

A Long Walk for Nothing? ASEAN's Ineffectiveness in Combating Transnational Organized Crime: The Case of Drug Trafficking in the 'Golden Triangle'

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Article Information

Submitted :

Accepted :

Keywords :

ASEAN; drug trafficking, transnational organized crimes; security community; Golden Triangle

Abstract

This paper seeks to analyze ASEAN's ineffectiveness in combating transnational organized crime, with special focus on the case of drug trafficking. With most member states being in a developing economy state, the region of Southeast Asia become a target for the various activities of transnational organized crimes (TOCs). One of the prominent TOC operating in the region is illegal drug trafficking, with its center in the region being at the Golden Triangle area—an intersection between Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. The three countries themselves are known for being production points of illegal drugs, with little national effort to combat it. While the hope for regional action from ASEAN emerge, ASEAN's various effort in combating illegal drug trafficking seems to be ineffective. This is evidenced by the constant increase of illegal drug production and distribution in the region and even outwards. This paper seeks to explain this ineffectiveness. By utilizing the framework of security community, this paper argues that there is a lack of collective identity and community sense that become the underlying factor for this ineffectiveness. Therefore, this paper concludes the need of ideational shift to increase effectivity in ASEAN's effort.

INTRODUCTION

As a region identified by a majority of developing countries, Southeast Asia is often the target of various transnational organized crimes (TOCs) activities. Although the phenomenon of transnational crime occurs in all parts of the world, each region has its own characteristics and challenges, making regional organizations such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) need to maneuver in carrying out their mandates. Failure to develop regional or international coordinated policies in the face of increasingly ever-growing TOCs can harm the security and stability of the nations in the 21st century (Shelley, 1995). Luong (2020) states that globalization and regional integration is a significant cause of the diversification and expansion of TOCs, which has become a threat to governments seeking to prevent illegal flows of people, money, and goods.

In exploring the status quo of transnational crime in Southeast Asia, the UNODC (2019) report on transnational crime activities in Southeast Asia can

be used as a reference. UNODC underlines that the condition of Southeast Asian countries that are weak in terms of law enforcement, border guarding, corruption-vulnerable are conditions that cause transnational crimes to emerge. Furthermore, UNODC underlines that there are four transnational crimes that are the most urgent in the region. The first is the illegal drug trade, with the main commodities being methamphetamine and heroin. Second, namely migrant smuggling and human trafficking. Third, namely crimes related to the environment, such as the trade in protected animals. Fourth, namely the illegal trade in counterfeit goods and drugs.

As underlined by ASEAN (2012), the inclusion of transnational crime agendas in the discussion of ASEAN member countries has begun since the 1990s, which is a reflection of the increase in information and transportation technology that allows the rapid increase of transnational crime. ASEAN has also discussed many crimes of terrorism in this framework, because often terrorism is cross-border and also commits other transnational crimes. In addition, ASEAN (2012)

also seems to place a special focus on the crime of illegal drug trafficking, because this issue is the problem with the highest frequency in this region. ASEAN has made various efforts in eradicating these transnational crimes. The main flow of discussion usually occurs at the level of a high-level summits, which is then followed up at the ministerial level and related agencies (Emmers, 2003). However, as underlined by UNODC (2019), Southeast Asia's transnational crime rate continues to rise from year to year.

This paper seeks to analyze ASEAN's ineffectiveness as a regional organization in combating TOC in Southeast Asia, with focus on the issue of drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle Area. This paper utilizes the conceptual framework of security community—a concept that has been much discussed to explain both the current and ideal state of ASEAN as a regional organization. This paper argues that ASEAN is lacking a sense of community, proofed by the lack of cross-border transaction and cooperation, which make its regional effort ineffective. This is demonstrated in its ineffectiveness in combating drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle area, as the three states in the area have shown little cooperation in the regional framework. The discussion of this paper is divided into four parts. First, this paper discusses the conceptual framework of security community and its preconditions, and to what extent it is applicable to the case of ASEAN. Second, this paper explained the drug trafficking challenge in Southeast Asia region, and how the Golden Triangle provide an excellent case of the challenge, as well as a demonstration of ASEAN's capability. Third, this paper then summarized previous ASEAN's effort in combating drug trafficking. Fourth, this paper finally analyzed ASEAN's ineffectiveness by pinpointing the lost element in ASEAN's effort as prescribed by security community framework. this paper argues that there is a lack of collective identity and community sense that become the underlying factor for this ineffectiveness. Therefore, this paper concludes the need of ideational shift to increase effectivity in ASEAN's effort.

