported new cases of the coronavirus [1]. WHO subsequently declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on 30 January 2020 and recognized it as a pandemic on 6 April 2020. The term pandemic does not indicate the severity of a disease, but only the extent of its spread [2].

Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the ASEAN Member States (AMS) were also affected in early 2020 during the outbreak of the new coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19). The ASEAN Member States and Institutions responded quickly to the outbreak. Many AMS implemented protective measures before the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic on March 11, 2020. AMS, including Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia were among the first governments in the world to put in place measures to control the spread of the virus. Governments across the region are supporting the urgent needs of local health systems and enacting various containment measures, movement restrictions, and social distancing requirements to slow the spread of the virus. The time frame and rigor of these measures varied significantly across regions, reflecting the severity of the virus in each AMS. While these measures are critical to virus control, widespread restrictions on movement have significant consequences on the lives and livelihoods of people across the region [3].

The number of COVID-19 cases in the region shows that every country in the region has similar problems. ASEAN, a regional institution in the Southeast Asia region that oversees 10 member countries and was established in 1967, has issued several regional initiatives to deal with the problem of the COVID-19 outbreak that is spreading in the region. One of the initiatives that member countries have successfully agreed on is the COVID-19 Response Funds. However, apart from the initiatives launched by ASEAN, the reality of international relations amid a crisis will have implications for two possibilities, namely encouraging collaboration with other affected countries or carrying out restrictions for self-preservation known as self-help mechanisms [4].

At first, each country tried to limit itself and focus on restoring its own country's stability (state-centric). However, recently countries have begun to develop research into COVID-19 vaccines and are trying to offer cooperation with countries and international organizations, including ASEAN. It should be noted that the offer of cooperation in the constellation of international relations cannot be separated from the existence of certain goals to be achieved. These countries then offer assistance to other countries in terms of cooperation for recovery in the health sector through the provision of vaccines which is now known as "Vaccine Diplomacy." One of the countries that practice vaccine diplomacy is China.

The author focuses on the country's level of analysis, namely China for several reasons. First, as the country at the epicenter of the spread of the corona virus, China has begun to show a slowdown in the rate of spread of Covid-19 cases. Second, China is the country that first identified and reported Covid-19, now experiencing positive developments. After lifting lockdowns in several regions in early April 2020, the number of new cases reported daily has decreased in recent times [5]. Third, China succeeded in creating a vaccine called Sinovac and offered cooperation with ASEAN countries through its vaccine.

The method used is a qualitative method by describing phenomena related to China's behavior in terms of handling the COVID-19 outbreak through its vaccine diplomacy. The data collection technique was carried out by Literature Studies, so that the data used came from official reports from the Singapore government and the ASEAN official website, journals and books related to China and ASEAN relations as well as online newspaper articles that correlated with the context of the issues discussed in this article.

Furthermore, the author formulates a research problem, namely how can vaccine diplomacy be China's strategy in expanding its influence in the ASEAN Region? This article attempts to analyze and describe China's efforts to expand its influence in the ASEAN region through its vaccine diplomacy. Further explanation regarding this matter will be divided into several parts, namely the relationship between China and ASEAN which is followed by the elaboration of cooperation between China and ASEAN through vaccine diplomacy, and an analysis related to the strategy of expanding China's influence in ASEAN member countries in geopolitics.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The first journal related to this research is a journal article written by Muhammad Nuha Zakiyy, Rio Abei Santoso, Yehezkiel Pramaditya Alviano, entitled ASEAN Response to the COVID-19 in the Economic, Health, and Tourism Sector in 2020 which was published in the journal Journal of ASEAN Dynamics and Beyond [6]. In this article, the author tries to see the impact caused by COVID-19 and ASEAN's response in dealing with issues consisting of health, economic, and tourism issues.

The Covid-19 pandemic has spread in every country, including ASEAN members affected by this pandemic. Economic growth will certainly be greatly affected by this pandemic. Each country in ASEAN has its strategy to deal with the pandemic problem. The research describes China as BRICs and BRI.

An overview of collaborative activities, including through Poonam Khetrapa Singh, WHO Regional Director for the Southeast Asia region, discussing strategies to overcome the impact of COVID-19 in ASEAN member countries. Most of the discussions at the conference discussed the negative impact caused by the corona virus on economic sectors in Southeast Asia. Several supporting factors, such as the implementation of lockdown policies in several countries, affected the weakening of the ASEAN economy.

The impact of the pandemic that occurred especially in the Southeast Asian region on the economic sector was a change in the economic growth of a country. Unforeseen events. International trade activities and chains have also experienced a significant impact due to this pandemic. The ASEAN trade chain includes many partner countries which are consumers and suppliers to various ASEAN member countries. The European Union, America, China as the largest producer and consumer countries in the world, are also major trading partners for ASEAN, accounting for half (50.3%) of the total ASEAN trade worldwide, so that disruptions in trade activities will cause shortages or effects on the global economy. these countries.

In addition to disruptions that occur directly from the economic sector, such as a decrease in demand, government policies to reduce the trading capacity of a country's external parties to prevent pandemic transmission can affect imbalances in the trade chain. The efforts made by ASEAN in dealing with this pandemic are by collaborating in determining policies, exchanging information about the situation of each country, and using tourism destination websites to restore the state of tourism in ASEAN.

The second journal related to this research is a journal article written by Rizky Widian and Vrameswari Omega W with the title ASEAN Regional Potentials for Combating COVID-19 in 2020 [7]. In this article, the author explores and elaborates on ASEAN's potential to encourage the realization of cooperation and commitment from countries in facing regional challenges under the conditions of the corona virus outbreak. This article describes the spread of COVID-19 in the ASEAN region and provides an overview of ASEAN's role in efforts to resolve its impacts.