METHODOLOGY

This research is explanatory research. This research seeks to analyze causality or causal relationship between variables in the research, namely the relations between ASEAN's identity as a security community and its ineffectiveness in combating transnational organized crime. This research, then, equipped a deductive-

qualitative paradigm by applying the theoretical framework of security community and identity in regionalism to the existing framework of transnational organized crime management within ASEAN. This research uses qualitative data from primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include official publications from ASEAN, while secondary data include surveys, analyses, books, and journal articles relevant to the topic.

ASEAN: (IMAGINARY) SECURITY COMMUNITY

In looking at the dynamics of the Southeast Asian region—and the emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), there are two prominent theoretical approaches. The first is systemic approach, proposed by Donald McCloud (1995 in Cipto 2007), which sees Southeast Asia from an external perspective, and sees this region as a subordinate part or subsystem of a wider global system. However, at the same time, McCloud himself explained that this perspective is quite weak and cannot be used, due to doubts about the ability of this perspective in explaining the internal dynamics of the Southeast Asian region, as well as the homogeneity of the sub-regions. sub-units in it to be put together as a single sub-section. Therefore, a second approach that is much more dominant and more frequently used in Southeast Asian studies emerged, namely the institutional approach, focusing on the process of peace institutionalization and war-risk-reduction proposed by Amitav Acharya (2001). This approach, according to Khoo (2004b) is an approach that comes from constructivism theory in International Relations, where Acharya (2001) is very visible focusing on the role of norms in the Southeast Asian region as the main standard of obligations and rights of countries. This concept, then, gave rise to the convergence of national interests on a regional basis, as well as the formation of a collective identity as a condition for the formation of a security community. Collins (2007) argued that the establishment of a security community, especially one like ASEAN, emerged as an effort to reduce and balance security dilemmas in a region.

Keliat (2004 Luhulima *et al.* 2008) argued that the establishment of a security community actually requires a very long road, because efforts are needed to undermine the beliefs of prominent realist thinkers when this approach emerges, which

states that norms, symbols, and the identity of togetherness can only be realized in national and not international order. Therefore, indeed, the establishment of the ASEAN community must involve a substantial change in the mentality of its member countries. The context of the security community, according to Acharya (2001), arises when there has been long-term peaceful interaction between countries in a region, which is supported by a rigid conflict resolution mechanism. This proposition was previously developed by Karl W. Deutsch (1957 in Luhulima *et al.* 2008) which defines a security community as “a group of people who are integrated at a point where there is a guarantee that members in the community will not fight physically, but will settle the dispute between them by other means”. However, according to Adler and Barnett (1998), this concept was actually introduced by Richard Van Wagenen in the 1950s. This perspective presents the security aspect of a regional integration, and is one of the prominent theories in regional studies along with Ernest Haas' Neofunctionalism approach (Acharya 2001).

Deutsch (in Adler and Barnett 1998) observes that there are two patterns of security communities, namely: (1) Amalgamated Security Community (ASC) which has been integrated into a single norm codified in law; (2) Pluralistic Security Community (PSC) which still has conformity in values, but actually still identifies as smaller units, but still strives to build a common identity. In other words, a plural security community will be formed when countries become integrated at a point where they have a sense of community. In measuring this sense of community, Deutsch (in Adler and Barnett, 1998) uses indicators in the form of transaction flows, in which the flow of information, communication, trade, and people are used as the main driving-force instruments in the integration of certain entities. ASEAN, then, according to several authors (Collins 2007; Khoo 2004a; Khoo 2004b; Tan, 2000) is an attempt to manifest the security community in Deutsch's view. But unfortunately, the progress has not been able to reach the various indicators that have been set. Acharya (1998) states that in a security community, the formation of a collective identity is an effort and a prerequisite for the emergence of an effective regional institution in carrying out its function as a medium for cooperation and conflict resolution. Acharya (1998) as one of the adherents of Neo-Deutschianism, bases this argument on the three levels of security community proposed by Deutsch *et al.* (1957 in Luhulima *et al.* 2008), namely: (1) the existence of factors accelerators of building a security community, such as

international cooperation, trade, and democracy; (2) the formation of mutual trust and collective identity; (3) socialization at the level of the political elite and the people in the integration effort. This basic, then, were further developed by another prominent Constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt (1999). Wendt argued that there are four main variables that become the foundation of a collective identity of a region, which become the core of a security community. The four variables are: (1) interdependence; (2) common perception; (3) homogenization; (4) principle of self-restraint.


ASEAN as a regional organization was established in 1967 through the Bangkok Declaration—in the context of the Cold War atmosphere in Southeast Asia and the world. Tan (2000) notes that initially, ASEAN consisted of only five countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. Previously, in 1961, there was an attempt to form a similar organization under the name of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), but this effort was crushed by the international conflict between the Philippines and Malaysia—two of the three ASA member countries along with Indonesia (Tan 2000). Confrontations based on the existence of territorial disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia also resulted in the failure of the establishment of the ASA (Ganesan 1995). The diversity of the political spectrum among Southeast Asian countries in the context of the Cold War also greatly influenced the difficulties of regional integration in the beginning. However, as Ganesan (1995) underlines, awareness began to emerge among Southeast Asian countries of the need for regional stability and security, starting with the end of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation in 1967 which also marked the beginning of the emergence of ASEAN. The failure of Maphilindo's cooperation which was initially the second attempt of the ASA also led to the formation of ASEAN. Initially, according to Ganesan (1995), ASEAN was formed as a form of institutionalization of Southeast Asian countries towards conflict resolution and management mechanisms. ASEAN member countries initially interpreted ASEAN in its capacity as a forum for communication, discussion, and arbitration to resolve problems in the Southeast Asian regional context (Tan 2000). This, for example, can be seen from how ASEAN is interpreted as an effort to stabilize various territorial disputes in the South China Sea that began to emerge in that era, as well as to become an extension of the arms of countries in resolving the Southeast Asian Cold War conflicts, such as the insurgency in Indonesia and Thailand, and the Vietnam War.

At the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia in October 2003, the ASEAN leaders in the ASEAN Declaration II or also known as the Bali Concord II agreed on the establishment of an ASEAN Community consisting of three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation (Luhulima *et al.* 2008). The ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as a manifestation of the first pillar then developed into the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) which is an effort to integrate the solution of increasingly integrated political and security challenges. APSC exists as an effort to establish political cooperation among Southeast Asian countries to resolve security challenges which according to Sukma are increasingly non-traditional and transnational. However, according to Morada (in Sukma 2012), the APSC framework itself is still very far below expectations, which is related to the instincts of ASEAN itself, the APSC still does not have the power to be a strong and effective security solution.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AS DRUG TRAFFICKING ARENA AND THE RISE OF 'GOLDEN TRIANGLE'

Alongside the massive industrialization that took place in the region towards the end of the Cold War period. This is because in achieving the level of effectiveness of illegal drug production that can provide economic benefits that are equal to the risks, it is necessary to have a large economic capital. While, as the previous data provided by UNODP (2019) in Map 1 shows that there has been a constant increase in drug trafficking in Southeast Asia, there are certain countries that stood out. While countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia are still fighting with drug trafficking, they become mere distribution hub for regional and international drug trafficking (Rifqi and Bangun, 2020). This is due to the fact that, as UNODC (2019) reported, most illegal drug trafficking in Southeast Asia is done through regular commerce distribution lines.


Map 1. Increase of Methamphetamine Foreclosure in ASEAN Member States, 2013-2018



Source: UNODC (2019)

On the other hand, countries in the Indo-China Peninsula seems to contrast against the aforementioned reality. Not only that these countries shown little national effort to combat illegal drug trafficking, they become home to massive drug production area. Most importantly, as underlined by Chin (2007) and Kramer (2017), Myanmar become the most prominent actor on this case. Both Chin and Chalk (2000) underlined how Myanmar has become one of world's largest opium and heroin production since the 1990s. Furthermore, two neighboring countries, Laos and Thailand, has also become a product of drug production proliferation. Together, the three countries are known as the 'Golden Triangle', although as underlined by Chin (2007), the triangle could be specified to a 388,5000 square kilometers of mountainous intersecting area between the three countries. This area accounts for 60-66% of world's illicit opium production in 1998, besides also being a production point for heroin and methamphetamine. This area is competing with the 'Golden Crescent'—located around West Asia with Afghanistan as its capital—as world's center of illicit drug center.