In the case explanation, the author provides an overview of the role played by ASEAN in its efforts to resolve the pandemic. This can be seen in ASEAN's commitment to issuing a recent declaration reflecting that ASEAN has the potential, especially in terms of goodwill and a framework or basis for cooperation, to fight the virus at the regional level.

The author explains several factors that cause a cooperation to be established according to Robert Jervis. First, the opportunity for cooperation will increase if something increases the incentive to cooperate or if there is something that reduces the cost of being exploited by others. Second, some reduce the incentives to exploit each other or those that make not cooperating expensive. Third, there is something that raises the expectations of countries that their counterparts are willing to cooperate. These factors are appropriate to conditions in ASEAN and can reflect the organization's potential to address problems cooperatively and coordinatively. Therefore, it is clear that ASEAN has the potential to combat COVID-19 through regional efforts.

The third journal related to this research is a journal article written by Rizka Fiani Prabaningtyas, Atin Prabandari with the title Synergy of Political Motives and Normative Motives in China's Humanitarian Diplomacy during the Covid-19 Pandemic which was published in the LIPI Political Research Journal in 2020 [8]. In this study, the author tries to map out the pattern of implementing humanitarian diplomacy carried out by emerging power countries in responding to the Covid-19 pandemic, in this case China.

By using a humanitarian diplomacy approach, the author analyzes that the humanitarian assistance provided by China is to gain a positive image as well as manage the impact of Covid-19 on China's relations with South Pacific countries. The author describes the understanding of the concept of humanitarian diplomacy and its relation to emerging powers by providing examples in the form of cooperation carried out Humanitarian diplomacy carried out by China cannot be separated from the existence of normative and political motives in its formulation and implementation.

The link between these two motives has long been part of the dynamics of the international humanitarian system. The emergence of China as one of the emerging donors is a dilemma for traditional donor countries because China does not want to be just a norm taker, but also wants to participate in reforming the existing system with the principles it believes in.

III. ANALYSIS

Before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, China's relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had experienced ups and downs. Historically, China has viewed ASEAN as an instrument designed to “encircle China” and thus maintain a safe distance from the regional body [3]. As China began to develop its economy starting in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, and in the following decades harbored ambitions for a global role, he realized that he needed to first achieve dominance regionally, close to his country. As Yuen Foong Khong, Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy once wrote. In his writings, he mentions that Asia is a place where China must build prestige or reputation for its power. In the 1990s, Beijing opened itself to seeking a settlement of differences and disputes among nations through peaceful means [9].

In 1991, China and ASEAN began a dialogue process marked by the presence of foreign minister Qian Qichen at the opening ceremony of the 24th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. In 2003, China agreed to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, ASEAN's first dialogue partner to do so, and established the China-ASEAN strategic partnership, which is again a pioneering effort. In 2010, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area was up and running. In 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed to jointly build a closer China-ASEAN community with a common future during his visit to ASEAN countries. In 2018, the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Vision 2030 was issued, a blueprint looking to the future [10].

In 2020, after COVID-19 hit all of us, China and ASEAN stand in strong solidarity to fight the virus, continue growth, and protect people's livelihoods. This solidarity is part of the form of humanitarian diplomacy. China has emerged as one of the emerging powers that consider the importance of cooperation between countries in this case humanitarian diplomacy through the provision of medical assistance in this case is the COVID-19 vaccine.

In general, there have been many previous studies on China as an emerging power and its humanitarian assistance. Broadly speaking, the main focus of the research is the evolution of China's involvement in the international humanitarian system and China's humanitarian assistance with development assistance in the context of providing Chinese foreign aid and the narrative of Chinese aid as part of China's foreign policy [8].

There are several previous studies that discuss the evolution of China's humanitarian aid goes hand in hand with the transformation of China's foreign aid system as a whole. In Hirono's research, there are aspects of foreign policy that shape China's current approach to humanitarian aid, namely national interests, China's degree of integration in the international humanitarian system, domestic influence, and humanitarian values [11].

Meanwhile, Kurtzer and Gonzales' writings highlight China's role in providing humanitarian assistance to achieve three interests. First, it distracts from the Chinese Communist Party's inadequate initial response to the virus. Second, take advantage of the perceived moment of US withdrawal from global leadership. Third, strengthen existing investment in development spending. China has used medical humanitarian aid as a tool to counter the prevailing narrative of responsibility for the spread of Covid-19. According to the Chinese government's white paper, as of May 31, 2020, China had donated medical supplies to more than 150 countries, regions, and international agencies and sent medical teams to 27 countries. A Stanford study documenting China's state-affiliated Twitter accounts revealed that the systematic effort to promote Chinese aid deliveries was an attempt to distract attention from the alleged cause of the virus while enhancing its image [12]. In the context of the influence of geopolitical competition on China's vaccine diplomacy performance, it indirectly strengthens its position as a global leader, especially in ASEAN.

Developed countries are currently competing in the discovery of a COVID-19 vaccine. The competition to find a Covid-19 vaccine marks a new chapter in the global arms race. China, Europe, and the United States (US) have invested billions of dollars and mobilized scientists to be the first to produce a vaccine. The victorious country will get the first steps to protect its citizens and restart its economy [13].

Because vaccine development is expensive, funding is an integral part of successful vaccine development. Nation-states, institutions, and pharmaceutical companies are pouring large sums of money and resources into vaccine development. The United States, through its program dubbed “Operation Warp Speed” initiated more than $18 billion dollars in vaccine development to various pharmaceutical companies to vaccinate hundreds of millions of Americans [14].

To date, several vaccines have been successfully developed and distributed, including [15]:

1. Modern. A vaccine manufactured by American biotech company Moderna was approved for general use in the US in December.
2. Oxford-AstraZeneca. A vaccine developed by the Swedish-British drugmaker in partnership with the University of Oxford has been approved for use in the UK, India and Argentina.
3. BioNTech-Pfizer. The first coronavirus vaccines allowed for use in the EU — a drug produced by German biotech company BioNTech and U.S. pharmaceutical giant Pfizer — have also been approved for use in the US, UK, Saudi Arabia, as well as at least 19 other countries.
4. Sputnik V, the vaccine produced by Russia and has been approved for use in Belarus, Argentina and Guinea.
5. Sinopharm and Sinovac. Both vaccines are produced by a Beijing-based biopharmaceutical company. This vaccine has been distributed to various regions, including ASEAN.

In general, there are 4 steps for a vaccine candidate to apply for approval. The first is the preclinical phase where vaccine candidates are tested with animal or human cells to ensure their safety before testing them on humans in clinical trials. Then, if successful, there are three phases of clinical trials to be carried out. The first involves a small number of healthy subjects to test primarily whether it is safe and also its ability to produce the antibodies needed to trigger an immune response. Phase II trials bring more people to determine dosages, schedules and assess the immune response from things like age, gender, and other variables. If promising, Phase III could be initiated as these trials could involve up to tens of thousands of people, looking at the effectiveness of the vaccine candidate for preventing infection [14], [16].

Based on the various vaccine variants developed, there are problems in terms of vaccine distribution. WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said that 87 percent of this dose was administered in upper-middle-income countries while 0.2. According to a CNBC report, an estimated 700 million vaccines have been distributed worldwide. However, countries with high and middle gross domestic income (GDP) dominate the list of vaccine receipts. percent go to low-income countries [17]. This huge disparity should be a serious concern and one of the reasons it's happening can be traced back to how the company allocates its vaccine launches.

According to *kontekstual.com,*, higher-income countries have funded vaccine development in the billions, and in return drug companies provide these countries with safe doses of vaccines for their people. This is common in the West because they have the resources to take the investment risks, they are able to make deals early in the pandemic even when a vaccine has not been proven effective. In addition, these countries buy more doses than their population will need to replace if the drug company's vaccines fail to deliver. In fact, more than 6 billion doses are covered by these upper-middle-income countries, when they represent only one-fifth of the global population. With the current limited production capacity, almost all doses produced by Western manufacturers are almost full from deals with rich countries [14]. Of course, this has resulted in poor countries lagging far behind.

Some of these countries have pledged to share their vaccines. But most of these world leaders make it clear that their own country comes first, then the excess dose can be shared with the world. This nationalistic approach to vaccine procurement means that poor countries cannot depend on the West. With the gap left by western democracies, China is also taking advantage of this opportunity by providing its vaccine to countries that need it. But it all comes at a price, as vaccines give these powerful nations a strategic opportunity to further expand their influence and win the seemingly irresistible war of “vaccine diplomacy.”

Citing from *thejakarta.post.com*, China has supplied or plans to supply 120 million doses of the coronavirus vaccine to ASEAN members. This is about 4.8 times the amount allocated to the region by the United States and European countries through the UN-backed COVAX global vaccine sharing program, according to a Kyodo News tally. The figures were compiled by Kyodo News based on data from Gavi, an alliance of governments, international organizations, companies, and charities promoting the COVAX program in collaboration with the World Health Organization, as well as from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations governments.

The tally also shows Cambodia and Indonesia get more than 90 percent of their vaccine doses from China. Laos gets about 89 percent of its dose from China and the Philippines more than 60 percent. Several countries in Southeast Asia have faced a resurgence of infections and are trying to get enough doses for their populations. With China's vaccine exceeding those provided to ASEAN members through the COVAX program by the United States and European countries, leaders of the Group of Seven industrialized nations on June 12, 2021, said they aim to help developing countries emerge from the coronavirus pandemic by providing 1 billion doses. China's Sinopharm vaccine will be supplied to developing countries via COVAX but does not include those allocated to ASEAN countries on Friday [18].

From this, it can be seen that vaccines have become a diplomatic tool or weapon for China. In the Southeast Asia Region, the Chinese Government offers its vaccines, namely Sinovac and Sinopharm. The presence of Sinovac and Sinopharm provides access for developing countries to obtain vaccines in the midst of vaccine production from major world pharmaceutical companies controlled by developed countries, especially the United States and Europe. Even so, China's move has come under scrutiny from some experts who think the country has a political motive behind the vaccine distribution. Global health researcher at the US Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Huang Yanzhong, said China's 'kindness' was linked to the Panda Nation's interest in restoring their reputation. Many countries are angry that China is considered the source country of the coronavirus. China is also considered to benefit from increasing the credibility of its biotechnology companies if the vaccine is successful [19].

In addition, especially in Southeast Asian countries, China has an interest in developing global influence to facilitate geopolitical affairs. For ASEAN, this is a 'golden opportunity' that is very tempting to miss, especially for affected countries with the highest infection rates such as Indonesia and the Philippines. The exposure to the pandemic has severely disrupted the economic foundations of most ASEAN member states. Thus, with China's assistance in facilitating the development of a vaccine, it can accommodate the interests of the state to accelerate the acceleration of post-pandemic economic recovery.