Graphic 1. Estimated Area under Opium Poppy Cultivation in Myanmar and Laos, 2013-2018



Source: UNODP (2019)

The local and national reasoning behind the emergence of the area as drug production point have been much researched before. Lyttleton (2004), for example, argued on how the centralized development pattern in the Indo-China countries affect peripheral communities in the border. The trend of crime in border area is, indeed, a high one in such developing regions. Furthermore, the colonial legacy that shaped Southeast Asian society as a production area for illicit commodities also contribute. Beside political factors contributing to this reality, a supporting geographical condition also possess challenge to national governance. The Golden Triangle is an area of "...isolated mountainous and heavily forested area overlapping the contiguous and outlying border areas of three countries..." (Chouvy 2013). Communities in this area, whom the drug criminals are mostly coming from, are also semi-nomadic, making law enforcement in the area even harder. Further challenge to drug trafficking in the region is also due to the fact that the criminals behind are organized (Chin, 2009). As noted by the report of UNODC (2019), most of the cases of drug trafficking in the region are rooted in massive drug trade syndicates. They created a transnational network of drug trafficking hubs that coordinated the trades. But as Lyttleton (2004) underlined, the ideational push for law enforcement in the countries aren't high either, just as low as the push for cooperation. This makes the hope for regional actions such as one from ASEAN emerge.

Map 2. Major Heroin and Crystalline Methamphetamine Trafficking Routes in Southeast Asia, 2016-2018



Source: UNODP (2019)

THE LONG WALK FOR NOTHING: ASEAN'S EFFORT IN COMBATING DRUG TRAFFICKING

Handling transnational crimes has been listed as one of the missions in the ASEAN Concord which was signed by the leaders of ASEAN member countries in 1976 (Kusumaningrum, 2013). This cooperation was then continued in 1996 through the first ASEAN Informal Summit in Jakarta which reviewed the increase in transnational crimes in the region. Southeast Asia. This then continued at the second ASEAN Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 which produced the ASEAN Vision 2020 document, and included the war on drugs (Sundram 1999). As a follow-up to the ideas at the head of state level in overcoming this transnational crime, a series of ASEAN ministerial meetings (AMM) were held to operationalize existing policies. Sundram (1999) underlines that there are several bodies that ASEAN uses in combating transnational crime. First, is the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) which focuses on formulating the main strategies in preventing transnational crime. Second, namely the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM) which carries out economic steps to stem transnational crime, and estimates the economic impact in relation to it. Third, namely the ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL) which focuses on harmonizing technical policies in operations to tackle transnational crime. Fourth, namely the ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) which focuses specifically on the illegal drug trade. In its development, there is one more significant framework in the area, namely ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD).

ASEAN started to focus on the drug trafficking issue in the late 1970s (Wibisono, 2017). However, for decades, the cooperative process lacked credible leadership and remained primarily

rhetorical as declarations and plans were not translated into action (Allison and Taylor, 2016). ASEAN Foreign Ministers acknowledge the urgency for closer coordinated and cooperative actions among ASEAN member states to fight the issue of drugs trafficking. In order to acknowledge this issue, they signed the Joint Declaration for Drug-Free ASEAN reinforcing ASEAN's commitment to eradicate and prevent the production, processing, distributing and use of illicit drugs in South East Asia by the year 2020 (Pushpanathan 1999). Further, at the 32nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in July 1999, the Foreign Ministers emphasized the need to intensify and strengthen ASEAN's regional capacity to implement drug control programmes with the assistance of relevant international bodies. Along with the assistance of relevant international bodies, there are also several ASEAN bodies who are involved, both directly or indirectly, in initiating activities and formulating policies against the issue of drug trafficking.

A. ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)

After several years of stagnation in ASEAN's performance in tackling transnational crime (Prameswaran 2017), the latest breakthrough issued by AMMTC occurred in 2017. This year, AMMTC produced the ASEAN Plan of Action in Combating Transnational Crime (ASEAN 2017), which has a vision to accelerate regional cooperation in realizing a Southeast Asia free from transnational crime. This ASEAN document (2017) also expands the definition of transnational crime which is formulated in ten priority areas of cooperation. First, namely terrorism. Second, the illegal drug trade. Third, human trafficking. Fourth, money laundering. Fifth, weapons smuggling. Sixth, piracy at sea. Seventh, international economic crimes, such as money laundering. Eighth, cybercrime. Ninth, people smuggling. Tenth, the smuggling of rare animals and illegal timber. However, as emphasized by Prameswaran, ASEAN's

lack of political integration creates ASEAN as a forum for coordination and joint movement, and not as a technical organization that operates directly in preventing these crimes. In addition, the pattern of international law within the ASEAN framework still gives jurisdiction to each country, causing the process of investigation and adjudication of transnational crimes to be returned to the country where the crime occurred, or through an extradition treaty.

B. ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM)

At their very first meeting on 1 March 1997 in Thailand, the AFM signed the ASEAN Agreement on Customs – apart from strengthening the ASEAN collaboration on customs activities with the target to strengthen cooperation on combating the issue of narcotics and psychotropic substances and will facilitate joint efforts in anti-smuggling and customs control (Pushpanathan 1999). According to the Article 7 (2) on 1997 ASEAN Agreement on Customs, it stated that Member States shall be encouraged to exchange vital information regarding the prevention and repression of smuggling, trafficking of narcotics and other psychotropic substance, and other Customs frauds (AGC 1997). Subject to the Paragraph 1 of this Article, ASEAN Customs authorities shall collaborate and cooperate among themselves in the conduct of investigation in regards of smuggling and other Customs frauds (AGC 1997).

C. ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL)

ASEANAPOL was established in 1979 aims to connect police forces of Southeast Asia nations in fighting transnational crimes (Vnanet 2019). ASEANPOL's collaboration and cooperation to fight cross-border crimes has significantly contributed in maintaining national and regional security, safety and social order. One of their main focuses is combating drug trafficking, especially on the issue of Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia. According to Vnanet (2019) ASEANPOL stated that "The golden triangle

which includes many ASEAN member countries remains a "hot spot" of opium growing and is emerging as a center for synthetic drug production in the world" (ASEANPOL in Vnanet 2019). In addition, ASEANPOL also makes various efforts in order to prevent narcotics and drugs trafficking, which include exchanging information between ASEANPOL members, establishing the ASEANPOL database system in order to facilitate the exchange of information, and conducting personnel exchanges and training among ASEAN police.

D. ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD)

ASOD was officially established in 1984 and initiatives on illicit drugs are based on the ASEAN Plan of Action on Drug Abuse Control, which was adopted at the 17th ASOD Meeting in October 1994 (Pushpanathan 1999). This Action Plan covers five priority areas, including; (1) preventive drug education; (2) treatment and rehabilitation; (3) law enforcement and legislation; (4) training and research; and (5) alternative development (ASEAN, n.d). Regarding preventive drug education and information, various workshop of drug education for teachers and curriculum designers and researches on preventive education have been conducted. In cooperative activities in law enforcement include the conduct of training programmes, the sharing of information concerning modus operandi, trends and routes of drugs trafficking, the exchange of law enforcement personnel, and many more. ASOD also have conducted regular exchanges of personnel involved in rehabilitation and treatment at the operational level (Pushpanathan 1999). Besides those five priority areas, ASOD mandate includes; (1) enhancing the implementation of the ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Drug and Narcotics; (2) consolidate and strengthen cooperation in the control and prevention of drugs issue in the region; (3) bring about the eventual eradication of narcotic plants cultivation in the region;

and (4) design, implement, monitor and evaluate ASEAN programmes or frameworks regarding drug issue (ASEAN 2003).

E. ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs

Wei Xiajun, deputy secretary-general of Chinese Narcotics Control Official stated that China will devote in a more active role and continue to reinforce the intelligence exchange and law enforcement cooperation with ASEAN Member States. At the 5th ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters, Xiaojun told ASEAN that China has always been closely cooperating with ASEAN Member States in the realm of drug control. He added that:

“At bilateral level, China maintains high level cooperation with almost all ASEAN countries in intelligence sharing, joint drug enforcement operations, personnel training and exchanges. In 2017, we organized law enforcement or forensic training courses for over 100 foreign drug enforcement officers from ASEAN countries” (Xiajun dalam Xinhua 2018).