On the other side, China has regional agenda interests related to the acquisition of the South China Sea. This motive is seen as increasingly visible when China made a vaccine diplomacy agreement for Malaysia and the Philippines. Previously, the two countries disputed China's expansion in the South China Sea. To expedite its action, China is trying to make its vaccine production a global public good. This was stated by President Xi Jinping in a keynote address via video at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2021 [20], [21].

Xi Jinping's movement to make the corona vaccine a public good seems to place Beijing at the forefront of public health. This effort is a kind of 'fill in the gap' of America's absence from the global alliance with 189 countries that promised to distribute vaccines equitably. America, which is China's competitor, only focuses on producing vaccines for domestic purposes. If Washington still refuses to compete, it is expected to cost the country the vaccine race.

China's vaccine diplomacy has focused on Southeast Asia, with Indonesia — the world's fourth most populous country — being one of the first recipients of Sinovac's shipments last December and now the leading foreign recipient of China's vaccines overall. The strengthening of China's vaccine diplomacy was further strengthened by the signing of cooperation in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a large-scale trade agreement involving China, ASEAN, and several other Pacific countries in November 2020 [22].

III. Conclusion

The COVID-19 pandemic has implications for changing the nature of relations in the international system. The pattern of existing relations shows two possibilities, namely building solidarity through cooperation or applying restrictive boundaries through protectionism. Through this paper, the author sees that the relationship between China and ASEAN leads to the first pattern, namely the emphasis on collaboration through cooperation in the region, in this case, the distribution of vaccines as a diplomatic tool.

The author concludes that the Chinese government offers the Covid-19 vaccine to ASEAN countries due to the interest to improve its geopolitics in the Southeast Asian Region. In addition, China is trying to rebuild its image which is considered bad because it is the epicenter of the spread of the coronavirus. With the presence of sinovac and sinopharm, it provides access for developing countries to get vaccines during vaccine production from major world pharmaceutical companies controlled by developed countries, especially the United States and Europe.

China took advantage of the opportunity at a time when Western countries were still focused on domestic conditions. The provision of humanitarian assistance cannot be separated from China's approach to vaccine diplomacy, which differs in ambition, strategy, and operationalization. China as an emerging power country has global ambitions to provide vaccines to developing countries throughout the region because it aspires to expand its influence indirectly. And, diplomacy is a powerful tool to launch the action.

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COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF INDONESIA WITH COMPETITIVE COUNTRIES FOR EXPORTING OF WORLD SPICES

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Abstract

Exports are an important component in the economy. The higher the export performance, the greater the positive impact. Indonesia is one of the producers of spices and is included in the 5 largest spice producing countries in the world so that it has great opportunities and potential to be developed. This study aims to determine the comparison of Indonesia's comparative advantage with competing countries for world spice exports. This study uses the basic analytical descriptive method. The data used in this research is secondary data. Secondary data in this study include data on area area, production, productivity from FAO (fao.org) and data on exports and imports from UN Comtrade (comtrade.un.org). Based on the results of the research, it can be seen that Indonesia is still in the top 4 position in the world spice commodity exporter. When viewed from the acreage and production of spices, Indonesia is still in the top rank, especially in the commodities of cinnamon, cloves and nutmeg. In the international market, it can be seen that the percentage of the market share for Indonesian spices is in fourth place.

INTRODUCTION

One of the spice producers is Indonesia. The country is included in the five largest spice producing countries in the world. Cultivated commodities include cloves, nutmeg, pepper, cinnamon and vanilla. This thing can actually be used as much as possible and has opportunities with great potential to be developed. In the future period of time, of course, the market demand for spices will increase along with the unstoppable population growth. Increasing the economy, health records, expensive substitutes and synthesis products will also have an impact on environmental sustainability. The rate of demand for the commodity of spices each year increased by 10.38% each year. This shows that the spice commodity has a prospective market and plays an important role in the international market (Anggrasari, 2021).

Integration between several countries is formed from the basic concept of needs between two or more countries. This can be both an obstacle and a bridge to the economic integration that occurs. Local economies must come together and form partnerships to promote trade and development. With a good regional economy, of course, it will also encourage a good country's economy (Akhmadi, 2017). Greene (2013) also states that the total trade (exports and imports) of state income, land population, market and geographic openness. Indonesia has the advantage of demographics that support the growth of the spice commodity so that this has become an advantage for the country. The socio-economic development of a country must also be supported by the strong capital it has. The country's strong economic development will be balanced with strong institutional qualities so that indicators of economic results can be seen from the relationship between social capital (Haile & Whakeshum, 2020).

The Indonesian agricultural sector is a priority sector for the development of national economic development. The role of the Indonesian agricultural sector for the economy is a contributor to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a source of foreign exchange, a provider of food for individuals or industrial raw materials and as a source of food security (Ervani, 2018). Several Indonesian agricultural commodities have a fairly good export role in the world, including European countries. The spice commodity has long been a mainstay of Indonesian exports to the world. Exports are an important component in the economy. The higher the export performance, the greater the positive impact (Nurhayati, Hartoyo, & Mulatsih, 2019). Therefore, the export of these commodities needs to be maintained and increased in value in order to balance the trade balance (Benesova, I., Maitah, M., Smutka, L., Tomsik, K., & Ishchukova, 2017).