Facing alarming transnational drugs crime, from this joint collaboration, China believes that ACCORD will play a more important role on the way forward in connecting China and ASEAN drug control cooperation and tackling regional drug issues. The ACCORD Plan of Action 2005-2010 is structured around four central pillars; (1) Civic Awareness; (2) Demand Reduction; (3) Law Enforcement; (4) Alternative Development (ACCORD 2005). With this framework, China has actively participated and contributed to its development. For instances, China has made 50,000 USD contribution every year since 2014 to ACCORD channelling through the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Center. The main objectives of the ACCORD are to monitor regional progress, strengthen regional coordination, and provide policy-level commitment in order to reach the goal of

“Drug Free ASEAN and China” by 2015 (UNODC 2009). However, it is too premature to classify ACCORD as a working regional regime. Refers to Krasner (1982) a regime is sets of implicit or explicit norms, principles, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations coverage in a given area of international relations. At the current stage, ACCORD does not include any specific principles of cooperation nor does it impose any standards of behaviour on participating states. Emmers (2007) mentioned that ACCORD is weakest when it comes to rules for action and decision-making procedures regarding policy implementation. The actions within the ACCORD framework is just primarily national and bilateral, involving slight implementation of collective choice. Emmers (2007) added that policy implementation at a collective and multilateral level has not yet been attained among the eleven participating states and much of the cooperation is still at an early stage and has fallen under the pillar of law enforcement.

Previous paragraphs have demonstrated that ASEAN has taken a bold step forward in order to combat, in a comprehensive manner regarding transnational crime, especially on the issue of drugs trafficking, with a view to neutralising and eradicating it. In order to contribute effectively, ASEAN needs to integrate and create collaborations between their bodies in the specific issue. However, from several bodies relating to the issue of drugs trafficking, from their mandate to their frameworks, it can be seen that there’s still the absence of compliance mechanism. The behaviour of the member states has not been constrained by ASEAN frameworks. No binding agreements have been sign and the adoption along with implementation of initiatives has remained firmly dependent on the member states. The consultative process, exchange vital information, transnational cooperation does not include the compliance mechanism that would

contribute to its inflict costs for non-cooperation.

THE MISSING BRIDGE: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

As a regional organization that is defined by its member states' interest and movement, there are two main approaches of cooperation in ASEAN framework. The first pattern is a top-down approach. This approach of cooperation is one pioneered by the institution itself. The pioneering usually started from an obvious common interest by member states, and often is formalized through important documents and declarations. However, in regards of the nature of the organization, which will be further discussed, such cooperation could not exist when there is a diverging interest. Therefore, the second pattern emerges, which is a bottom-up approach. In this approach, member states would often initiate a form of cooperation. This approach usually come forward when a certain issue is much concerned by some member states, while other member states have no opposing interest in the issue. Regardless, in both approaches, collective identity become a must in achieving cooperation enacted in a security community, either as a pre-existing condition or a precondition. As mentioned in the second section of this paper, there are four variables of collective identity as explained by Wendt (1999): interdependence, common perception, homogenization, and the principle of self-restraint.

The four elements above must be built in order to prescribe member states' behavior that are solid, as solidarity to a certain vision become the main driver of states' policy. In the case of a security community, the vision to establish a secure region from both traditional and non-traditional security threat should be the main consideration in states' behavior, even perhaps overriding self-centered national interest. In the words of Adler and Barnett (1998), the presence of collective identity

should shift the regional order from "logic of anarchy" to "logic of community". However, the status-quo of ASEAN's interaction is still defined by the former. As underlined by Allison-Reumann (2017), ASEAN member states' interaction are still defined by the fundamental norm of 'ASEAN way', which include the principles of: (1) non-interference, meaning restraining interference to other member states' domestic politics; (2) sovereignty, meaning respecting the boundaries and attitudes of each member states; (3) informality, meaning focusing on effectivity and negotiation; (4) consensus, as main principle of decision-making.

Checking on the aforementioned four variables, as also argued by Rosyidin (2017), only interdependence and self-restraint apparently exist in the case of ASEAN. The other two variables seem to be missing from ASEAN, in specific on its effort to combat drug trafficking. In one hand, ASEAN member states seems to have no common perception on what threat should be eliminated first. The main reason for the lack of common perception is the polarized understanding on member states' security issues priority. While some states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are much focused on eliminating non-traditional security threats such as illegal commerce, some states in the Indo-China Peninsula are still dealing with traditional security issues such as separatism and border conflicts. The peak of this evidence could be seen in the case of South China Sea conflict, in which states' have not yet agree on whether China's action in the region could be interpreted as a threat, and therefore also creating ineffectiveness for ASEAN in dealing with the conflict. These divergent priorities would shape different and overlapping agendas in the regional framework and caused ineffectiveness. Furthermore, the different priorities would shape different national policies, which in turn could hinder bilateral or multilateral cooperation as it is based on shared interest. Another evidence is on how there has been a clear lack of rigid mechanism in

previous ASEAN efforts, mainly in the case AMMTC and ACCORD, showing a lack of willingness from member states to establish and engage in a sustainable framework.

On the other hand, there has been an illusion of homogeneity that is being imagined in the ASEAN. In this case, Wendt (1999) would define homogeneity as shared intrinsic elements—which could be values, belief or experiences—between states. While ASEAN have promoted a series of values that are claimed to be shared by all of its member states, such as democracy, good governance, and respect to human rights, the nationalistic notion in ASEAN member states is much stronger. While the states in the region might be tied around the same post-colonial experience, that is pretty much about it. As norms and regular pattern of behaviors in the region are built upon this individualistic notion, differences are being acknowledged instead of converged, ultimately building on the previously mentioned 'ASEAN way' norm. ASEAN member states still diverge in democratic level with no sign of democratic capacity-building intended. There have been traces of human rights violations in states like Myanmar and Cambodia, yet ASEAN have failed to act. Therefore, the different responses and levels of enthusiasm of member states in combating drug trafficking, as discussed in the previous section, is bound to happen.

Last but not least, not only that ASEAN member states lack of collective identity, but also sense of community. The idea about community sense correlates with the idea of a shared regional vision, in which member states' might override their national interest and even identity to achieve a bigger, broader goal. By having one, the prescription for member states' behavior should have been a prioritization towards common agendas instead of national ones. Rather, ASEAN member states, specifically seen in the case of drug trafficking, take an individualist business approach to foreign policy. This is most

prominently shown in the case of ACCORD, as China's leadership which was driven by economic and geopolitical interest in the region has shown to be a successful intervening variable (Harper and Tempra 2019). However, this also shows the opportunistic side of some member states, specially relating to those in the Golden Triangle area.

CONCLUSION

THE NEED FOR IDEATIONAL SHIFT

This paper concludes that the main reason behind ASEAN's ineffectiveness in combating illicit drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle area is the lack of collective identity and community sense. This is due to the underlying nationalistic notion that is still being upheld and glorified in the ASEAN environment, and therefore become a restraint towards a community-building. In the framework of ASEAN, which pertain to what it is famous for, diversity of identity and interest is being immortalized with little means to converge it. This would impact on ASEAN's functionality as an organization, in which its success would only be as restrained to the big, communal issue every member state could agree on. On the other hand, specific issues which draws little to no attention and interest from member states such as transnational organized crimes could not be handled effectively. This worsen when there are overlapping interest between member states and majority vision in the regional framework.

To build a resilient security community, therefore, this paper prescribed the continuation of Constructivist prescriptions of ideational shift. The logic of anarchy that has always become the path-dependency in ASEAN's day-to-day

business could only be changed should there be a shift of ideas in the domestic politics of its member states. The conception of ASEAN as a 'community', as this paper have discussed, is no more than mere imagination of past history. ASEAN is stuck in the post-colonial/Cold War nostalgia of daylight-clear security threat, while refusing to acknowledge the fog of non-traditional security threats. The idea that ASEAN member states could be united is redundant these days. Rather, the states should focus on how it is united despite the shift of major security threat. The case of drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle, at the end of the day, have shown the urgency for building a regional collective identity should ASEAN wishes to move on from the nostalgia, and achieve the communal vision of prosperity and security it often glorifies.

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