The Indonesian spices commodity is one of the plantation sub-sector commodities with a big opportunity in the international market (Zuhdi, Rahmadona, & Maulana, 2020). As a spice producer, Indonesia has the opportunity to become a world spice exporter. However, when competing countries appeared, the old producers had to strengthen the competitiveness of their products (Sa'diyah & Darwanto, 2020). Lakner et al. (2018) revealed that since the 1960s, the quantity of global spice trade has increased exponentially, The value of the international trade in spices has increased 41 times which indicates a slightly higher rate of increase in the overall food trade. Based on the results of the analysis from 2000 to 2017, the average ISP value of Indonesian spices is positive. This shows that the domestic supply is greater than the demand. However, the value of Indonesian ISPs continues to decline due to the average rate of increase in exports of Indonesian spices commodities per year of 8.07%, while the average rate of increase in imports of Indonesian spices commodities per year is 92.54%. The high rate of imports of Indonesian spices, one of which is due to the sharp increase in imports of clove commodities (Anggrasari & Mulyo, 2019).

Economic distance is one of the factors that influence the level of exports. This also affects transportation costs which are usually charged to importing countries as well as additional costs such as communication costs. Another thing that needs to be considered is the tariffs that lead to an increase in export prices. The rates referred to are excise, taxes, import duties or taxes that are imposed on products exported to countries of destination for inter-country trading. The export share is based on the export performance of a country along with the country's trade patterns. Measuring exports can be determined from the export value of the country's commodities compared to the value of world exports (Beaudreau, 2011). The existence of tariffs has a negative effect on exports (Kis-Katos, K., & Sparrow, 2015). Of course this is also considered by exporting countries for the spice commodity such as Indonesia. Basically, Indonesian spice commodities have a comparative advantage when viewed from the RCA calculation. Its comparative advantage is quite strong in trading on the European Union market (Laursen, 2015). The RSCA index value for Indonesian spices until 2018 has a positive value except for the ginger commodity (Shohibul, 2013). Based on this description, this study aims to compare Indonesia's comparative advantage with competing countries for world spice exports.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses the basic analytical descriptive method. This research method focuses on solving actual problems in the present so as to provide a systematic picture of a fact and the characteristics of the object or subject accurately. The data used in this study is secondary data, namely data obtained based on the results of literature studies of various archives and statistical data from related agencies. Secondary data in this study include data on area area, production, productivity from FAO (fao.org) and data on exports and imports from UN Comtrade (comtrade.un.org). The limited researched spices commodity based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) code sourced from UNComtrade (2019) includes codes 0904 (pepper, chili, capsicum), 0905 (vanilla), 0906 (cinnamon), 0907 (cloves), 0908 (nutmeg, awing, cardamom), and 0910 (biopharmaca) for spices with data spanning 2000-2017.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

World Spice Exporting Countries

The top three exporting countries for specific spices or groups of spices are occupied by producing countries with tropical climates. The main spice exporters are China, Madagascar, Indonesia and India while Guatemala, Brazil, Vietnam and Sri Lanka are exporters whose trade value varies each year, and fluctuates around US $ 2.5 billion (FAO, 2015). In table 1, it can be seen that several countries exporting world spice commodities in 2000 and 2017.

Table 1. World Spice Commodity Exporters, 2000 and 2017

2000			2017		
Country	Export (US$)	% World Export	Country	Export (US$)	% World Export
China	390.234.998	13,22	Viet Nam	1.544.582.142	16,83
India	317.138.661	10,74	India	1.381.663.798	15,06
Viet Nam	212.068.308	7,18	China	946.791.367	10,32
Indonesia	197.279.884	6,68	Indonesia	774.461.043	8,44
Germany	137.436.000	4,65	Madagascar	574.738.870	6,26
Netherlands	135.262.760	4,58	Netherlands	384.696.274	4,19
Dunia	2.952.895.535	100,00	Dunia	9.176.698.632	100,00

Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

With abundant production, Indonesia, India, Vietnam, China and Madagascar have made these countries the main exporters of spice commodities in the international market. In 2000 and 2017 the countries of China, India, Vietnam and Indonesia were always in the top four in the supply of spice commodities in the international market. These countries are always active in exporting spices on the international market.

In 2000, Madagascar was not included in the main exporter of spices, but then Madagascar became a new competitor in the international market. This can be seen in 2017 the country of Madagascar was able to control the market by 6.26% in the world. This shows that Madagascar can become a new competitor for spices in the international market.

Comparison of the Comparative Advantages of the Top Exporting Countries of the Spice Commodities of the World

The comparative advantage of Indonesia's spice commodities with competing countries can be viewed in terms of land ownership area, total production, and level of productivity.

In terms of acreage and production in 2017, Indonesia ranks first in the commodity of cinnamon, cloves and nutmeg but in terms of productivity, Indonesia is still low, which is in third place with a productivity level of 0.83 tonnes / ha in cinnamon, 0 , 23 tonnes / ha for cloves, and 0.19 tonnes / ha for nutmeg. China and Madagascar have better productivity levels of cinnamon and cloves than Indonesia. India and Madagascar have better nutmeg productivity compared to Indonesia.

India has the largest area of pepper and the largest production in nutmeg. Although the area of Indian nutmeg is still less competitive with Indonesia, India's nutmeg productivity is better than Indonesia so that India can outperform Indonesia's nutmeg production. Madagascar has an advantage in vanilla and ginger with the largest area of land and production among other spice exporting countries

Table 2. Comparison of the Comparative Advantages of Spice Commodities in the World Main Exporting Countries in 2017

Commodities	Vietnam	India	China	Indonesia	Madagackar
Pepper					
Area (ha)	132.000	181.978	18.436	11.382	93.507
Production (ton)	72.000	87.029	35.389	6.425	252.576
Productivity (ton/ha)	0,55	0,48	1,92	0,56	2,70
Vanilla					
Area (ha)	-	-	5.774	15.203	73.171
Production (ton)	-	-	662	2.402	3.227
Productivity (ton/ha)	-	-	0,11	0,16	0,04
Cinnamon					
Area (ha)	102.059	-	42.412	105.530	1.620
Production (ton)	37.126	-	79.486	87.130	2.811
Productivity (ton/ha)	0,36	-	1,87	0,83	1,74
Clove					
Area (ha)	-	-	938	548,091	59,966
Production (ton)	-	-	1.305	123,773	19,677
Productivity (ton/ha)	-	-	1,39	0,23	0,33
Nutmeg					
Area (ha)	-	108.000	-	180.205	16
Production (ton)	-	43.000	-	34.385	16
Productivity (ton/ha)	-	0,40	-	0,19	1,00
Ginger					
Area (ha)	-	10.556	53.515	34	168.000
Production (ton)	-	216.587	583.126	118	1.070.000
Productivity (ton/ha)	-	20,52	10,90	3,47	6,37

Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

When viewed as a whole, Indonesia has a comparative advantage in terms of area size, however the productivity of Indonesian spices is still low because it cannot compete with its competing countries. Therefore, Indonesia needs to make technological innovations in order to increase its productivity.

Comparison of the Market Share of the World's Top Exporting Countries of Spice Commodities in the International Market

Figure 1 shows the average comparison of the export share of each country in the international market from the percentage of total consumption of spices around the world for 18 years (2000-2017). In the international market, the percentage of the market share for Indonesian spices is fourth. In 2017, the market share for Indonesian spices was 6.3%. Meanwhile, in 2000, the share of the Indonesian spices commodity reached 13.15%. This indicates a 52.11% decline in market share with an average annual decline in market share of 1.77%.

India is a country that has the largest market share of spices in the international market with an average of 12.15%. India has had a positive market share growth rate for 18 years, namely 51.89% with an annual increase in market share of 3.36%. India's market share in 2017 was 13.91%.

China ranks second with an average market share for the spices commodity of 10.93%. The growth rate of China's market share for 18 years was 64.60% with an annual increase in market share of 4.40%.

Of the ASEAN countries, Vietnam is Indonesia's competitor with a 9.34% market share for the spice commodity. Vietnam's market share has an increasing trend with a market share growth rate of 91.52% with an annual increase in market share of 5.28%. In 2000 the market share for Vietnamese spices was 6.28%, then in 2017 it increased to 12.06%. Madagascar and the Netherlands are ranked fifth and sixth with an average market share of 4.51% and 4.37%. Madagascar has the largest market share growth rate compared to other countries, namely 105.34% with an annual increase in market share of 12.34%. In 2000 the market share of Madagascar's spice commodities was only 4.37%, then increased in 2017 to 8.98%. Meanwhile, the Netherlands has a declining market share trend with a decline rate of 19.04% for 18 years with an average annual decline rate of 0.54%. In 2000 the market share of the Dutch spices commodity was 4.54% and in 2017 it was 3.68%. In Figure 2, you can see the growth in the market share of the world's main exporter of spices in 2000-2017.



Figure 1. Average Market Share of the World Main Exporting Spices 2000-2017
Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)



	Indonesia	Vietnam	Netherlands	China	India	Madagascar
2000-2005	8.10	5.40	4.07	10.26	8.28	6.86
2006-2011	6.86	8.50	4.62	12.39	13.66	2.18
2012-2017	8.39	14.15	4.41	10.14	14.51	4.49

Figure 2. Growth of the Market Share of the World Top Exporting Countries for the Spice Commodities 2000-2017

Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

In Figure 2 it can be seen that only Vietnam and India have the growth in market share of the spices commodity which has increased for 18 years in 3 periods. Overall, Vietnam competes with India for the largest market share of spices in the international market. Indonesia, China and Madagascar have fluctuating market shares, while the Netherlands has a more stable market share. This means that the Netherlands can maintain its market share.

Comparison of the Trade Balance of the World's Main Exporting Countries of the Spice Commodities

The trade balance for the world's main exporting countries' spices for 18 years (2000-2017) has an average surplus value. The highest average surpus was owned by China with a surplus value of US $ 541.07 million, followed by Vietnam US $ 530.51 million, India US $ 482.64 million, Indonesia US $ 341.62 million, Madagascar 226.30 million US $, and the Netherlands 7.37 million US $. Each country has a trade balance value for spices which tends to increase or increase every year.



Figure 3. Comparison of the trade balance for the world's main exporting countries of spices 2000-2017

Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019).

This shows that the world demand for spices still provides good potential and opportunities in the international market. The growth rate of the surplus spices of Vietnam, India, China, Indonesia, Madagascar, and the Netherlands for 18 consecutive years was 669.79%; 394.87%; 640.34%; 87.11%; 796.07%; and 325; 55%, while the growth rate of surplus in spices commodities per year was 15.77% per year, 14.65% per year, 14.32% per year, 33.83% per year, 29.22% per year. year, and 160.88% per year.

Comparison of the Prices of Spices for the Commodities of the Spices of the Main Exporting Countries of the World

The price of spices for each country varies. There are countries that have commodity prices with high value, but there are also countries that have lower commodity prices compared to other countries. Some spice exporting countries are also spice producing countries, so there are some spice products that are not sold in processed products so that the price of these commodities is lower. For higher commodity prices, this could be because the spice products have been processed so that they have added value. One country that has quite high commodity prices for spices is the Netherlands. The Netherlands is not a country that produces or produces its own spice products, but the Netherlands is a re-exporter of spice commodities so that the Netherlands buys fresh spice products or semi-finished products at low prices then processes them and provides added value so that the price of Dutch spices commodities quite high in the international market. Comparison of the prices of several spice commodities between exporting countries can be seen in Figures 4 to 9.

Figure 4 shows that the price of pepper has an increasing trend in each period for 18 years (2000-2017). This can be seen from the development of pepper prices in each exporting country of the spice commodity on the international market. In the period 2000-2005 and 2006-2011, the price of Dutch pepper had the highest value compared to the price of pepper in other countries. In the 2012-2017 period, the price of Dutch pepper was not much different from that of Vietnam, which had the highest value. This is because the Netherlands is a re-export country so that the price of pepper sold by the Netherlands has additional costs due to processing, storage, and so on. The price of Dutch pepper has an increasing trend for 18 years with a growth rate of 44.82% with an annual increase in the price of pepper of 4.25%.

The price of Vietnamese pepper is in second place with an average price of pepper for 18 years, namely 4.20 US $ / kg. The price of Vietnamese pepper has an increasing trend for 18 years with a growth rate of 29.84% and an annual increase in pepper prices of 0.21%. Meanwhile, Indonesia occupies the third position with an average price of pepper of 4.41 US $ / kg. The price of Indonesian pepper has an increasing trend for 18 years with a growth rate of 61.56% with an annual increase in pepper prices of 7.02%. The price of Indonesian pepper reached 9.25 US $ / kg in 2014.



Figure 4. Comparison of Pepper Prices of the World Main Exporting Countries in 2000-2017

Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

The development of Indonesian pepper prices in the domestic market actually follows the development of pepper prices in foreign markets because Indonesian pepper is mainly used for export. However, Indonesia as one of the main pepper producing countries in the world has not been able to influence world market prices or act as a price leader, so it does not have a good bargaining position in international trade. So far, Indonesia is still a price taker in determining the price of pepper on the world market (Niviati, 2015). In addition, the price of pepper is also influenced by the supply or production of pepper. According to Fazaria et. al. (2016) fluctuating Indonesian pepper prices are thought to be the result of the fluctuating price of pepper in the international market. The world price of pepper thus affects the price of pepper in the domestic market.

Madagascar and China are in fourth and fifth place with an average price of pepper, namely 4.73 US $ / kg and 2.02 US $ / kg with a growth rate of pepper prices for 18 years of 47.86% and 225.62%. The growth in the price of Chinese pepper compared to other countries. Meanwhile, India has the lowest pepper price with an average pepper price of 1.66 US $ / kg with a pepper price growth rate of 9.45% with an annual increase in pepper price of 4.9% per year.

When viewed as a whole, the price of pepper in the international market for exporters of spices has a price trend that tends to increase. This shows that pepper has good prospects for farmers. For vanilla commodity, prices fluctuate greatly and there is a huge imbalance of prices from one country to another.

The price of vanilla tends to be more volatile than the price of pepper. The price of vanilla per kg is more expensive than the price of pepper. China and Vietnam have higher prices for vanilla than the prices for vanilla from India, Indonesia, Madagascar and the Netherlands. In Figure 5, it can be seen that in each period only the vanilla prices of India, Madagascar, and the Netherlands experienced an increase even though the prices for vanilla in these three countries were not high. For 18 years India has had a vanilla price growth rate of 607.16% with an annual increase in vanilla price of 20.01%. Madagascar has a vanilla price growth rate of 112.60% with an annual increase in vanilla price of 6.23% and the Netherlands has a vanilla price growth rate of 418.82% with an annual increase in vanilla price of 4.25%.



Figure 5. Comparison of Vanilla Prices in the World Major Exporting Countries 2000-2017
Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

The price of vanilla in Vietnam, China and Indonesia has fluctuated every period. If we look at the average rate of increase in the price of vanilla in China and Indonesia, it has increased every year by 26.01% and 58.28%. Meanwhile, Vietnam experienced an annual price decline of 12.58%. In Indonesia, the price of vanilla is determined by the quality of the vanilla fruit being sold. Prices on the world market influence the high and low price of vanilla among farmers. So that world vanilla price fluctuations will later affect price changes among farmers. The increasing price of vanilla in Indonesia is because the world market is starting to see the vanilla market originating from Indonesia (Chandrayani, P. M. W., & Natha, 2017).

If the price of vanilla is compared to the price of cinnamon, there is quite a difference in the price. A comparison of the price of cinnamon in the world's spice exporting countries can be seen in Figure 6.



Figure 6. Comparison of the Prices of Cinnamon in the Main Exporting Countries in the World 2000-2017
Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

On average, the one with the highest price of cinnamon was Vietnam 2.48 US $ / kg, followed by the Netherlands 2.38 US $, India 2.09 US $ / kg, China 1.34 US $ / kg, Indonesia 1.10 US $ / kg, and Madagascar 0.91 US $ / kg. For 18 years, the growth rate of Indonesian cinnamon prices is in second place after India with a growth rate of 377.52% and an annual growth rate of 10.91%. In 2000 the price of Indonesian cinnamon was 0.61 US $ / kg, then in 2017 the price of cinnamon increased to 2.93 US $ / kg.

India has the largest cinnamon price growth rate, namely 1,431.81% with an annual growth rate of 20%. In 2000 the price of Indian cinnamon was 0.28 US $ / kg, then in 2017 it was 4.24 US $ / kg. From these data it can be seen that in 2000 the price of Indian cinnamon was lower than that of Indonesia, however India succeeded in increasing the price of cinnamon to exceed the price of Indonesian cinnamon.

If viewed partially, the price of cinnamon has an increasing trend in all countries. This shows that cinnamon has good prospects for cultivation by farmers. Apart from cinnamon, there are cloves which also have an upward trend in prices. In Figure 7, you can see the comparison of clove prices among exporting countries for spices on the international market during 2000-2017.



Figure 7. Comparison of Clove Prices for Major World Exporting Countries 2000-2017
Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

The price of cloves has an increasing trend for 18 years (2000-2017). This can be seen from the development of clove prices in each of the world's clove exporting countries which have a positive growth rate. In each period it can be seen that the price of Dutch cloves has the highest position compared to the price of cloves in other countries, with an average of 7.34 US $ / kg. The annual rate of increase in Dutch clove prices is 8.56%.

The average annual growth rate of Indonesian cloves is 8.72%. China, India, and Madagascar also had a good rate of increase in clove prices each year, sequentially, namely 13.41%; 14.99%; and 10.15%. Meanwhile, Vietnam has an annual growth rate that tends to decrease by 8.84%. The decline was due to the frequent fluctuating or fluctuating prices of Vietnamese cloves.

The price of cloves when compared to the price of nutmeg has a lower value. In Figure 8, we can see the comparison of Indonesia's nutmeg prices with its competing countries. The price of nutmeg has an increasing trend during the period 2000-2017. This can be seen from the development of the nutmeg price in each country which tends to increase in each period. In the 2000-2005 period, Madagascar's nutmeg price was the highest compared to other countries' nutmeg prices, namely 8.73 US $ / kg. However, in the following period the Chinese nutmeg price was superior to the Madagascar nutmeg price with a price of 15.71 US $ / kg in the 2006-2011 period and 40.32 US $ / kg in the 2012-2017 period.



Figure 8. Comparison of the Prices of Nutmeg in the Main Exporting Countries in the World 2000-2017
Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

When viewed from the growth rate of nutmeg prices for 18 years, the most rapid growth in the price of nutmeg is China with a growth rate of 2,032.86% with an average annual growth rate of 20.10%. The average annual rate of increase in the price of Indonesian nutmeg is 2.17%. India, the Netherlands, and Madagascar also have good annual increment rates of cinnamon, namely 5.48%; 4.28%; and 14.26%. Meanwhile, the growth rate of Indian nutmeg has decreased annually by 4.81%.

The price of biopharmaca has an increasing trend for 18 years (2000-2017). This can be seen from the development of biopharmaca prices in each of the world's biopharmaca exporting countries. In each period it can be seen that the price of Madagascar's biopharmaca is the highest compared to the biopharmaceutical prices of other countries. The growth rate of Madagascar's biopharmaceutical prices is 35.13% for 18 years with an annual increase in biopharmaceutical prices of 11.50%.



Figure 9. Comparison of Biopharmaca Prices for Major World Exporting Countries 2000-2017
Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

China and Indonesia are the countries with the lowest biopharmaceutical prices when compared to other exporting countries. However, the rate of increase in the price of Indonesian biopharmaca each year is still positive with an average increase of 26.72% per year. Vietnam, China, and India also had a good rate of increase in biopharmaca prices each year, sequentially, namely 8.16%; 15.27%; and 6.06%. Meanwhile, the Netherlands has a downward trend in biopharmaca prices by 2.94% per year.

Comparison of the Contribution of the Exports of Spices to the Top Exporting Countries of the World

In Figure 10, you can see the comparison of the export contribution of the world's main exporters of spices from 2000 to 2017 to all export commodities of each country. Madagascar has the highest export contribution of spices among other countries with an average export contribution value for 18 years of 15.33%. In 2017, the export contribution of Madagascar's spices, compared to all commodities, was 33.27%. The growth rate of Madagascar's export contribution was 171.58% for 18 years. This shows that the commodity of spices for Madagascar is an important export commodity.

Vietnam as the largest exporter of spices, only contributed 0.70% to total exports for an average of 18 years with a tendency for the export contribution to tend to decline by 43.67%. The average contribution of Indonesia's exports for 18 years was 0.33% with a decrease in the contribution of exports by 23.00%. The export contribution of China's spices also decreased by a value of 20.83%. The average export contribution of Chinese spices for 18 years was 0.05%. India also experienced a decline of 4.05% with an average export contribution of 0.38%. Meanwhile, the contribution of Dutch exports to the spice commodity has increased by 49.18% for 18 years with an average export share of 0.05%.



Figure 10. Comparison of the Contribution of the Spices Exports of the World Main Exporting Countries 2000-2017

Source: Secondary data analysis (UNCOMTRADE, 2019)

CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the research, it can be seen that Indonesia is still in the top 4 position in the world spice commodity exporter. When viewed from the acreage and production of spices, Indonesia is still in the top rank, especially in the commodities of cinnamon, cloves and nutmeg. In the international market, it can be seen that the percentage of the market share for Indonesian spices is in fourth place. Each country has a trade balance value for spices which tends to increase or increase every year. This shows that the world demand for spices still provides good potential and opportunities in the international market. The price of spices commodities at any time and in each country, of course, varies. Indonesia must be able to emulate the Netherlands, which can produce quite good commodity spices. Indonesia has actually taken steps to maintain the price of spices to remain stable, for example, the price of pepper has followed world developments, but in fact Indonesia has not been able to influence world pepper prices due to several factors such as fluctuations in world prices which tend to develop. Indonesia should maintain the growth in the market share of the spices commodity for at least the next 3 periods. This is intended so that Indonesia can compete with competing countries in Asia, such as Vietnam and India. This of course cannot be separated from the trend of Indonesia's market share which must be more stable than usual.

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